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Abstract 
 
After the fall of Rome, how did the work and words of the ancient Greek 
philosophers make their way, textually and intellectually, into later European 
thought? There were two primary and obvious paths that this Greek literature could 
have taken to reach medieval Europe after the split of the Roman Empire into east 
and west sectors, but these two potential paths functionally became, instead, dual 
roadblocks to its transmission. In the western portion of the former Roman Empire, 
there was an overwhelming passive indifference to Greek philosophy coupled with a 
decline of culture generally in Western Europe during the so-called Dark Ages. In the 
eastern portion of the former Roman Empire, the attitude toward Greek philosophy 
was tempered by the imperial authority of Constantinople and eastern Christianity, 
and ranged from cautious acceptance to occasionally active censorship.  
 In response to the research question, here is my thesis: The Islamic Empire of 
the Middle Ages was the primary and indispensable force behind the preservation, 
transmission and acceptance of the Greek philosophical tradition to later European 
thinking. I will contend that without the influence of Muslim scholars during the 
medieval period, the foundational impact of Greek philosophy on later Western 
philosophy (including specifically, Western sources of educational philosophy) may 
have been greatly reduced (or potentially lost), used differently, and/or forced to find 
other sources of transmittal.  
 vii 
My research will pursue the historical connections between classical Greece 
and pre-Renaissance Europe on three interrelated levels—textual, philosophical, and 
cultural. First, I will examine the textual transmission of specific works by Plato and 
Aristotle, looking at the translation and transmission work done over time and 
through several language and cultural groups. Second, I will seek to find how the 
ideas of Plato and Aristotle were used and transmitted, moving from text to 
philosophical patterns of thinking. Third, I will look more broadly at the acceptance 
of philosophical inquiry and the development of critical thinking within culture itself, 
in Greek, Arabic, and Latin settings, to see how the often competing ideas of faith and 
reason play out over the course of our historical framework.  
 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 This research project begins with an important philosophical and educational 
assertion: We who claim lineage in the Western philosophical tradition have one 
common and indisputable foundation from which we view ourselves and our ideas, 
namely, that of the early Greek thinkers. Alfred North Whitehead, the noted 
twentieth-century philosopher, made the now famous comment, “The safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series 
of footnotes to Plato.”
1
 Certainly, Whitehead is not proposing that everyone in the 
West agrees with Plato’s scheme of thought, or that we all are in some fashion 
idealists. But he does mean to say that Western philosophy and education are 
indebted to the ancient Greeks for their wealth of ideas and for their disciplined 
inquiry into these ideas, particularly Plato and his able student Aristotle. Charles 
Freeman restates Whitehead’s basic thesis by asserting that, “the Greeks provided the 
chromosomes of Western civilization.”
2
 He goes on to state that “Greek ways of 
exploring the cosmos, defining the problems of knowledge . . . creating the language 
in which such problems are explored, representing the physical world and human 
society in the arts, defining the nature of value, describing the past, still underlie the 
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2
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 2 
Western cultural tradition.”
3
 More to the point of this dissertation, Sheila Dunn 
observes, “It was during this early period . . . that Western educational thought and 
theory had its beginnings . . . Fundamental issues between these two Greek 
philosophers have continued to shape contemporary education throughout the 
centuries.”
4
 From this shared starting point of the ancient Greeks, Western thought, 
along with its most common mode of transmission—education—has evolved into the 
many modern philosophical branches that are known and studied today. Indeed, 
Bernard Williams clearly states, “the legacy of Greece to Western philosophy is 
Western philosophy.”
5
 
 
1.1 The Research Question 
 To simply state that the Greeks supply the cornerstone to Western thinking is 
certainly to state the obvious. So I will move on to state what is not obvious: The path 
that the early Greek writings and ideas took in finding their way into later European 
thought is far more complicated and far less direct than many sources on the history 
of philosophy describe. Carol Thomas makes a similar point when she states, “The 
extent of our debt to ancient Greece is clear, but specific links between past and 
present are more indistinct; the line of transmission has not been straight and single.”
6
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To take for granted and without reflection that the philosophical giants, Plato and 
Aristotle (and Greek modes of thinking in general), are part of the West’s intellectual 
background is to miss an important and equally fundamental part of our historical 
development. What I will attempt to show in this dissertation is that the transmission 
of the Greek philosophers to Western Europe happened in a rather haphazard way and 
that this transmission was aided by a most unlikely source, the Islamic Empire of the 
Middle Ages. What I want to do is objectively unpack the history of Western 
philosophy in such a way that those of us who depend on its foundation will 
understand how and why that foundation exists in the first place.    
 Here, then, is my research question: After the fall of Rome, how did the work 
and words of the ancient Greek philosophers make their way, textually and 
intellectually, into later European thought? The Roman Empire was the first post-
Greek culture to inherit the wisdom of the Greek philosophers. But when the Roman 
Empire collapsed in the West due to the invasion of barbarian armies, the status of 
Greek philosophy was at the mercy of the Mediterranean basin’s complex and chaotic 
next chapter in history. There were two primary and obvious paths that this Greek 
literature could have taken to reach medieval Europe after the split of the Roman 
Empire into east and west sectors, but these two potential paths functionally became, 
instead, dual roadblocks to its transmission. In the western portion of the former 
Roman Empire there was an overwhelming passive indifference to Greek philosophy 
coupled with a decline of culture generally in Western Europe during the so-called 
Dark Ages. Greek philosophy was, for all practical purposes, ignored and/or forgotten 
 4 
in the West. In the eastern portion of the former Roman Empire, the attitude toward 
Greek philosophy was tempered by the imperial authority of Constantinople and 
eastern Christianity, and ranged from cautious acceptance to occasionally active 
censorship. More importantly, even though Greek thought survived in some form in 
the East, the Byzantine Empire (the name given to the later eastern portion of the 
Roman Empire) became increasingly isolated from Europe due to differences in 
theological and authority priorities while at the same time becoming more internally-
tuned due to concerns over leadership and survival. Greek philosophy was, in effect, 
blocked from readily entering Europe from the East, even if the West had the 
intellectual desire for such stimulation at this time.  
 Many avenues of inquiry could be followed that would provide partial 
answers to this question. To keep a sense of manageability to this research plan, I will 
focus on one continuous thread in the tapestry of contending ideas that could be 
explored. Here is that guiding thread, in the form of a thesis statement that gives a 
potential answer to the research question stated above: The Islamic Empire of the 
Middle Ages was the primary and indispensable force behind the preservation, 
transmission and acceptance of the Greek philosophical tradition to later European 
thinking. I will contend that without the active influence of Muslim scholars during 
the medieval period, the foundational impact of the Greek philosophical triumvirate 
of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on later Western philosophy (including specifically 
for purposes of this research, Western sources of educational philosophy) may have 
been greatly reduced (or potentially lost), used differently, and/or forced to find other 
 5 
sources of transmittal. The role played by Islamic translators and scholars during the 
Middle Ages provided a central catalyst for not only the Aristotelian revolution of the 
twelfth century but for the Renaissance of the fourteenth-seventeenth centuries that 
concretely changed the direction of Europe and Western society.  
This thesis presents a research-based re-understanding of the course of 
Western philosophy and education with important ramifications not only about how 
we in the West gained access to the Greek philosophical tradition but indeed about 
what the essence of that tradition is itself. This research will allow us to explore not 
only an interesting and often overlooked historical period but more importantly it will 
force us to reexamine what it means to be part of the Western intellectual schema. We 
will see that our so-called Western tradition takes an unexpected turn to the East. 
More than just manuscripts being preserved in a non-Western language (namely, 
Arabic) until Latin translators discovered them, the entire scope of Western 
educational philosophy moves through and is in some way transformed by Eastern 
culture, represented by the medieval Islamic Empire. If this research was solely 
confined to textual transmission, while being significant in its own right, the larger 
implications for Western thought might be minimized. My research will thus pursue 
the historical connections between classical Greece and pre-Renaissance Europe on 
three interrelated levels—textual, philosophical, and cultural. First, I will examine the 
textual transmission of specific works by Plato and Aristotle, looking objectively at 
the translation and transmission work done over time and through several language 
and cultural groups. Second, I will seek to find how the ideas of Plato and Aristotle 
 6 
were used and transmitted, moving from text to philosophical patterns of thinking. 
We will see that Platonism and Aristotelianism exhibit a definable ebb and flow as 
first one then the other finds prominence in the Hellenistic and Early Medieval 
periods. Third, I will look more broadly at the acceptance of philosophical inquiry 
and the development of critical thinking within culture itself, in Greek, Arabic, and 
Latin settings, to see how the often competing ideas of faith and reason play out over 
the course of our historical framework. It is important to see the close connections 
between these three levels of inquiry, and, in my mind, their inseparability. For 
example, simply having access to a particular text from Aristotle does not necessarily 
imply an understanding of Aristotle’s philosophical system nor an acceptance of 
philosophical inquiry in general. In fact, quite the opposite can be (and at times was) 
true.
7
 So my investigation will be multi-tiered in order to tease out the true path of the 
Greek tradition rather than being satisfied with tracking manuscript libraries alone. 
Here lies the most significant part of this dissertation—its topic and its 
rationale. The research question and its accompanying thesis are the heart and soul of 
this project. For while I hope to uncover pertinent research related to this question 
and thesis, the real strength of this and any scholarly work is to prod its readers to 
ponder for themselves the legitimacy and significance of the topic in and of itself; that 
there is indeed a legitimate question to be analyzed. If this dissertation takes the 
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 For example, we will see that the Byzantines held many of the Greek philosophical manuscripts 
but they always interpreted this classical tradition in ways that placed it in a subservient position to the 
theology of Christianity, thus making Byzantium a poor conduit through which Greek philosophy 
could make its way freely and holistically to Europe, even if communication opportunities between 
East and West were easily accessible, which they were not. 
  
 7 
reader further down its specific paths of inquiry, that will of course be satisfactory 
and satisfying. However, more importantly, if the research question itself prompts the 
reader to entertain new and perhaps surprising ideas
8
 and fresh approaches to old 
patterns of thought, then we will all have profited to a much larger degree by allowing 
ourselves to examine our Western historical and philosophical foundations and 
presuppositions with a fresh set of lenses. There is a presupposition among most 
Westerners that the Greek philosophical tradition has been naturally and uniquely 
bequeathed to them, and perhaps to them alone. However, as I have hinted at already 
and will demonstrate later, the direct connection between the early Greek thinkers and 
the later European Renaissance is not a simple connection and could legitimately be 
said to be an accident of history. Our Western minds take the Greek foundation as our 
rightful and necessary heritage when in fact its transmittal to the West was quite 
haphazard and involved historical players outside the Western purview who seldom 
are acknowledged as part of our intellectual heritage. If my research question allows 
our Western minds to step outside the deep ruts of conventional philosophical and 
educational history long enough to “connect the historical dots” between ancient 
Greece and medieval Europe and to see the important path these dots create, then the 
first and primary goal of this dissertation has been accomplished. Perhaps in the 
                                                           
     
8
 That surprise might be one result of following this particular line of research is corroborated by 
the work of Richard E. Rubenstein, who has done recent work on a parallel topic to my dissertation: 
Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and 
Illuminated the Middle Ages (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc, 2003). The author provides the following 
narrative in his preface regarding the Aristotelian Revolution of the twelfth century: “The story itself 
was the first surprise. What most astonished me was how little known it was, considering its high level 
of dramatic interest and great historical importance. The Aristotelian Revolution transformed Western 
thinking and set our culture on a path of scientific inquiry that it has followed ever since the Middle 
Ages . . . One could hardly imagine a more pertinent story for modern readers, yet few people outside a 
small circle of academic specialists seemed to know anything about it. Ibid., ix-x. 
 8 
process of allowing this question to play across our minds, we will be better prepared 
to more fully understand what the Western philosophical/educational tradition entails, 
adding a richness of diversity to our often monotone view of how Greek thinking 
became Western thinking.  
 Any history of the Middle Ages will note the impact, to a greater or lesser 
degree, of the Islamic Empire on Europe.
9
 Many have discussed the connection 
between the Greek classics and their reintroduction into Western European culture 
and thinking. “As in science, so in philosophy, the Muslim and Jewish thinkers were 
the great bridge between antiquity and the ‘Renaissance of the Twelfth Century’ [in 
Europe].”
 10
 However, this connection seems to be understated and underappreciated 
in the general course of understanding Western development, especially in the arena 
of philosophy in general and philosophy of education specifically. In the course of 
this examination, I will argue that what is defined as Western Civilization has 
important philosophical cousins that have too long been ignored. On the other hand, 
while it will be easy to show a lack of appreciation for the influence of Islamic culture 
in the development of Western Europe, it is also possible to overestimate this 
influence. So then, in this dissertation, I will strive for balance, as reflected in this 
observation:  
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 To a greater degree, see for example Montgomery W. Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval 
Europe, Islamic Studies 9 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1972); to a lesser degree, see for 
example, William Turner, “Arabian School of Philosophy,” in the New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, 
copyrighted 2003 by K. Knight, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01674c.htm>, accessed July 10, 
2006.  
  
     
10
 Frederick B. Artz, The Mind of the Middle Ages: An Historical Survey A.D. 200-1500, 3
rd
 ed., 
rev. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 163. 
 
 9 
 It [Islam] would so critically shape medieval society from the eleventh 
 century that one historian has even described Islam as the force in the 
 “awakening” of Europe with “the prince, a speaker of Arabic, bestowing the 
 kiss of delivery from centuries of deep sleep.” We will not go so far, but there 
 is no doubt that medieval Europe was much challenged and enriched by its
 Islamic neighbors.
 11
 
 
 I will try to show that elements of the Middle Eastern mindset are not as far 
removed from the Western mindset as history and current events tend to characterize 
and that these two cultural centers have found common ground in centuries past.
12
 
Perhaps the very definition of what we call “Western” Civilization will have to be 
reexamined in light of the emerging historical roots and diverse background that will 
be highlighted in this study. To what exactly does the adjective, “Western” refer? A 
geographical location? A philosophical tradition? A cultural linkage? A shared 
mindset?  
 There is no desire or ability on my part to retell the entire story of Western 
philosophy—that has been done quite well by many others. But I do have a desire to 
uncover one of the roots of the Western mindset that has often only been partly 
understood and partially described. For, while the Greek philosophers were well 
entrenched and appreciated in the thinking of the early Hellenistic period and in the 
following period of the Roman Empire, after the fall of Rome in the fifth century we 
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 C. Warren Hollister and Judith M. Bennett, Medieval Europe: A Short History, 9
th
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12
 “Middle Eastern” thought could refer not only to Islam but to other religious/philosophical 
systems from this geographical region—systems such as Judaism, Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism. It 
is easily acknowledged that Judaism is directly linked, especially as it is tied to the foundations of 
Christianity, to Western thought, but this dissertation will concentrate on another of the Middle Eastern 
voices, Islam, not usually connected to Western development. Chapter 2 will further define 
connections that existed between West and East (Middle East) from ancient times. 
 
 10 
begin to see a change in attitude toward the classical Greek thinkers and how 
philosophy was understood and taught. I will explore the path of the early Greek 
works during the time period known in Europe as the Dark Ages
13
 or early Middle 
Ages. Here we will see that Plato and Aristotle were not always held in the high 
regard we find them today. The full use of these early philosophers by people of that 
time and the future transmission of their ideas to modern generations were, in a very 
real sense, in jeopardy during this period. This dissertation will endeavor to show 
how the Greek philosophical tradition was maintained and even expanded through 
these critical years, finally finding a safe haven in the medieval universities of 
Europe’s Scholastic era, circa 1100–1500, from which the Western intellectual 
tradition rapidly expanded.
14
  
 
1.2  The Interplay between Philosophy and Education 
 My dissertation ultimately centers on the history of education and how we 
have come to understand philosophy of education in Western thinking. But as the 
reader has already seen, I am quite freely using “philosophy” as the entry door into 
this discussion about education. What then is the relationship between the key 
elements of education and philosophy? They are clearly not identical but they 
certainly bear a close, overlapping relationship, one that I desire to make clear from 
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 This particular term is falling out of general use by scholars as this period of time has been 
reexamined in light of cultural and archeological discoveries. I will explain how historians generally 
define the “middle” epoch of European history later in the dissertation and will comment on why the 
phrase “the Dark Ages” is misleading.  
 
     
14
 Appendix J shows in graphic form the direction and purpose of my dissertation.   
 11 
the beginning. Because my research will often use the word “philosophy,” it is 
important that the reader hears at least an echo of the word “education” whenever the 
word “philosophy” is used.  
 An appropriate beginning point for this kind of connection, and a mandatory 
discussion before I move further with the research question, must proceed from a 
careful definition of what I mean by the word “education.” For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will use a definition that is quite broad. The work of historian Lawrence 
Cremin is a natural source to investigate a broad definition of education, and to his 
widely recognized description I now turn:  
 I have conceived of education in this essay as the deliberate, systematic, and 
 sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, 
 skills, or sensibilities,  and any learning that results from the effort, direct or 
 indirect, intended or unintended. This definition obviously projects inquiry 
 beyond the schools and colleges to a host of  individuals and institutions that 
 educate—parents, peers, siblings, and friends, as well as families, churches, 
 synagogues, libraries, museums, settlement houses, and factories. And it 
 clearly focuses attention on the relationships among the several educative 
 institutions and on the effects of one institution's efforts on those of another. 
 What is needed most for a sound historical understanding of these 
 relationships—or linkages, as I have called them here—is a variety of 
 investigations that study them in their own right, with explicit educational 
 questions uppermost in mind.
15
 
 
 Although Cremin’s definition of education was created in the context of his 
study of early American education specifically, his classification of educational 
relationships has been and will be applied here to education generally. His definition 
reminds us that education has connections that go far beyond formal schooling and 
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 Lawrence Cremin, “Family-Community Linkages in American Education: Some Comments on 
the Recent Historiography,” in Families and Communities as Educators, ed. Hope Leichter (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 1978), 567, first published in Teachers College Record 76 (December 
1974): 250-265. 
 12 
even beyond intentional learning. Cremin emphasizes that education must be defined 
latitudinally, that is, education encompasses the breath of human society’s structures 
and relationships. It is these lateral linkages, studied “in their own light, with explicit 
educational questions uppermost in mind,” that I will endeavor to analyze as I review 
the path that Western foundational philosophers took to arrive in Europe and become 
the building blocks of Western thought. 
 While Cremin casts the education net widely, he is hesitant to equate it simply 
with the transfer of culture generally. “It [Cremin’s own definition of education] sees 
education as a process more limited than what the sociologist would call socialization 
or the anthropologist enculturation, though obviously inclusive of many of the same 
phenomena.”
16
 But he is not far from another highly regarded American historian’s  
definition of education: “The entire process by which culture transmits itself across 
the generations.”
17
 Bernard Bailyn’s definition helps us build from Cremin’s work in 
two ways. First, we see clearly that education and culture are closely linked; agency 
(education) and content (culture) are mutually dependent on each other. Second, 
Bailyn’s definition of education is not limited to activity contemporaneous with a 
                                                           
     
16
 Lawrence Cremin, Public Education (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 27. 
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 Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1960), 14. That Cremin is in basic agreement with Bailyn’s view is seen in Cremin’s 
own review of John Dewey’s work. “The most notable distinction between living beings and inanimate 
things, he tells us [Dewey in Democracy and Education], is that living beings maintain themselves by 
renewal. Among human beings, that renewal takes place through a process of cultural transmission, 
which Dewey refers to as ‘education in its broadest sense.’ Education in its broadest sense is a process 
that is continuous, ubiquitous, pervasive, and all-powerful—indeed, so powerful that Dewey draws the 
moral that the only way in which adults can consciously control the kind of education children get is 
by controlling the environment in which they act, think, and feel.” Cremin goes on to note Dewey’s 
perception of a wider definition of education but chides him for his lack of linking it in practical terms 
to non-school events, perhaps artificially creating a dualism between school and society, something 
Dewey himself would vigorously oppose. Lawrence Cremin, “Public Education and the Education of 
the Public,” Teachers College Record 77 (1975): 1-12. 
 13 
stated observer but assumes continuity and influence “across the generations.” Here 
the definition of education takes on another dimension, one that significantly clarifies 
Cremin’s position. While Cremin emphasizes a latitudinal (or breadth) view of 
educational sources and activities, Bailyn emphasizes the longitudinal (or depth) 
dimension by bringing in the historical aspect of educational transmission. Another 
American historian, Ray Hiner, offers his definition of education, a derivative of 
Cremin’s and Bailyn’s, succinctly reinforcing both the needed educational 
dimensions I have just highlighted: “The entire process by which humans develop a 
sense of self, formulate their identities, learn the ways of their society so they can 
function within it, and transmit their culture from generation to generation.”
18
 
According to Hiner, this kind of definition is mandatory for current and coherent 
educational research. “We need to . . . develop an epistemologically comprehensive 
definition of education if we hope to exploit the great potential of the history of 
education to contribute to human understanding.”
19
 
 With these definitions in mind, it is clear that education is, at its heart, a 
historical endeavor. Education proceeds through time as families, agencies, and 
societies pass on to the next generation its skills, ideas and values. An understanding 
of these “linkages,” as Cremin calls them, both historical and present, is essential to a 
study of educational foundations and to my particular investigation into Western 
education. Understanding the fact that education is a broadly conceived topic with a 
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 N. Ray Hiner, “History of Education for the 1990s and Beyond,” History of Education Quarterly 
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 14 
multiplicity of linkages—some obvious, many others not—will help legitimize the 
wide scope of the present project and will present the reader with a common and 
coherent beginning and ending point for my analysis—namely, that this analysis 
begins and ends with a focus on education in the Western tradition. While this project 
will stray at times from direct educational commentary, these definition anchor points 
will provide the necessary boundary lines for this investigation. 
 In light of the foregoing broad definitions of education, when I talk about 
philosophy, I will also be talking in some way about education. Here, finally, is my 
own working definition of education that I will use for this dissertation: Education 
includes (but is not encompassed by)
20
 the process of transmitting a group’s 
worldview latitudinally to its constituents and others outside the group over which 
there is influence and longitudinally to succeeding generations from preceding 
generations. “Worldview” refers simply to the three key questions of philosophical 
inquiry: What is real? (Metaphysics), How do we know? (Epistemology), What do we 
value? (Axiology). A worldview can ask questions beyond these three, but it must ask 
at least these three. Wrapped up in these questions, we see that philosophy is actually 
composed of two related elements. Philosophy is both activity and a body of content, 
both a set of “thinking tools” and an accepted set of presuppositions and 
                                                           
     
20
 Education certainly does more than transmit a group’s worldview; collected data and information 
about the world and perfected hands-on skills provide the basic material of educational curricula. But 
in a real way, both information and skills are subsets of a worldview and of the priorities presented 
within that worldview. See my discussion later on Eisner’s definition of normative education. 
 
 15 
conclusions.
21
 Education is the agent for transmitting a group’s worldview, or 
philosophical tools and content, to that group’s sphere of influence. 
 It is interesting that most philosophy of education textbooks examine a variety 
of individuals who were, in their respective lifetimes, both philosophers and 
educators. However, many personalities studied in the course of philosophy of 
education would likely be considered primarily philosophers and secondarily as 
educators, if we were forced to label them. The following names come easily to mind 
and many more could be added: Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Descartes, 
Calvin, Kant, Dewey, Rorty. These people were all philosophers and to a greater or 
lesser degree also wrote about how their philosophy impacted the educational realm. 
Dunn would go so far as to say, “With rare exceptions a philosophy of education is by 
no means built into the philosophical positions of Western thinkers . . . Nonetheless, 
thoughts that are applicable to . . . education can be found with relative ease in the 
works of Western philosophers.”
22
 That is why a philosophy of education course 
cannot help but be a course in philosophy itself to some extent; the two subjects—
education and philosophy—heavily overlap each other. If we describe . . .  
 . . . education as a deliberate process that has a desired goal . . . then educators 
 must have some basis for arriving at a conception of that goal. Concern with a 
 goal presupposes a world view or a philosophical viewpoint that involves a set 
 of beliefs in the nature of reality, the essence of truth, and a basis for forming 
 values . . . concepts of reality, truth, and value are the “stuff” of philosophy. 
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 Philosophy, therefore, is a basic constituent in the foundation of educational 
 practice.
23
  
 
 If my definition of education holds any weight, then we can see philosophy as 
the intellectual tools and content a society claims as valid and valuable, and education 
as the means of transmitting these tools and content. This is where the topic of 
philosophy of education and the individual categories of philosophy and education 
can get quite muddied and understandably so. For when we ask, for example, “What 
is the ‘end’ of education?” we must also ask, “What is the ‘end’ of human endeavor 
and speculation?” Mary-Lou Breitborde and Louise Swiniarski clearly observe: “We 
believe that before educators can fashion a picture of the ideally educated person, 
they must first examine their fundamental beliefs about reality, truth, value, power, 
and authority. Once educators formulate these beliefs, they can make school and 
classroom decisions that are coherent.”
24
 Leonard Waks restates my premise in the 
form of four key questions: “1. How does this field [philosophy of education] relate 
to the parent discipline, philosophy? 2. How does it relate to educational policy and 
the direction of educational practice? 3. How does it relate to the concerns of the 
‘educated person in rapidly changing contemporary society’? 4. Is there any value in 
narrowly intellectual work in this field, or must it all be ‘relevant’?”
25
 Waks goes on 
to remind us that “philosophical thinking is not the isolated production of a free-
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standing product or the isolated inquiry with a free-standing result. Rather, it always 
has a relational context . . . consisting of a series of conversations.”
26
 Waks’ 
comments reinforce the idea that philosophy and education must stand in close 
relation to one another for either to fulfill its responsibilities. 
 The reason I am developing this definition of education that closely reflects its 
philosophical connections is due to the topic matter of this dissertation. While I will  
follow the development of Western philosophical tradition, this research must at the 
same time track key educational concerns in the Western tradition. Philosophy and 
education cannot be separated because they are in reality the two sides of one coin. 
What a group believes, it will also transmit. 
 Elliot Eisner’s seminal work in curriculum design will provide a theoretical 
framework for this part of my discussion and definition of education, helping further 
connect the arenas of philosophy and education, and how they will be viewed in this 
research. Eisner carefully differentiates between normative and descriptive theories of 
education. A normative theory of education places emphasis on subjectivity and on 
perceived value.  
 Education itself is a normative enterprise—that is, it is concerned with the 
 realization of aims that are considered worthwhile. Thus, educational 
 activities are not simply concerned with learning, because what a person 
 learns might have negative consequences for his or her development. What 
 makes experience educational is its participation in a set of values. To the 
 extent to which those experiences participate in those values, they are 
 educational.
27
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 In contrast, a descriptive theory of education emphasizes objectivity and a set 
of generalized and accepted conclusions. Descriptive theory obviously finds a home 
in the natural and social sciences where predictability and “fact” are given highest 
status. While both of these theories work together in a dialectical interchange in most 
educative settings, Eisner correctly points out that normative theory pervades and, in 
a very real sense, supersedes descriptive theory . . .  
 . . . because the methods of inquiry we choose and the criteria we choose to 
 apply to test truth . . . reflect beliefs about the nature of knowledge. These 
 beliefs are basically value judgments. Those embracing a different conception 
 of knowledge will employ different methods of inquiry and may therefore 
 come to different conclusions about the world. In short, epistemological 
 commitments reflect a set of values.
28
    
 
 As Eisner notes, education is never simply an objective transmission process; 
there is always a filtering process that occurs that is connected to a group’s 
subjectively-tuned worldview. What a society perceives as important, valuable, and 
foundational will in turn focus what that society will investigate, prioritize, and 
transmit to its constituents.  
 Eisner’s identification of the overriding influence of normative educational 
theory leads me to conclude this important discussion on the relationship between 
philosophy and education with one last necessary comment. As I develop the pathway 
that the early Greek philosophers took to arrive in medieval Europe and to Western 
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thought in general, I will be relying on a key educational proposition: the process of 
education is always determined to some extent by contextual (i.e., historical) 
parameters. While any given philosopher/educator will have certain personal beliefs 
and priorities regarding how education should function in society (what might be 
called the internal dimension of an individual’s educational philosophy), that person 
will also have a particular and unique historical content in which he or she must 
function and by which he or she is necessarily influenced (what might be called the 
external dimension of an individual’s educational philosophy). It is this historical 
context that forms the normative experience out of which any particular writer or 
thinker works, either arguing for or (more often) against the general educational 
philosophical views in which he or she is immersed by virtue of being a member of a 
particular time-bound society. 
 The key to a successful venture into a study of the foundations of education is 
to read and to find meaning and relationships in the primary texts of these writers. 
Secondary texts can certainly be used with great profit, but the greatest potential for 
personal growth is a concerted effort to wrestle with the primary documents, allowing 
the original writers to speak for themselves without the filter of biased interpreters. 
The problem with reading primary texts is that a full understanding of the writer’s 
external circumstances must precede one’s reading, otherwise we are prone to take a 
writer’s ideas out of context, to see a writer’s views as meaningless in our current 
historical situation and/or try to apply a writer’s principles anachronistically, 
temptations succumbed to by many.  
 20 
 “The apparent ease with which children learn is their ruin.” This quote from 
Rousseau begins the chapter of a book on my desk, like so many books today, in 
hopes of motivating the reader by way of fascination and intrigue to move further into 
the coming chapter. We are a “quote-unquote” society, where any phrase from any 
recognized author can be picked out of the air to definitively defend any given point. 
This penchant toward using divorced-from-context quotes as a means to deliver and 
seal our arguments is an interesting breed of pseudo-intellectualism that has important 
implications for our reading of educational philosophy.
29
 Take, for instance, the quote 
above. Without knowing something of the context in which Rousseau lived and 
wrote, his quote can be interpreted in one of several ways, but only one of which 
Rousseau intended. Does Rousseau intend to say that children are naïve and need to 
be protected from unwanted educational influences? Or does he intend to indicate that 
education for children needs to move from an environment of ease to one of rigor and 
discipline so they can avoid ruin? Or does Rousseau think that the point of educating 
children is beyond hope and the road to ruin for children is inevitable? Only by 
understanding Rousseau’s world can we begin to understand Rousseau’s words. 
Understanding context is not just reserved for isolated quotes. Whenever we 
open a primary text, before we ever read a word, it is imperative that the historical 
situation of the writer be acknowledged and generally identified. No writer ever 
composed a piece of writing in a vacuum; the surrounding culture of the time dictates 
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far more than readers often realize. Our tendency when reading texts, both recent and 
ancient, is to read them from our own perspective, to read into the text our 
contextualized situation. When we do this, we make the text into something it was 
never intended to be, namely, a commentary about us and our times. As Martha 
Nussbaum has noted, “There are no surer sources of disdain than ignorance and the 
sense of the inevitable naturalness of one’s own way.”
30
 In order to understand what a 
text might have to offer us today, we must first do the more difficult work of 
understanding what the text meant to its original readers. This two-step plan—what 
did it mean; what does it mean—helps us avoid the relativism and subjectivism 
inherent in our ethnocentric and “present-time centered” perspective. The world, after 
all, does not revolve strictly around us, as much as we might want it to, and to mold 
texts in our image is to make their authority null and void. James Hillesheim states 
this same observation in a positive way when he says, “Perhaps the greatest benefit to 
be derived from a consideration of educational theory is a growing awareness of 
one’s place in a continuum of thinkers and practitioners” [emphasis added].
31
 
Hermeneutics is the method of trying to recreate the original context of a literary 
piece in order to capture the true essence of the original message. 
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When applied to philosophical readings, the following steps are crucial to take 
prior to examining any primary reading and are pertinent to my dissertation research 
question and thesis:
32
 
 1. Explore the historical setting of the writer. When and where did the author 
live? What kind of society did the writer know? What key national and international 
events would have been on the mind of the author? These questions involve some 
knowledge of the geographical, historical, political, and sociological background of 
the writer. Compare, for sake of an extreme example, the contextual setting of Plato’s 
Republic in the fourth century B.C. Greece, Rousseau’s Emile in eighteenth-century 
France, and Dewey’s Democracy and Education in twentieth-century America. Each 
of these key educational philosophy texts addresses similar issues but from widely 
different societal perspectives. The only way these three texts can be legitimately 
discussed together in terms of their value to current educational thought is to view 
them first through their unique historical contexts. 
 2. Identify the literary genre of the piece you are reading. Is the text a book, a 
paper delivered at a conference, correspondence to a friend, random unpublished 
notes? All of these literary genres have unique characteristics that will provide clues 
about the text’s meaning. For example, we would read the inaugural address given by 
John Stuart Mill at the University of St. Andrews in 1867 much differently than we 
would read Rousseau’s Emile. Mill’s address was given orally, with prescribed 
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content and time parameters, within a long-standing tradition of similar addresses 
behind it. Rousseau’s book borders on the style of a novel. 
 3. Recognize the intended audience of the original work. This issue usually 
closely coincides with the issue of genre, since audience often dictates genre. In 
Mill’s case, he was addressing his academic peers while Rousseau wrote for a large 
and public audience. You can imagine without even reading these two particular 
writers how their work would be affected by their intended audiences. 
 4. To whom was the writer responding? One important point that is often 
overlooked in reading educational philosophy is the fact that most writers made the 
decision to write in the first place to counter someone else’s argument or point of 
view. In other words, if there were no other perspective, why spend the time 
formulating an argument? To what was the writer responding? Every philosophical 
discussion is based on prior ideas that have been shared in some kind of educational 
forum. “A particular philosophy is a conscious response to its predecessors and 
cannot be understood apart from them: Aristotle is incomprehensible without Plato, 
Kant without Hume.”
33
 The problem that we modern readers have is this: we have our 
writer’s argument in front of us, but all too often we do not have the counter 
argument or the point of departure available to us. The author knew his or her 
opponents well as did, no doubt, the original audience. However, we have often only 
one side of the argument. The analogy to this situation is like listening to one side of a 
phone call. Our job is to try to fill in the other side of the conversation, to try to 
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reconstruct the opposition argument. When we read Plato, we must immediately 
understand that his work was a direct counterargument to the established views of 
education advocated by the Sophists, who placed rhetoric over reason. While Plato 
sometimes acknowledges the opposition point of view, the careful reader will need to 
supplement a reading of Plato with an overview of the Sophist tradition in order to 
see how and where Plato departs from their line of thinking. On the other hand, when 
we read Dewey’s Experience and Education, the other side of the discussion is 
clearly laid out by Dewey as he explains his position in distinction to both traditional 
and progressive education. Here we are given a clear view of all sides of the 
discussion, yet the reader can be further aided by understanding Dewey’s developing 
arguments during the almost thirty years prior to the writing of Experience and 
Education. 
  To return now to my dissertation topic, contextual exploration and literary 
hermeneutics play a critical role in my research involving four distinct interpretive 
layers. First, the early Greek philosophers wrote within a particular historical context. 
While their ideas have universal qualities, to fully understand Plato or Aristotle 
demands an understanding of their own unique setting and societal background. To 
claim the Greeks as foundational to Western philosophy implies a grasp of the 
original context (note the four steps outlined above) of these writers. Second, as these 
Greek thinkers move into the hands of succeeding generations and non-Greek 
cultures (e.g., the Muslims), the original Greek writers are read and commented upon 
 25 
within a new context that is separated from the original by time and context.
34
 So 
when, for example, Arabic philosophers read the Greek philosophers they produced 
commentaries on these writings that were affected by their current historical setting. 
As we will see, both the original Greek writings along with these Arabic 
commentaries came to Europe at the same time. To claim the Greeks as foundational 
to Western thinking is to acknowledge some kind of filtering process through which 
the Greeks arrived in Europe, through the worldview of the intervening and 
transmitting cultures.
35
 Again, as we read Islamic commentaries on the Greek 
philosophers, we must take into consideration the four hermeneutical steps mentioned 
above. Third, the Greek writings were transferred to Europe via translations. For my 
study, I am interested in how the Arabic translations of the original Greek language 
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were in turn translated into Latin for European consumption. Here is yet another 
hermeneutical bridge we must cross. There is an old Italian proverb that says, 
Traddutore, traditore: “Translators, traitors” or in English idiom, “Translators are 
traitors.” When one language is moved into another language, there are subtleties that 
are lost or added because no language is fully equivalent to another. As Greek was 
translated into Arabic which was then translated into Latin, those of us in the Western 
tradition must understand, to some extent, the vagaries of the translation process and 
the discipline of textual criticism.
36
 Fourth, once the Greek writings penetrated 
Western Europe, those writings were again subjected to the same hermeneutical 
concepts as I have already noted above. Did Aquinas read Aristotle in the same way 
that the Muslims did? In the same way that Aristotle’s contemporaries did? Those of 
us in the Western tradition must realize that the Greek ideas were read and understood 
in medieval Europe initially through the filtering agency of Scholasticism and the 
Roman Church. That our Greek intellectual foundation has since passed through the 
filters of other cultural and historical agencies is also part of our philosophical 
tradition. 
 Asking the questions about how the Greek thinkers were originally to be 
understood, how they were presented to Europe and how they were received by 
Europeans, is to take us back to Cremin’s idea of educational linkages and Eisner’s 
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idea of normative educational theory, which helps us remember that philosophy is 
never done in a vacuum. To say then that we read Plato or Aristotle in the Western 
tradition is to say that we read them from a Western tradition viewpoint, one that 
includes the transmission filters just mentioned. That is not to say that we are, in a 
deterministic way, a mere product of our past. There is always room and need for 
transformation along with transmission. However, a clear understanding of our 
foundations is the necessary first step in current dialogue and debate about what it 
means to think from a Western perspective. 
 
1.3  Sources of Influence for this Dissertation 
 As the previous discussion has indicated and the subtitle of this dissertation 
substantiates, the normal “inch wide, mile deep” schema of typical dissertation work, 
while not being ignored, is being modified for this analysis. Rather than a narrowly 
defined topic, this project is purposely taking a wide-angle view of its topic of 
inquiry. For this particular study, it is important to see points of connection over a 
long period of time in order to fully understand the question at hand. So, with full 
realization of the implications of working on a dissertation that is “a mile wide” (but, 
I trust, more than an inch deep!) let me move now to the two key sources of impetus 
for my study. Both of these influencing sources are derived from my current teaching 
assignments at MidAmerica Nazarene University and include my courses in 
Philosophy of Education and Ancient and Medieval History of the Christian Church. 
Immediately the reader will recognize these sources as complementary and 
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interdisciplinary, as is this dissertation in general. The related fields of education, 
philosophy, and European history will form the nexus of my research and their points 
of confluence will define my thesis. 
 
1.31  Philosophy of Education Textbooks 
 The key starting point for my interest in the above stated research question 
can be found in an examination of textbooks that cover the history and philosophy of 
education. Most of these kinds of textbooks take one of two approaches to the topic. 
Nathan Nobis describes these two approaches: 
For the most part, courses and textbooks in philosophy of education approach 
philosophy of education as either thematic or figurative history of philosophy 
of education, or moments in intellectual history that have influenced thought 
and practice in education. By “thematic” history I mean the “—isms” 
approach—idealism, pragmatism, realism, and so forth. By “figurative” 
history I mean reading some (or about) figures like Plato, Rousseau and 
Dewey, among others.”
 37
 
 
 Nobis goes on to state his thesis that these historical approaches to the 
teaching of philosophy of education are insufficient, and presents instead a non-
historical, pragmatic approach. Whether or not Nobis is correct, it remains true that 
philosophy of education textbooks do indeed largely approach this topic historically.  
Typical history and philosophy of Western education textbooks begin with the Greek 
fathers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, whose work comes to us from circa 500 B.C. 
However, with this strong and common foundation, the timeline submerges quickly 
out of sight with the fall of the Western Roman Empire after A.D. 500, as we move 
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into what is commonly called the Middle Ages. In many texts, we move quickly from 
the Greek fathers and their place in later Roman education to people like Desiderius 
Erasmus (1466-1536) and John Calvin (1509-1564) of the Renaissance/Reformation 
period and Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and  John Locke (1632-1704) of the 
Enlightenment period. So we see that between A.D. 500 and 1600, (a period of more 
than a full millennium!) the witnesses to Western education are difficult to find and 
identify. Various texts do include the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274)—less frequently Anselm (1033-1109) and Abelard (1079-1142)—and the place 
of Scholasticism. However, even including these figures, the chronological gap 
following the fall of the Roman Empire is substantial, with the cultural gap even more 
significant.  
 By way of example, we can look at two current, well-respected texts that treat 
the foundations of education timeline. Howard Ozman and Samuel Craver
 38
 take a 
thematic approach to the topic. In dealing with Idealism, they move from Plato to 
Augustine to Descartes. In dealing with Realism, they move from Aristotle to 
Aquinas to Bacon and Locke. Gerald Gutek
39
 takes a biographical approach to the 
topic. After discussing Plato, then Aristotle, Gutek moves to the late Roman educator 
Quintilian, then jumps to Aquinas and then on to Erasmus. In both cases, the gap 
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between ancient Greece and post-Renaissance Europe shows that a large hole exists 
in the timeline connecting Western intellectual development. 
 By way of further example, a standard “readings” text for philosophy of 
education by Steven Cahn
40
 moves directly from Plato and Aristotle to Locke. 
Perhaps this is an unfair example since the book is not intended to be comprehensive 
in its scope and is interested in key transitional figures, but the point is that this text 
has jumped almost 2000 years in time without a word about the intervening period of 
transmission or direct witnesses to Western philosophical tradition.
41
 
 Some might simply attribute this blank space on our Western timeline to the 
period labeled as the Dark Ages or early Middle Ages, an era in Europe notorious for 
an interruption in culture and learning.
42
 However, even if we allow for such a decline 
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in intellectual fervor during this time, the question still begs an answer: How was 
learning revived in Europe and specifically how did the Greek foundations of 
Western philosophy find their way again into discussion and dialogue? Here is the 
“hole in history” that has prompted my research.
43
 In order to explore this “hole in 
history,” I will be engaged in what could be called philosophical archeology, where 
historically framed longitudinal lines of connection and influence will be explored.
44
 
 
1.32  Ancient and Medieval History of the Christian Church  
 My personal study and teaching in the area of ancient and medieval Christian 
Church History has also contributed to this dissertation’s focus. While this area of 
study will be covered in detail in a later chapter, a short introduction to its significant 
role in this research will be provided to introduce the reader to this second point of 
foundational influence for this project.  
 Before proceeding, let me first be sure the connection between my teaching in 
Church History and its bearing on Western intellectual development is clear: from the 
time of Constantine’s conversion to Christianity through the European Renaissance, 
the history of the Christian Church and the history of Europe are inseparable.
45
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 The lively debate about whether or not Constantine’s conversion to Christianity was authentic or 
not is beside the point. The fact that Christianity was changed in status to a legal religion under 
Constantine, to be followed within 70 years by Christianity becoming the official religion of the 
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Constantine’s decision to legalize Christianity, in the 313 Edit of Milan, is a clear 
watershed moment in Western Civilization’s history. “Constantine made two personal 
innovations that were of the highest important for the future. The first was his 
decision to embrace the Christian faith. The subsequent rise of Christianity and its 
acceptance as the official religion of the empire transformed the whole nature of late 
classical culture.”
46
 From this point to the modern era, one cannot separate out the 
secular and sacred elements of European development. It is not an exaggeration to 
state that virtually every noted scholar and writer in both Western Europe and the 
eastern Byzantine Empire from Constantine’s time to the beginning of the 
Enlightenment period of the 1600s was a Christian, certainly in name if not in deed. 
The universal authority of the Church, the Roman in the West and the Orthodox in the 
East, shaped in every tangible way the course of European history during this 
historical era.  
 This history of Christian Europe also had an impact on the non-European 
arena of this same time period, especially the development of the Islamic Empire, 
which was to dominate the Mediterranean basin for almost 600 years during the 
Middle Ages. For it is the clash of Christianity, both East and West, with Islam that 
creates a unique religious boundary zone that greatly influenced the course of 
Western culture and thought, as I will show. To understand the flow of Western 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Roman Empire shows the monumental role Constantine played in the future of not only the Roman 
Empire but of Europe in general. See A.H.M. Jones, Constantine and the Conversion of Europe (New 
York: Collier Books, 1967). 
 
     
46
 Brian Tierney and Sidney Painter, Western Europe in the Middle Ages, 300-1475, 3
rd
 ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 18. The second innovation was his move to Constantinople. 
 33 
educational and philosophical development demands an understanding of European 
history, and European history demands an understanding of the steering currents of 
religious influence during this time when church and state interests merged and when 
Christians and Muslims, when they were not fighting, found occasion for dialogue 
and cross-fertilization of ideas. 
 Christians and Muslims are often pitted historically as archenemies, each 
seeking the destruction of the other. However, when the geographical boundary lines 
between these two groups are examined and when times of direct conflict move to 
times of relative peace, there is evidence of mutual interaction, collaboration and 
dialogue. The most long-term area of intercultural interaction was on the borders of 
Asia Minor, between the Byzantine and Islamic Empires. Even though these two 
civilizations pressed each other in battle over a period of almost 800 years, their close 
proximity allowed for ideas to flow between them. We will see that this region of 
cultural exchange will become an important component of the reason behind Islam’s 
later intellectual development. 
One of the most notorious of these Middle Ages boundary points with Europe 
was, of course, the multiple Crusades directed against the Muslim superintendents of 
the Holy Land area by European ecclesial powers, regional kings and knights, and a 
multitude of rabble. While the Crusades were intermixed by hotly contested, bloody 
battles between the two sides, there are many reports of Crusader-Muslim interactions 
that were congenial and mutually supportive. An interchange of culture and ideas 
occurred during the intermittent times of relative peace. 
 34 
 “When the Muslim traveler, Ibn Jubayr, journeyed through the Holy Land in 
 1184 he was astonished to find it economically and socially flourishing 
 despite the increasingly unhealthy political situation. Here and there Franks 
 and Muslims tilled the fields together and shared common pastures for their 
 cattle. The great caravans were able to travel in safety to Acre where they 
 were dealt with by a smoothly functioning customs system staffed by Arabic-
 speaking Christians.”
47
 
  
 But a much more fertile area in which to explore such an interchange of ideas 
with the West can be found in the modern countries of Spain and Portugal, 
particularly Spain. Here is found the most interesting and dynamic Christian-Muslim 
boundary zone in the Middle Ages. As the Islamic Empire rapidly expanded in the 
years following Mohammed’s death in 632, Muslim dominance raced in all four 
directions of the compass from its beginnings in the Saudi peninsula. Its westward 
march took it quickly along the northern African, Mediterranean coast all the way to 
the gate of this inland Sea, known commonly as Gibraltar, itself an Arabic name.
48
 
Muslim forces soon marched north, taking over most of the Iberian peninsula by the 
middle 700s, giving it the Arabic name al-Andalus. From here, the plan was to invade 
central Europe, past the Pyrenees mountains and into what is now France. At the 
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famous battle of Tours in 732, the Frankish leader Charles Martel defeated the 
Muslim army and the Islamic advance in the West was stopped.
49
 Spain remained, 
though, in the hands of Muslim leaders to some degree until the 1200s. During this 
time of Muslim occupation, there developed a very open community between the 
newly arriving Muslims and the remaining Christians (and Jews). It is here, at the 
southwestern corner of Europe, that I will specifically concentrate my efforts to see 
how Muslims and Christians interacted, especially in regard to philosophical issues. 
 The reason that this particular intercultural interaction is so important to this 
dissertation is that it is here, in medieval Spain, where Greek philosophical thought 
found a path into Europe. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the West in 476
50
 and 
with the consolidation and isolation of the eastern Roman Empire under Christian 
leadership in the Byzantine era, use and transmission of the early Greek thinkers 
became scare in Europe. The West fell into the hands of various barbarian groups of 
Germanic origin. This time of upheaval did not lend itself to intellectual pursuit and 
the Greek texts were functionally lost to the lands under barbarian rule. Even though 
Greek writings were used by such a notable Latin personality as Augustine as late as 
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the early fifth century, by the time of Gregory the Great, bishop of Rome (i.e., the 
Pope) at the end of the sixth century, the West was basically monolingual and 
translations were rare. Where in earlier centuries Romans took pride that their 
education included the Greek language, Latin became the sole language of the 
shrinking educated class. As Eby and Arrowood conclude: “The decline of Latin and 
Greek scholarship, to which many factors had contributed, had been greatly 
accelerated by the victories of the barbarians; so that teaching and learning were at a 
low ebb in the age of St. Gregory.”
51
 
 In the eastern half of the old Empire, Constantinople’s libraries did indeed 
retain much of the early Greek literature of its ancestral roots but there was an 
increasing reluctance to use these pagan authors in educational arenas that did not 
easily connect Greek philosophy and Christian theology. While the Greek texts were 
not lost in the East, they were used in ways that did not easily allow free discussion 
and exploration of ideas. Karl Krumbacher admits that, “in the view of most scholars, 
Byzantium was the vast death-chamber of the Hellenic race of giants, only worthy of 
attention on account of the remains and jewels preserved there from a time long 
gone.”
52
 While this view is overly dramatic and incomplete, it does remind us that the 
Byzantines were first Christian, then Greek. The reasons for this kind of limited 
suppression are not difficult to pinpoint. In the East, intellectual development was 
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confined to a large extent by a centralized imperial leadership. This Christian-based 
authority wielded a heavy hand on educational pursuits, especially those concerned 
with philosophical exploration that used the early Greek thinkers as a primary starting 
point.  
 The single most important factor accounting for the unique uses which 
 Byzantium made of these resources [including the classical tradition in Greek] 
 is the unbroken continuity of central imperial rule . . . Habituated to directives 
 and funding from above, Byzantine thinkers developed a mindset that 
 precluded the establishment of autonomous institutions for the creation and 
 dissemination of ideas independent of imperial policy.
53
 
 
 As time progressed, to read and use Plato and Aristotle was permitted, but not 
without supervision and critique. Reason and faith were partners as long as faith held 
the leading role. As an example of this policy, the emperor Justinian, in 529, closed 
the 900 year-old Academy of Plato’s creation, effectively shutting off the intellectual 
pursuits of the non-Christian professors located there and forcing the leading 
members of the Academy to relocate to areas east of Byzantine influence.
54
  
 Although the Greek [Christian] apologists and church fathers, all thoroughly 
 educated in classical rhetoric and philosophy, recast theology in classical form 
 with no difficulty, a separation between secular and religious thought . . . 
 developed in the post-patristic period. [Much later, in the 11th century, we 
 still find that while] both Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy were taught 
 [in the  Byzantine Empire] . . . Students were required to hold philosophical 
                                                           
     
53
 Marcia L. Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition: 400-1400 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 113.   
     
     
54
 The point of the closing of the Academy should not be taken too strongly; the Academy by this 
point was not a strong institution and this action was not taken against Hellenism but against paganism. 
“Therefore, if we maintain that the most important and decisive characteristic of Byzantinism in 
opposition to Antiquity is Christianity, the beginning of the Byzantine era should be placed in the time 
of Constantine the Great, not in that of Justinian, who closed an isolated pagan institution and raged 
against the remnants of paganism,” Krumbacher, The History of Byzantine Literature, 7. Still, the 
shadow of Christian authority over liberal thinking is significant. And in some minds, Hellenism and 
paganism were difficult to separate.  
 
 38 
 disputations in the presence of the patriarch, who was charged with reporting 
 ideological deviants to the emperor . . . By this time, Byzantines had come to
 regard philosophy as an alien science: not as a part of the Greek heritage that 
 served  the true, Christian wisdom but as a discipline exterior and even 
 irrelevant to it . . . [the] chief philosopher in Constantinople, John Italos 
 (fl.1055) . . . lost his post for seeking to express Christian theologian terms of 
 Aristotelian logic . . . efforts to combine philosophy and theology [were] now 
 unwelcome in  Byzantium.
55
 
 
 Norman Cantor provides a sad commentary on the contribution of the eastern 
part of the split Roman Empire to the continued use of its natural Greek intellectual 
foundations and, in turn, to Western Civilization in general: 
 The history of Byzantium is a study in disappointment. The empire centering 
 on Constantinople had begun with all the advantages obtained from its 
 inheritance of the political, economic, and intellectual life of the fourth-
 century Roman Empire. Except in the realm of art, in which the Greeks 
 excelled, Byzantium added scarcely anything to this superb foundation. The 
 east Roman Empire of the Middle Ages made no important  contributions to 
 philosophy, theology, science, or literature.
56
  
 
 Cantor goes on to note that one of the major reasons for Byzantium’s failure 
to advance intellectually can be attributed directly to “the tremendous pressures that 
were exerted almost incessantly on the frontiers of the empire from the sixth century 
onward. The Byzantines had to apply all the resources at their command to hold back 
the Arabs and their other enemies, and in so doing they dissipated their best energies 
and allowed their culture to become more and more rigid.”
57
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 Even allowing for Byzantium to be a preserver of the Greek classics, there 
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West. Here again Christianity is involved. The Roman Empire had from its outset a 
natural cultural and geographical divide between its western and eastern sections, its 
Latin and Greek sections as we might describe. As the Christian Church exploded 
across the Mediterranean scene, first as an illegal religion, later as the official religion 
of the Roman Empire, it too followed this natural division. When the Empire founded 
capitols in both Rome in the West and Constantinople in the East, this divide became 
painfully obvious. With the fall of Rome, West and East were irreparably separated 
politically and, over time, theologically as well. As I will explore, the western and 
eastern sectors of the Church were divided over many issues, both practical and 
speculative, resulting ultimately in the Schism of 1054 in which the Roman Catholic 
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opened again until the fall of Constantinople at the hands of the Ottomans and the 
beginning of the Italian Renaissance.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
in which to live can be allocated to more philosophical enterprises. Societies in turmoil typically make 
poor candidates for systematized and thoughtful reflection on the deeper issues of life, although 
conflict does often provide the catalyst for philosophical reflection once stability is fixed. On the other 
hand, societal stability is not the only variable important to intellectual advancement. The second key 
component of a thriving intellectual community is dynamic interaction with ideas outside of the 
society’s sphere of thinking, otherwise philosophical stagnation sets it. Societal stability along with 
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the flow of Western intellectual development. 
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 I have outlined how the path for the Greek classics to medieval Europe was 
jeopardized. Following the decisive split of the Roman Empire, East and West, after 
the fall of Rome in 476, custodianship of the early Greek writings fell to the East. But 
from here they would find a poor road to travel into Europe; they were used with 
caution by the new Christian leaders in Byzantium, they were written in a language 
becoming unknown in the West, and civil dialogue between East and West was 
largely blocked due to the growing division between the eastern and western parts of 
the Christian church, which finally resulted in the East and West Christians 
pronouncing mutual excommunications on each other. Greek philosophical texts and 
ideas would not easily find their way into Western Europe from Constantinople. 
 The West, once it fell into the hands of the only mildly civilized barbarians of 
the north, began to lose its cultural vitality. Learning became the possession of the 
minority, often confined to isolated outposts of monastic sanctuaries. With Greek a 
forgotten language in the West, and with few Latin translations at hand, the Dark 
Ages begin in Europe without the light of the Greeks, who once had admonished 
humanity to free itself of the dullness of life based on sensorial repetition and 
uncritical thinking and to find the unchanging light of Truth.
58
 The Greek 
philosophical texts and ideas would not be rediscovered internally in the West due to 
lack of intellectual energy and scholarly resources. As was mentioned earlier in 
relation to the Byzantines, when life necessitates an emphasis on the basics of 
survival, and where peace is regularly overturned by turmoil, philosophy finds a poor 
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home. As Aristotle said long ago, it is only “when pressing needs are satisfied, [that] 
man turns to the general and more elevated.”
59
 
 What then will be the final resting place for Plato and Aristotle? Are they 
doomed to be buried deep inside Byzantine’s remote and musty libraries or relegated 
to the minds of a few close-mouthed Latin monks? This is precisely where my 
research will open the door on medieval Spain; I will seek to demonstrate that a third 
option becomes available to Western Civilization. A major part of this dissertation 
will detail the arrival in al-Andalus of the Greek philosophical fathers via the route of 
Islam. The following survey serves as an outline of the key facts in this analysis, to be 
developed more thoroughly in the following chapters. 
 As the Islamic Empire moved into the vacuum presented by the waning 
Roman Empire, Muslim invaders not only took over the new land, but also the ideas 
of the people they conquered. “As the Arabs extended their religion and their 
language, the conquered peoples, in turn, passed on their civilization to their 
Mohammedan conquerors.”
60
 This assimilation of ideas occurred initially in the 
eastern portion of the fading Roman Empire, in the area then known as Syria
61
 and 
now known as southern Turkey and further east in the area then known as Persia, and 
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now know as Iraq/Iran.
62
 These areas had accumulated the vast resources of Greek 
philosophy in the period preceding the Islamic expansion and now their philosophical 
wealth was plundered by the new Muslim overlords. Within two centuries of the 
Islamic advance, most of these early Greek works were available in Arabic 
translations. The cultural center of the Western world, as far as active and engaged 
thinking, was shifting from Rome and Constantinople to cities with stranger, non-
Western sounding names: Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Cordova. The Muslims were 
great book collectors and avid manuscript translators, taking the literature of their 
newly acquired territories and placing it in their growing centers of learning. 
According to Gutas, while there is not yet a full survey of the Arabic translations of 
all the Greek philosophers,  
 a century and a half of Graeco-Arabic scholarship has amply documented that 
 from about the middle of the eighth century to the end of the tenth, almost all 
 non-literary and non-historical secular Greek books [philosophical works are 
 included in this classification] that were available throughout the eastern 
 Byzantine Empire and the Near East were translated into Arabic . . . One can 
 justly claim that the study of post-classical Greek secular writings can hardly 
 proceed without the evidence in Arabic, which in this context becomes the 
 second classical language, even before Latin [emphasis added]. 
63
 
 
 Islam, during the Middle Ages, represented the key intellectual power of the 
Mediterranean basin, easily surpassing the darkened minds of western Europe and the 
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increasingly immobilized and isolated minds of Byzantium.
64
 “For centuries, Islam 
was both a threat and a source of commerce and ideas to both the Greek East and the 
Latin West. Its great cities and the courts of its princes became, from the eighth 
century through the twelfth, the centers of a brilliant material civilization and of a 
great scientific, philosophic, and artistic culture.”
65
 Names not usually mentioned in 
Western texts but whose influence directly and indirectly played a role in later 
Western thought include al-Kindi, abu Bishr Matta, al-Ghazali, al-Farabi and the 
great Avicenna. Interestingly, not all of these philosophers were necessarily Muslim 
(one Christian is among the group just highlighted), but the common thread is that 
they are all working with Arabic language translations of early Greek works. A 
particularly rich blend of intellectual creativity was found in the western sector of the 
sphere of Islamic influence, namely Spain, where philosophical discussion and 
dialogue continued to exert influence until the twelfth century. As a result of this 
intersection, the “medieval scholars crossing the Pyrenees found the quintessence of 
all preceding science distilled by the theorists and practitioners of Islam. Historically, 
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by entering the arena of Islamic civilization they had indeed entered the whole vast, 
vibrant world of antiquity as well.”
66
 It is here in medieval Spain that I will pause and 
explore the rich soil of interaction between Muslim and Christian (and, not 
unimportantly, Jews) and the wide range of research that has encompassed this region 
and era.
67
 I will examine in more detail perhaps the most notable character in this 
historical review, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, 
known simply to the Latin West as Averroes.  
 Averroes (1126-1198) is known for his translations and commentaries of 
Aristotle’s and, to some extent, Plato’s works. Before his time, only a few translated 
works of Aristotle existed in Latin Europe, and as I have noted, they were not much 
studied or known widely. Significantly, it was through the Latin translations of 
Averroes’ work in Arabic that the work of the early Greek philosophers began to find 
a way into Europe and into Western scholarship. For example, Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274), noted as a key personality related to Western philosophy of education 
and a student of Aristotle, is sometimes called “the first disciple of the Grand 
Commentator (i.e., Averroes)” having obtained his texts and intellectual priorities 
from this Arabic-speaking philosopher, even though he violently disagreed with 
Averroes’ conclusions. Having offered this colorful description of Aquinas, the 19th 
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century French philosopher and philologist Ernest Renan goes on to say, rather 
remarkably, that, “St. Thomas owes practically everything to Averroes.”
68
 The 
journey from Aquinas leads directly through Scholasticism and the early universities 
of Europe that, in turn, opens the way to the period of the Renaissance and the 
beginning of modern philosophical inquiry. S.M. Ghazanfar states this same thesis in 
even stronger terms:  
A very large part of the period includes the multi-dimensional development of 
Arab-Islamic thought. During this period, Islamic scholarship not only 
absorbed and adapted the re-discovered Greek heritage but also transmitted 
that heritage, along with its own contributions, to Latin-Europe. Thus was 
provided the stimulus for developing the human intellect further, for 
conveying a mold for shaping Western scholasticism, for developing 
empirical sciences and the scientific method, for bringing about the forces of 
rationalism and humanism that led to the 12
th
 century Medieval Renaissance, 
the 15
th
 century Italian Renaissance and, indeed, for sowing the seeds of the 
European Reformation.
69
 
 
Would modern Europe have found its way back to the Greek classics without 
the aid of Arabic-speaking thinkers? Probably. The dual metaphysical systems 
described by Plato and Aristotle represent the kind of thinking basic to all humans. I 
agree with Hillesheim’s suggestion that “we all have a natural inclination either 
toward idealism or realism,”
70
 which suggests that all human minds resonate in 
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similar ways. In addition, I will show that there were other alternative paths that the 
Greek works took into Western Europe, such as the path of the Irish monasteries and 
the path of isolated and conservative scholars from Byzantium. To state that these 
fundamental “Greek” ideas would never have appeared in Western thinking without 
the Arab-Spain connection is to press the issue too far. However, the fact that Greek 
texts became available and that Greek ideas became acceptable during this particular 
period of the Middle Ages over the Islamic bridge does recognize that Europe’s 
academic future was definitely influenced in direct ways by non-Europeans.  
 So while the battle of Tours stopped the invasion of Muslim armies into 
central Europe, it did not stop the invasion of Muslim-carried ideas into Western 
thought. The road to Europe for the Greek fathers and for Greek ideas takes a peculiar 
route; from the early Roman Empire, past the twin dead-ends of the conquered and 
dark-aged Western Roman Empire and the reclusive and constrictive Byzantine 
Empire, through an upstart religion/culture born out of the desert sands of Arabia. 
Carried westward by warriors and scholars the length of the Mediterranean, this 
intellectual cargo finally found a most unusual location for the osmosis process to 
take place in the southwestern corner of the European continent. Those who carried 
the Greek tradition to Western Europe and Western Civilization had Arabic names! 
Perhaps it should be no surprise (although it is to most who finally discover this fact) 
that the famous Renaissance painting by Raphael, “The School of Athens,” has 
among its well-known Greek personages one face that is neither Greek nor ancient 
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(besides Raphael’s own representation). There, with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, 
behind Anaximander of Miletus and Pythagoras of Samos, is none other than 
Averroes himself.
71
 An Arab imposter in this group of ancient Greeks? Or did even 
Raphael understand the important bridge that Arabic philosopher Averroes provided 
these Greek minds over which to travel to later Renaissance Europe? 
 
1.33 Thomas Cahill’s “Hinges of History” 
 Beyond my two personal teaching interests mentioned above, there is a third 
influencing factor for this dissertation, one that resonates with the plan of my own 
research of rediscovering the foundations of Western thought and philosophy. Both of 
the influencing sources above point to the fact that some kind of historical “hole” 
exists in our examination of Western sources of philosophy, or as Ghazanfar says, a 
“Great Gap.”
72
 The 1995 national bestseller book by Thomas Cahill titled How the 
Irish Saved Civilization agrees with this general premise.
73
 Although writing for a 
popular audience, Cahill is a noted scholar and a careful researcher of European 
history. In this book, Cahill takes a snapshot of a small segment of Western 
Civilization that has large implications for our understanding of identity as 
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“Westerners.” He focuses on the Irish island, a remote corner of Europe in Roman 
times, and shows how this out-of-the-way, barbarian-in-origin, unlikely-to-succeed 
people end up saving the day for Europe. His thesis is that, without the Irish monastic 
caretakers of the cultural foundations given to them by Romans and Christians, 
Europe would have persisted in its intellectual darkness well past the Middle Age 
time period. He states that it was the Irish that preserved the cultural seeds of the 
early Greeks and Romans in their remote land and who then brought them back to 
Europe, enabling the Middle Ages to flower and flourish. For Cahill, Western 
intellectual development owes its existence to the work of the Irish scholars. 
 How the Irish Saved Civilization is part of a series of books Cahill is currently 
producing called “The Hinges of History.” Here is Cahill’s own description of his 
project: 
In this series, “The Hinges of History,” I mean to retell the story of the 
Western world as the story of the great gift-givers, those who were entrusted 
with keeping one or another of the singular treasures that make up the 
patrimony of the West. This is also the story of the evolution of Western 
sensibility, a narration of how we became the people that we are and why we 
think and feel the way we do. And it is, finally, a recounting of those essential 
moments when everything was at stake, when the mighty stream that became 
Western history was in ultimate danger and might have divided into a hundred 
useless tributaries or frozen in death or evaporated altogether. But the gift-
givers,  arriving in the  moment of crisis, provided for transition, for 
transformation, and even for transfiguration, leaving us a world more varied 
and complex, more awesome and delightful, more beautiful and strong than 
the one they had found.
74
 
 
 My own research resonates with this perspective. I want to know about our 
roots. Tracing our cultural lineage is important to us all (Cahill’s “evolution of 
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Western sensibility,” my “philosophical archeology quest into Western educational 
philosophy foundations”). So, as I read Cahill, I followed him back in time to see 
with fresh eyes the significant role that the Irish did indeed play in keeping 
civilization alive during the bleak years after the fall of Rome. I congratulate Cahill 
for mining this story from the hard ground of historical oversight and see that he has 
discovered a treasure for us all. He has found “that the history we tell ourselves, the 
history we learn in school, is full of holes. All sorts of things happened in the course 
of Western history that even well-educated people are ill informed about.”
75
 
 Cahill is wise enough to know that it was not just the Irish who contributed to 
the survival and growth of civilization. His title, How the Irish Saved Civilization, is 
purposely designed as an overstatement, but one that contains more than a kernel of 
truth. Cahill has written three other books in this series, one about the Greek and two 
others about the Jewish/Christian contributions to Western Civilization, and plans 
three more.
76 
 Each of these groups provides yet another piece to the story of how the 
West developed and grew. My dissertation once carried a temporary title similar to 
Cahill’s first book: “How Islam Saved Western Civilization.” Maybe that title is 
presumptuous, but as in Cahill’s research, my analysis does attempt to show that a 
significant part of the story of Europe’s development is underdeveloped. Indeed, there 
are “holes” in our historical understandings. The role that Islam played in the growth 
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of Western intellectual maturity is the thesis of this project and one that I will show 
needs to be emphasized. We will see that Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages are 
among the many “gift-givers” to Western Civilization, and perhaps the most 
surprising one of all. Interestingly, Cahill has been asked if he plans to write one of 
his books on the influence of Arabic-speaking thinkers. To this question, his response 
is: “Many, many readers would like me to comment on Islam. Though I will touch on 
Islam in Volume V of ‘The Hinges of History,’ Islam, not being a major source of 
Western sensibility, must remain substantially outside the scope of my study.”
77
 I find 
his conclusion completely inadequate, based on the research found in this project. 
 As in Cahill’s work, this project does not purport to uncover some purposely 
designed conspiracy to hide the place of Islamic thought from our Western 
sensibilities. Yet any philosopher of history will clearly state that all historical writing 
carries bias and subjectivity, based on the reporter’s presuppositions and background. 
“When historians raise the question whether history as they practice it can be 
objective in the sense of being value free, they are notoriously pessimistic.
78
 Carl 
Becker observes that, “the historian cannot eliminate the personal equation.”
79
 
Charles Beard expresses the issue well: “Whatever acts of purification the historian 
may perform, he yet remains human, a creature of time, place, circumstance, interest, 
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predilections, culture.”
80
 That the story of Islam’s connection to the West is an under-
told part of Western history is not surprising. Christians and Muslims have had much 
more to separate them over the centuries than to link them. Islam’s worldview has 
generally appeared strange from a Western perspective. The purpose of this research 
is not to artificially make the East and West closer than they are in reality, but to find 
points of connection between East and West that have legitimately existed and to fill 
in the historical holes that may exist in understanding what it means to be part of the 
Western intellectual tradition. 
 The rather recent inclusion in philosophy of education courses and textbooks 
of “far eastern” sources of thought shows a readiness in Western tradition to explore 
non-Western ideas. For example, I was first exposed to the writings of Confucianism 
and Taoism in James Hillesheim’s “History and Philosophy of Education” course, 
(University of Kansas, Spring, 1999), illustrating a trend to move outside of European 
philosophical and educational parameters. The latest edition of the text I used for my 
own college course in Philosophy of Education, Gutek’s Historical and Philosophical 
Foundations of Education (2005), has just added a chapter on Confucius. Perhaps my 
research can follow this wave of interest and appreciation for non-traditional sources 
of philosophy and education. Perhaps future courses and textbooks in philosophy of 
education will routinely include Middle Eastern authors and thinkers as part of their 
curricular plan.   
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1.4 Research Methodology 
 As I have stated, this dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach to a 
broad topic that links both education and philosophy. My approach will be historical 
and sequential. I will first establish the primacy of the classical Greek philosophers 
within the Western tradition and will look at the historical and intellectual context out 
of which especially Plato and Aristotle flourished. Then I will carefully follow and 
trace the path these thinkers took—from the Hellenistic period, to the time of the 
Roman Empire, through the Byzantine and Islamic era, finally to the pivotal Middle 
Ages, analyzing the interplay between Christian Europe and the Islamic Empire 
during this key transition period in world history. This is a long road, and it will take 
time, both historically and within this dissertation, before we reach the central ideas 
related to Islam specifically. But this road is important to examine in its own right. 
This will be one of the unique points of my dissertation. While many have explored 
individual segments of the history of the transmission of Greek thinking to Western 
Europe,
81
 I will follow the philosophical trail from beginning to end. The relationship 
of Muslim philosophy to Greek thought and medieval Europe will not be understood 
without traveling the road that comes before. So I will purposely follow Plato and 
Aristotle for almost 1000 years before they begin reaching the hands of Arabic 
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translators in order to show why Islam plays such an important part of this historical 
journey.  
The work of Burgess Laughlin comes closest in intent to my work.
82
 His 
research takes a similar approach in tracing Greek roots through their historical 
connections. Where I depart from Laughlin’s plan is to make a much stronger 
connection between Arabic and Latin scholars of the Middle Ages. Laughlin 
acknowledges the Islamic translation tradition of Greek works but concludes that this 
tradition was little more than a dead-end in the history of how Greek thought reached 
Europe. My conclusion is radically different from Laughlin’s, but our research 
question and our methodology is largely the same. Richard Rubenstein’s work, 
Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient 
Wisdom and Illuminated the Middle Ages, comes closer in thesis to mine but does not 
provide the deep historical timeline that I propose to follow. So my work will build 
on the methodology of Laughlin and the conclusions of Rubenstein in a unique 
synthesis combined with my own interpretation of the relevant data. 
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 I will show that the historical process by which we received these early Greek 
ideas, (that is, the context in which Greek influence reached the West) is significant 
for a full understanding of what it means to claim Western philosophical citizenship. 
The reader will do well to have both timeline and map in hand as I review the context 
and content of the Islamic Empire’s role in Western development. I will emphasize 
quite literally the “lay of the land” because history is always yoked to geography.
83
 I 
will agree with Hegel’s assumption that history has an essential basis in geography. 
Hegel demonstrates that world history is played out at those unique and natural 
intersections on the globe that give rise to interchange of ideas and whose natural 
climates allow for personal resources to be trained on the philosophical rather than 
mere survival. Hegel points out, in his discussion on the “geographical basis of 
history” that Greece and the Mediterranean basin occupied perhaps the most 
conducive geographical position known on earth for intellectual development; so it is 
no surprise that history’s most dynamic growth has occurred in this region. 
We began with the assertion that, in the History of the World, the Idea of 
Spirit appears in its actual embodiment as a series of external forms, each one 
of which declares itself as an actually existing people. This existence falls 
under the category of Time as well as Space . . . The true theatre of History is 
therefore the temperate zone; or, rather, its northern half, because the earth 
there presents itself in a continental form, and has a broad breast, as the 
Greeks say . . . the Mediterranean Sea is similarly the uniting element, the 
centre of World-History. Greece lies here, the focus of light in History . . . The 
Mediterranean is thus the heart of the Old World, for it is that which 
conditioned and vitalized it. Without it the History of the World could not be 
conceived.
84
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I do not admit to being entirely Hegelian in my approach. For example, I do 
not have the optimism of Hegel that world history is a rational process moving 
relentlessly toward the spirit of freedom. I would subscribe to a more nonlinear and 
random view of how history unfolds. While not fully subscribing to his metaphysics, 
I do however feel comfortable in appropriating his epistemology and, using his well-
known triadic formula “hypothesis-antithesis-synthesis” that attempts to sequence 
historical interaction, his macro-view of world history. Thus, my approach can be 
described as a macro-historical analysis of my research question. A better term to 
describe my work is that of a synthetic history, showing points of connection over a 
large timeframe with the goal of parsing out a unified philosophical theme.
85
 What is 
synthetic history? Jon Butler says, “everyone knows the smart aleck answer: history 
without original research . . . ‘It’s just based on secondary works.’”
86
 Indeed, I will 
use a large majority of, but certainly not exclusively, secondary sources for this 
macro-study, since a large part of my work will deal with the historiography of 
Western philosophy. However, we need a better definition of the genre of a synthetic 
or synoptic history and Butler provides a starting point: A synthetic history 
“emphasizes several overarching interpretive themes that may be complementary or 
contradictory (or both) but share one common function: the themes guide almost all 
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the material that appears in the book.”
87
 Butler goes on to emphasize, “Synthetic 
history isn’t for the weak at heart . . . it obviously requires a broad knowledge of the 
field.”
88
 Synthetic history attempts to immerse itself in the details of the past while at 
the same time maintaining a position that allows for recognition of themes and trends, 
to “connect the dots.” Synthetic history must be content at times to live with 
ambiguity; history is complex and cannot be told without rough edges. But seeing the 
whole is the focus of such a project. Using a microscopic approach, viewing all the 
details, is often the appropriate course of research, especially in a historical study. But 
sometimes standing back and using a telescopic approach to see the bigger picture 
helps us to see the complexities, the connections and the continuity that exist in any 
historical exploration. That will be my goal. 
 Whether my historical approach can be defined as speculative or critical, 
according to common definitions of historical inquiry, is difficult to pinpoint and falls 
into both categories to some extent.
89
 Certainly, the major scope of my work is of the 
critical variety, carefully analyzing the historical connecting points that link ancient 
Greek philosophers with medieval European thinkers through the medium of the 
Arabic translations and commentaries. However, it also has a speculative perspective, 
seeing the course of Western intellectual development from a “bird’s eye” view with 
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direct implications about how to interpret what is meant by Western philosophical 
and educational tradition. My speculative interest lies in the part of my inquiry that 
seeks to know not only “how” but “why.” I will constantly have in the background, if 
not the foreground, of my study this question: What meaning does this historical 
research have for current philosophical and educational discussion? 
 There is no pretense in this project that any one person can claim to be an 
expert in all ages and cultures. With Cahill, I will not pretend to understand 
everything.  
 . . . I am not really pretending to do that. My goal is somewhat more modest: I 
 want to trace the effects to their causes . . . one of the problems with 
 contemporary historians is that, as they concentrate on ever smaller patches 
 of history in ever greater detail, we, their audience, understand less and less 
 about the larger forces that have shaped us. I am trying to overcome this 
 fragmentation by seeing our history whole, as a series of vast movements, 
 often taking many centuries to reach their accomplishment. Of course, I shall 
 fail, at least in some ways. But the human mind cannot turn aside from the 
 attempt.
90
 
 
 My historical survey is not revisionist in the strict sense but there will be 
revisionist themes in my work. Revisionist historians are sometimes viewed as 
individuals whose main job is to take to task the hard work of historians before them. 
Revisionists have been accused of an “I’m right, everybody else is wrong” mentality. 
However, historical revisionism has a legitimate academic use. It is the reexamination 
of historical facts, with a goal of updating history with newly uncovered, more 
accurate, or less subjective data. Simply said, history as it has been traditionally told 
is not always entirely accurate or as objective as it needs to be. Revisionist history can 
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provide a great service to the scholarly community by probing into historical 
conclusions that have not fully accounted for biased assumptions. Such is the case 
with the present study. Since Islam and Christianity, both Byzantium and European 
varieties, were more often enemies than not, any collegiality between these two 
cultures is bound to be downplayed by historians writing from either perspective. 
This is especially so for later Western observers of medieval Europe, who might see 
Islam as an antithesis to Christian thought and as a vacuum for intellectual endeavor 
rather than a seedbed for philosophical vigor. Our Eurocentric perspective places 
natural blinders on Western minds that often create a blind spot in our historical 
evaluations.
91
 “The Arabic component of our paradigmatic view of the Middle Ages 
has always remained incidental; it has never been systemic . . . the myth of 
Westerness [is] too much shaped by cultural prejudices [that are] still quite powerful 
in the real world of literary historiography.”
92
 S.M. Ghazanfar correctly notes, “Few 
problems in civilisational [sic] dialogue are as delicate as that of determining the 
extent of the influence of one culture upon another. This is especially true with 
respect to the links between medieval Islam and Latin-Europe.”
93
 Christopher 
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Dawson strongly asserts this same idea, perhaps even more obvious when he was 
writing in the last century: 
We are so accustomed to regard our culture as essentially that of the West that 
it is difficult for us to realize that there was an age when the most civilized 
region of Western Europe was the province of an alien culture (i.e., Islam) . . . 
At a time when the rest of Western Europe was just emerging from the depths 
of barbarism, the culture of Moslem Spain had attained complete maturity and 
surpassed even the civilization of the East in genius and originality of thought 
. . . All of this brilliant development of culture is completely ignored by the 
ordinary student of medieval European history. It is as though it were a lost 
world which had no more to do with the history of our past than the vanished 
kingdom of Atlantis.
94
 
 
 Cultural blind spots are difficult to remove, even more difficult to discover. 
The question I will bring back to the forefront at the conclusion of this dissertation is 
the question of revising our preconceptions concerning our intellectual roots. 
Specifically, can Westerners overcome “the great difficulty in considering the 
possibility that [we] are in some way seriously indebted to the Arab world, or that the 
Arabs were central to the making of the medieval Europe?”
95
   
With these critical introductory parameters set, one further and last comment 
will be made. I claim the richness of the Western tradition of culture and scholarship 
as my own. I have neither Arab nor Muslim roots. Although the languages of Latin 
and Greek generally lie within my personal field of accessibility, I speak and read 
only a little Arabic. What can a person like me possibly say about the Islamic-
Christian connection of the Middle Ages? Perhaps because my personal observation 
post is not naturally biased in favor of the central subject of this paper, I may be in a 
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position to see this history in a unique light; a Westerner striving to see an Easterner’s 
point of view. There is much I will miss due to my nonuse of Arabic primary sources, 
to be sure. But there may be much to be gained by looking at the largely English 
sources on this subject to see how this history is treated and, as much as possible, to 
give this often overlooked historical issue a fair hearing in an age when Islam is not 
usually equated with intellectual or cultural advancement by the West.  
 Perhaps there is also a bit of selfish reflection in this project as well. My 
personal journeys have often brought me into contact with the Middle East and with 
the Muslim culture. While I have enjoyed and profited from each of these 
opportunities, I cannot deny the fact that Islam appears strange to my Western eyes. 
However, I also cannot deny the fact that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the 
world and stands second only to Christianity in size. Today the West and East are 
being forced into contact again, much like the period of the Middle Ages a thousand 
years ago. Perhaps this interaction will prove to be more humane and profitable than 
it generally was a millennium ago, as characterized by the Crusades. But the negative 
images and the stereotypes persist today. Westerners and Easterners, Christians and 
Muslims seem to have little common ground.  
Former United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan gave the following 
words in a speech titled, “The Dialogue of Civilizations and the Need for a World 
Ethic,” that pertain to my research plan: “Civilizations no longer exist as separate 
entities in the way they once did. But modern societies still bear the strong stamp of 
history, and still identify with each other along cultural fault lines. Among these fault 
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lines, the one that generates the most discussion today runs between Islamic and 
Western societies.”
96
 As history is recast in light of how philosophy in the West was 
connected to philosophy in the East in days gone by through this research project, 
perhaps new points of connection will be found today that can lead to mutual respect 
and appreciation, and most importantly, to open dialogue.
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Chapter 2 
 
The Greek Foundation 
 
 
 “Ancient Greece forms the founding myth of Europe.”
1
 With this pregnant 
truth as a focal point, I begin this research by seeking an appropriate beginning point. 
In order for me to trace the path of classical Greek thought into Europe via the 
Islamic Empire of the Middle Ages, I choose to start this journey much further back 
in time. If I plan to follow Greek thought through the centuries, I need to first present 
a picture of what Greek thought entails; I must focus our attention on what exactly we 
will be looking for in this historical analysis. So I will begin with an examination of 
early Greek thought and its ageless axioms of philosophical inquiry that will provide 
the signposts I will search for later, on the historical pathway to medieval Europe. 
 The Greeks of the classical era play a unique role in European historical 
foundations, often considered the primary progenitors of Western culture, politics, 
literature, art, and philosophy.
2
 As Shelley says in his Preface to Hellas: “We are all  
Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their roots in Greece. But 
for Greece—Rome the conqueror, or the metropolis of our ancestors, would have 
spread no illuminations with her arms and we might still have been savages and 
idolaters.” No single society has been given more credit for the direction of post-
Renaissance Europe than the ancient Greeks. The shores of the Aegean Sea provided 
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the land and resources for the first true civilizations in Europe, namely the Minoan 
and the Mycenaean, from which would spring the early Greek culture. Plato 
colorfully described the Greeks living around this beautiful Sea and among its many 
islands as “frogs around a pond.” From these “frogs,” the Western world would come 
to find a definition and a model of civilization and a way of thinking worthy of honor 
and emulation. Eby and Arrowood observe, “With the Greeks we share a spiritual 
kinship that we feel for no other ancient people; with them we are almost completely 
at home . . . To them we trace the beginning of creative activity and those logical 
methods of thinking that have made for genuine intellectual progress.”
3
 Samuel 
Butcher, in an earlier era, stated this case in even stronger terms, “The Greek genius 
is the European genius in its first and brightest bloom.”
4
 
 In few areas is this Greek cultural foundation more evident and obvious than 
in the arena of educational philosophy. The ancient Greek legacy lives on in the way 
Western philosophy and education have been discussed and applied, undiminished to 
the present. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am narrowing and directing my 
attention to two early Greek educational philosophers that have often been used to 
summarize the brilliance of Greek culture as a whole, namely Plato and Aristotle. In 
these two personalities, Greek thought found its apex and from them the Western 
intellectual tradition finds its most clear ancestors. As Dunn succinctly notes,  
 Western philosophy begins with Plato and Aristotle. Fundamental issues 
 between these two Greek philosophers have continued to shape contemporary 
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 education throughout the centuries . . . Many would agree that all of 
 philosophy is either Platonic or Aristotelian and that thinkers of their caliber 
 are few and far between in our civilization.
5
 
 
 Most current philosophy of education textbooks rightly begin their historical 
surveys with a review of the fundamental ideas of Plato and Aristotle, recognizing the 
essential nature of building both philosophical and educational thought with these two 
men’s reasoned foundations firmly in place. 
 Since my thesis assumes that the classical Greek foundation, especially the 
work of Plato and Aristotle, is indeed valid and reasonable to the majority of Western 
minds today, I will not spend space debating this certainty. What I will do in this 
chapter is set the context in which these Greek thinkers flourished, showing that the 
work of Plato and Aristotle must be understood in light of two key influences: the 
pre-Socratic thinkers and the shared ideas of previous non-Greek cultures. From this 
study, I will show that the “Greek way of thinking” did not arise in a vacuum. That 
there were significant contributing and prior influences is an important part of my 
discussion if I am to show later what elements of this Greek influence moved into 
medieval Europe. Just as classical Greek philosophy arrived in Europe as “something 
more” by virtue of its immersion in Muslim culture (as I will show later), so too the 
beginnings of classical Greek philosophy were “something more” than the mere 
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accumulated wisdom of the Greeks alone by virtue of related ideas they borrowed and 
assimilated from earlier, non-Greek civilizations. 
 For later Europe, it is not enough for us to simplistically state that the works 
of Plato and Aristotle were translated and became available for reading in medieval 
Europe. With these literary works, more importantly, came a worldview and definite 
ontological assumptions. Defining and illustrating the true nature of Greek 
philosophy will assist my discussion of how this intellectual force shaped Western 
civilization. When we say that Western society is the inheritor of Greek thought, I 
want to be sure that statement has meaning beyond the fact that we have the writings 
of the early Greeks on our bookshelves. 
 Once I review the fertile ground out of which Plato and Aristotle grew, I will 
provide a basic review of what it means to “think in Greek ways,” to understand and 
utilize the basic philosophical assumptions and tools that Plato and Aristotle 
crystallized and presented to the thinking world. I will address the question, “What 
are the enduring qualities of Plato and Aristotle that have found such resonance in 
Western thought?”  
 I will conclude this chapter with a candid look at what we mean when we use 
the adjective “Western” in dialogue, in light of the context of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian environment. When I arrive later in this dissertation at the place of the 
Muslim world in the transmission of Greek ideas, I will have set the premise that 
there is perhaps a wider range of contributing intellectual forces at work in Western 
thought than is typically affirmed. The very adjective “Western” carries with it 
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assumptions, context, and bias that I wish to explore before moving further into my 
historical analysis of how Greek philosophical and educational ideas became 
available to later Europe. As I will attempt to prove, the linear course of Greek 
thought to European thought actually moves nonlinearly through an Eastern 
component (Islamic) and even begins with an earlier Eastern component 
(Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Hebrew), giving support to my general thesis that a strict 
Eurocentric, Western perspective is not only limiting, but incorrect.  
 Like the axiom that states a fish does not know it is swimming in water, so too 
it may be difficult for those of us within the Western tradition to fully grasp what that 
tradition actually consists of. This dissertation will try to show some of the 
preconceptions that accompany a Western perspective of philosophy and education. I 
will attempt, from a limited angle, to understand the “water” in which we move and 
breathe intellectually. 
 
2.1 The Context of Plato and Aristotle’s Work 
 To comprehend the work of Plato and Aristotle, an understanding of their 
philosophical and cultural Greek predecessors is mandated. And to comprehend the 
early development of the Greek people, an understanding of their unique geographical 
region must first take place. Two items stand out in a geographical overview of 
Greece. First, the Aegean Sea and, more broadly, the Mediterranean Sea form the 
physical backdrop for Greek civilization. Most early Greeks lived along the 
shorelines of the Sea, with all major occupation points no more than 40 miles from 
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the water. This connection to the Sea and thus to the most basic form of transportation 
in ancient (and not so ancient) times provided the Greeks with access to the rest of the 
Mediterranean world. It is this connection that will prove to be so fruitful in providing 
the Greeks with a plethora of ideas from neighboring societies from which to borrow 
and critique. Second, the shoreline of the Greek area is extremely rugged. While the 
great civilizations before Greece, of Mesopotamia and Egypt, were built around 
common river systems that encouraged a kind of homogeneity along their connected 
lengths, the Greek landscape encouraged just the opposite. The jagged coast built 
natural barriers between points of land and in semi-isolation each of these occupation 
areas developed into independent city-states. To some degree, this unique 
geographical configuration would aid the desire for independent thinking that will 
later become a hallmark of Western thought. 
 While the earlier precursors to Greek civilization started in earnest circa 1600 
B.C., a survey of Greek intellectual development usually starts with the Archaic or 
Pre-Classical Period, beginning in the ninth century B.C. and concluding around 500 
B.C. It is within this period of Greek history that we find the epoch writer Homer and 
the composition of his Iliad and Odyssey tales. More importantly for my purposes, it 
is also during this period that we find the earliest of the Greek philosophers, known 
commonly as the pre-Socratics, their name indicating their relative historical position 
in relation to Socrates, and his followers, Plato and Aristotle. While, for many, 
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Western philosophy functionally begins in the Socratic period, an understanding of 
those thinkers who came before are an important beginning point to our discussion.
6
 
 What we might think of as “philosophic thought” first appears in Greece in a 
poem, Theogony, written by Hesiod about 725 B.C. Theogony retells the myths of the 
gods and speculates in part about the origins of things and the order of the universe. 
From this beginning point, the pre-Socratics offer a rich range of speculative 
discussion on the origin and nature of reality. The pre-Socratic philosophers placed a 
unique emphasis on questions of the physical world; Aristotle once referred to them 
as “Investigators of Nature.” Their interests included mathematics, astronomy, and 
biology. However, as philosophers, they went beyond scientific investigation. They 
emphasized the unity of things, and rejected shallow mythological explanations of the 
world.
7
 Their interests included metaphysics, theology, ethics, and logic. 
Unfortunately, only fragments of the original writings of the pre-Socratics survived 
into later time, often contained in the works of later philosophers like Aristotle, and 
modern scholars are often forced to make educated guesses about the full extent of 
their ideas.  
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 Pre-Socratic philosophers desired most of all to find the material principle 
(ajrchv) of things, their unchanging essence and the unifying factor in the world they 
observed.  
 What faced them every day, however, was not the eternal but the mutable—all 
 the multiplicity, diversity, motion, and change they perceived in individual 
 beings that go from nonexistence to birth and life and, finally, to death, decay, 
 and nonexistence . . . It is not possible, they reasoned, to make sense of what 
 is mutable, what is becoming, what passes so fleetingly into existence and 
 then is gone forever. But because there is also in our experience a quality of 
 permanence . . . we do not live in an arbitrary universe but a patterned one. If 
 this is so, there must be an underlying thing that never changes . . . the 
 uncreated material out of which all the mutable things spring.
8
 
 
 Thales, often called the father of Greek philosophy, claimed that water was 
the basis of all things. Anaximenes took the element air for his foundational principle. 
Anaximander assumed that nothing tangible could qualify for the first principle. 
Instead, he offered the idea of an undefined, unlimited substance (to a[peiron), itself 
without elemental qualities, out of which the world was formed. 
 Pythagoras saw the world as a perfect harmony, and dependent on an 
understanding of the relationship of numbers as the basis of fully grasping the world. 
Xenophanes saw God as the eternal unity, infusing the universe, and governing it by 
his will. Parmenides and Zeno affirmed the idea that unchanging existence was alone 
true; change was only an appearance without reality. Empedocles agreed with the 
unchangeable nature of substance. However, he also supported a plurality of such 
substances, namely, the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. From these the 
world existed through the interplay of two forces—love as the cause of union, strife 
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as the cause of separation. Anaxagoras described the ordering principle of reality as 
Mind (nouV).9 Leucippus and Democritus developed the doctrine of “atoms,” small 
primary bodies infinite in number, indivisible, and imperishable.  
 Heraclitus believed fire (pu:r; flux, motion, change) was the basic structure of 
reality, guided by logos (lovgoV)—defined as “logic” or “reason”—emphasizing, 
rather than harmony, the perpetual disharmony in nature. The Eleatics, especially 
Parmenides, took exception to Heraclitus’ ideas and generally expanded the 
exploration of the pre-Socratics to a deeper and different level when they denied that 
the physical senses could give access to unchangeable truth, since the world of sense 
allowed only a view of phenomenal existence. However, reason can perhaps take us 
to the stated goal of discovering ultimate and unchanging reality.  
 What these questions all raise is the issue of “the one and the many.” How can 
there be unity in a world that appears in multiple forms? The pre-Socratics’ 
involvement in the metaphysical question of the distinction between appearance and 
reality and in the epistomological question of dialectical reasoning in an effort to 
understand what is real set important standards for the future development of Greek 
thought. 
 One final group of influential pre-Socratics deserves our attention, forming 
the immediate context for the work of Socrates. In reaction to the Eleatics, the 
Sophists held that all thought rests solely on the subjective apprehensions of the 
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senses.
10
 Specializing in logic and rhetoric, the Sophists’ view of the world was 
dominated by an intellectual and moral relativity that placed “man as the measure of 
all things.” Prominent Sophists included Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus. 
It was against the Sophist position on the inevitability of relative truth that Socrates 
would make his philosophical stand. 
 The pre-Socratic thinkers clearly showed that philosophy was composed of 
both content and activity, both conclusions and tools. While the content of much of 
pre-Socratic metaphysical theory was soon overturned in preference to other less 
simplistic ideas, their tools were enduring and provided for later Greek (and Western) 
thought a threefold definition of the scope of philosophical inquiry:   
 1. Speculative thinking expresses human curiosity about the world and about 
reality, trying to understand in natural and reasoned, rather than mythical, terms how 
things really are, what they are made of, and how they function.  
 2.  Practical thinking emphasizes the desire to influence personal and 
corporate conduct by investigating the nature of life and the place of human beings 
and human behavior in the bigger scheme of reality. 
 3.  Critical thinking involves a careful examination of and dialogue on the 
foundations upon which thinking relies, seeking to achieve a method for assessing the 
reliability of various proposed philosophical positions. It could be supported that it is 
this third dimension that clearly embodies the true work of a philosopher. 
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 Using these three definitions as a guide, the pre-Socratics began their work 
primarily as speculative thinkers and then later added the dimensions of practical and 
critical thinking.   
 Relying on the use of reason, largely unaided by scientific apparatus, the pre-
 Socratic philosophers pursued their questions relentlessly in every direction. 
 However, this reliance on reason alone could divert attention from practical 
 matters, and this aspect of Greek thought is one of the best illustrations of an 
 aesthetic, intellectual delight in the workings of the mind; contemplation was 
 regarded as a good in  itself.
11
 
 
 The idea of community, of the Greek polis, kept practical concerns within 
arm’s reach of these philosophers. “When the earliest philosophers became more and 
more drawn to abstract reasoning for its own sake, there was a reaction in the persons 
of the Sophists who trained their considerations on human existence rather than on 
the stuff of the universe.”
12
 So the second of the three philosophical dimensions 
mentioned above became part of the pre-Socratic contribution to later Greek thought.  
 The pre-Socratics often, at least at first, worked alone or in small schools and 
hammered out their metaphysical designs as isolated views of reality, without the 
benefit of critical dialogue from opposing positions. However, over time, careful 
examination of opposing viewpoints became part of the pre-Socratic philosophical 
contribution as well. The debates between Heraclitus and the Eleatics offer a prime 
example of this kind of dialogue as do the extended conversations of the Sophists. To 
be sure, there was little in the way of compromise in these early conversations, but 
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dialogue did occur, ushering in the third of the key philosophical approaches noted 
above. 
 Cahill provides an important summary of the pre-Socratic philosophical 
influence in Greek thought: 
Generations before the great blossoming of Athenian philosophy under 
Socrates and his student Plato, these PreSocratics were already sketching out 
the program that all Greek philosophy would subsequently follow. It was built 
on three assumptions: the phenomena we experience immediately possess no 
ultimate importance; there must be an ultimate, eternal, and (despite 
Heraclitus) unchanging reality; it is the task of the philosopher to . . . attain 
that reality and then direct others to the correct path. This was the strictly 
philosophical strand of their enterprise, which also lent the philosopher the 
mantle of a religious sage . . . But there was also the scientific strand, which 
they pursued without telescopes, mircroscopes, or lab experiments . . . Though 
some of them did find it useful to make simple observations of the visible 
world, they all believed they could think their way to the truth by way of what 
Albert Einstein would call das Gedankenexperiment, the thought 
experiement.
13
  
 
 
 
2.2 Non-Western Influences on Greek Thought  
 While the connection of classical Greek thought to the pre-Socratic tradition is 
an obvious point of context, the influence of non-Western societies on Greek thought 
may not be as obvious. Remembering that the Greeks were sea people points us in the 
direction of cultural connections made through trade and travel contact with foreign 
civilizations. The fifth and fourth centuries B.C. provide the time frame in which 
Plato and Aristotle, preceded by Socrates, did their thinking and writing. What 
intellectual developments preceded this time period in areas outside of Greece and 
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which of these groups may have had contact with the Greece civilization thereby 
providing cultural fodder from which Greece thought could borrow and critique?
14
 
Three civilizations that preceded the Greeks will be briefly examined, each of which 
provided philosophical context for the classical Greek thinkers’ own work, each of 
which are Eastern (not Far Eastern)
15
 or Middle Eastern in orientation. 
 Let me introduce this section by retelling one of those important anecdotes 
Plato was fond of telling. In the Timaeus, he recounts how the Athenian legislator 
Solon visited the Nile delta and told stories of the first foundation of Athens to the 
Egyptian priests he met there. Although in Solon’s view these myths went back to a 
very remote antiquity, one of the priests pointed out that Egyptian historical traditions 
were older. “You Greeks are always children, there is no such thing as an old Greek,” 
the priest teased Solon. “You are young in soul,” he continued, by way of comparing 
Greek historical traditions to the infinitely more ancient and grander traditions of 
Egypt. The priest then related to Solon the true story, as he saw it, of the origins of 
Athens which he said the Athenians themselves had forgotten. This “true” story of 
Athenian origins, told by a foreigner, provides the framework for Plato’s discussion 
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in the Timaeus of God and man, of space, time, and eternity. Sabine MacCormack, 
noting this Plato parable, agrees that there is “the question of how the components of 
the cultural tradition we ascribe to ‘the West’ have been assembled, and how 
therefore we understand the origins of the culture of ‘the West.’”
16
 MacCormack goes 
on to emphasize that while intellectual borrowings from one culture to another are a 
worldwide phenomenon,
17
 “the interest that Greek . . . mythographers, philosophers, 
and historians repeatedly demonstrated in taking stock of cultural imports . . . shows 
that otherness was part and parcel of Greek . . . cultural self-definition.”
18
 
 The way in which Greek civilization found its way philosophically within the 
world community can be looked at from three competing perspectives.
19
 The “Aryan 
model” denies significant influence on Greece by outside civilizations and proposes 
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that a purely and uniquely Indo-European instinct created the Greek genius. “In so far 
as the Greeks were presented as an isolated race of genius who laid the foundations of 
European civilization, they could be used to support the idea of superior cultures 
based on racial purity.”
20
 This Hellenocentric (perhaps better, philhellenic) and 
Eurocentric model downplays intercultural fertilization and supports a Greek mindset 
that was novel in the ancient world. An “Afrocentric model” denies to the Greeks any 
originally and proposes instead a “stolen legacy,” especially from Egypt (or from 
Semitic areas in general).
21
 It posits that the Greeks were a young civilization which 
had few or no written traditions of their own and who indeed allowed themselves to 
be influenced by the much older civilizations to the south and east.
22
 The “diffusionist 
model” tries to understand the emergence of new thinking forms in terms of the open 
interaction between people groups and the formative effects of communication arising 
between them. This model states that between all cultures there is constant flow of 
information which allows for creative interaction and exchange. Isolation of 
civilization is rare and would be ultimately counterproductive in terms of cultural 
development. As Bernal comments,  
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 It is inaccurate to refer to the relationship between ancient Egypt and ancient 
 Greece as one of cultural theft. Probably the best description of the 
 relationship is as “approbation.” The ancient Greeks as a whole were only 
 partially guilty of the more severe charge of plagiarism, as they often cited 
 their Egyptian and Oriental antecedents. It was the classicists of the nineteenth 
 and twentieth centuries who completed the denial of the earlier sources, giving 
 all the credit to the European Greeks.
23
 
 
 It is this third model that I will adopt as a guiding theory in an understanding 
of how Greek intellectual development occurred prior to the classical age. In 
agreement, Eby and Arrowood comment, 
 Contact with peoples of different customs and institutions has always a 
 stimulating effect upon the mentality of men, for it encourages observation 
 and accuracy of knowledge. It leads to reflection upon human institutions and 
 modes of living; and thus makes for open-mindedness. Comparative 
 observation is the foundation of all critical judgment in human affairs.
24
 
 
With this critical understanding of cultural interaction as a basis for examining 
the early Greek intellectual environment, I now turn to the exploration of three key 
predecessors to the classical Greek era. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, my research will 
show that there appears to be a “hole in history” between the decaying Roman Empire 
and the emergence of Renaissance Europe; here is another “hole in history,” namely 
the lack of recognition of the “eastern” historical and cultural precursors to the rise of 
Greek intellectual thought.
25
 As Dunn simply but clearly notes, “The wisdom, insight, 
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and knowledge of the East no doubt played a large role in the early development of 
Western thought.”
26
 As Sarton states even more clearly,  
The fact that the cradle of Western civilization is to be found along the banks 
of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris was hardly understood before [the 
last century], but is now extremely clear . . . The time is not long past when 
scholars considered that the roots of Western civilization were to be found in 
Greece . . .We now know that the Greeks . . . were indebted to Egyptian, 
Babylonian, and perhaps other forerunners.
27
  
 
 Cantor reminds us that as we approach the Middle Ages of Europe (and from 
there move to the modern West), the study of those civilizations that preceded and 
influenced later Western thought must be identified, acknowledged and understood, 
emphasizing the fact of continuity and connection. “European medieval civilization 
was not produced by any one event or series of events, but by the absorption by 
western Europe of certain ways of life, ideas, and religious attitudes that had 
prevailed for many centuries in the Mediterranean world.”
28
 As we approach our 
study of how and why the Western intellectual tradition came to be, we must 
remember, “there was a [prior] Mediterranean culture and society that was adopted 
and absorbed.”
29
 From this presupposition, Cantor begins his study of the Middle 
Ages by examining the cultures of the ancient Mediterranean basin, as I will similarly 
do in this dissertation.  
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2.21  Mesopotamian 
The word “Mesopotamian” refers not to a specific group or civilization but to 
a region, literally, in Greek, the “land between the rivers,” namely the Tigris and 
Euphrates. In this region, often called the “Fertile Crescent” and the “Cradle of 
Civilization,” several successive civilizations flourished including the Sumerian, 
Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian. Here we find the world’s first literate 
societies, putting into pictographic writing basic information about their lives and 
world. We find among the Mesopotamian civilizations a priority placed on order, 
structure and law (e.g., Hammurabi’s laws), theology and cosmogony, and basic 
scientific discovery. The greatest gift bequeathed to the rest of the world, including 
the Greeks, by the Mesopotamians was how to be “civil” within a civilization. Also, 
especially within the Zoroastrian tradition, we begin to find traces of dualistic thought 
which we will easily identify in Plato’s metaphysics. 
 The specific areas of geographic connection between ancient Greece and 
Mesopotamia are difficult to pinpoint but most likely the overland trade routes 
through present-day Turkey would have provided easy linkage between these groups.  
The Persian culture particularly,
30
 which flourished in this region after the 
Babylonians, beginning around 500 B.C., had great impact on the Greeks, especially 
after Alexander the Great assimilated much of the Persian territories in his bid to 
conquer the Mediterranean basin and its connecting land areas from his Macedonian 
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(northern Greece) origins.
31
 The Mesopotamian sphere of influence in connection to 
the Greek world will come again fully into play as we view the rise of the Muslim 
Empire after A.D. 600, which took the ancient Mesopotamian setting for it capital 
cities.  
 
2.22  Egyptian 
Another of the “river” civilizations, the Egyptians lived and died on the ebb 
and flow of the Nile. The Egyptians had an incredibly long history of occupation and 
relative stability and great influence in the Mediterranean region. That the early 
Greeks and Egyptians had great opportunity for cultural connection is easily 
documented. “Contact with Minoan Crete and the Mycenaean Greeks is well attested. 
The image of Egypt is already firmly established in the Homeric poems and a 
plethora of Egyptian artifacts has been unearthed in Greece, the Aegean and even in 
western Greek colonies such as Cumae and Pithecusa in Italy from as early as the 
eighth century.”
32
  
 Egypt was seen as a treasury of ideas and skills, much envied by the 
Mediterranean cultural groups. We have this ancient account about an Greek-
Egyptian intellectual encounter that may well serve as an example of the kind of 
interconnection these two civilizations experienced: “Thales advised Pythagoras to go 
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to Egypt and to entertain himself as much as possible with the priests of Memphis and 
Diospolis: It was from them that he had drawn all the knowledge which made him a 
sage and a scientist in the eyes of the masses” (Iamblichius, Life of Pythagoras). 
 The extent to which early Greek philosophers borrowed ideas from Egypt is 
difficult to quantify but impossible to ignore. Hooker places this influence on the high 
side:  
 What we generally call “Greek philosophy” was almost certainly derived by 
 the Greeks from Egyptian culture, particularly natural science (physics and 
 math) which preoccupied Greek thought up to the time of Plato. The Greeks 
 seem also to have derived much of their philosophical theology from the 
 Egyptians as well. These are not modern interpretations of Greek philosophy; 
 the ancient Greeks themselves claim without dissension that their philosophy 
 comes from Egypt.
33
 
 
 It is clear that the Greek philosophical mentality was unique, but it did not 
spring into existence ex nihilo. Though based on traditional Greek elements, it was 
made explicit by new concepts derived from Egypt. For example, the following 
philosophical concepts, used extensively by the Greeks, find initial foundations in 
Egyptian thought: ta onta (ta; o[nta)—being; arche (ajrchv)—beginning; phusis 
(fuvsiV)—process of becoming; cosmos (kovsmoV)—the totality of what exists; 
aletheia (ajlhvqeia)—truth; sophoi (sofovi)—wise men; nous (nou:V)—mind. These 
new concepts were fully developed in Egyptian literature at the time when they first 
emerged in Greece, animating the Greek mind.
34
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 Concerning the significant impact of Egyptian culture on future Greek and 
Western philosophy and education, Eby and Arrowood conclude, perhaps with some 
exaggeration:  
 Here [in Egypt], out of the increasing complexity of human experience, arose 
 the first ideas of righteousness, truth, justice, moral distinctions of right and 
 wrong, the idea of character, the operation of conscience . . . it became the 
 birthplace of a great many things that make our own civilization what it is 
 today . . .  Through . . . the Greeks, Egyptian ideas were transmitted to the 
 Western world.
35
  
 
 
 
2.23 Hebrew 
Unique among the pre-Greek cultures in the Mediterranean region was that of 
the Semitic culture of the Hebrews (later called Israel, Jews). This former nomadic 
civilization became a key cultural contributor in the area linking Asia and Africa, 
Mesopotamia and Egypt. Not only did it function as a bridge between these two river 
civilizations, it succeeded in producing its own philosophical innovations that were 
used by the Greeks directly and indirectly in their intellectual development.
36
 A 
Hebrew-Greek cultural interface would have occurred quite naturally in the 
Mediterranean world, especially during the strong Solomonic kingdom era (circa 900 
B.C.) and more directly after the diaspora of the Jews following their defeat and 
dispersion after the Assyrian invasion of Israel in the eighth century and the 
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Babylonian invasion of Judea in the seventh-sixth century, resulting in Jewish 
communities all across the region. The Hebrew contribution to Western thought, of 
course, has further implications later in history, providing the seedbed out of which 
both Christianity and Islam grew, both of which will interact in positive and negative 
ways with Greek philosophical development in later centuries. 
 We can summarize the unique contributions of Hebrew thought using the 
following categories: 
 Language. Perhaps the most important reason for the success of the Greeks to 
later philosophical growth in the Western world was their ability to manipulate 
written language. The Attic dialect of the classical Greek writers was a precise 
language that allowed for intricacies of thought and argument to be laid out for 
dialogical inquiry and critique.  
 Their language played a large part in their intellectual development. From 
 early times it exhibited a wonderful richness and flexibility. Its descriptive 
 adjectives, complex declensions of nouns, and elaborate conjugations of 
 verbs, and fine difference in tenses, all indicate an unconscious appreciation 
 of the logical relations of thought never equaled by any other people.
37
 
 
Eby and Arrowood go on to note, 
The Greeks were the first people to move up the steep ascent from the lower 
level of pragmatic and conventional intelligence to the higher level of critical 
judgment. In connection with the progress of thought, during the fifth century 
B.C. a passion for accuracy and beauty of expression seized them. Up to this 
time, their language had been on the one hand highly poetical and on the other 
practical, that is, concrete and emotional . . . They wrangled over points of 
law, the policies of the state, the meanings of the poets, the truths of theology 
and of moral precepts, and the nature of the world and of man. It was under 
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such conditions that they first became conscious of the necessity for accuracy 
in the use of words and the analysis of language.
38
 
 
 The development of written language is traced to both the Mesopotamian and 
Egyptian cultures, but these groups were mired in a pictograph system of writing that 
was awkward and imprecise. The invention of an alphabet, enabling a vast array of 
words not possible in a pictograph system, developed first among Semitic tribes 
(which include the Phoenician). A simple alphabet of a couple of dozen letters could 
be learned by the average person as opposed to the thousands of symbols required in 
pictograph writing and only available to a few privileged scribes. The Greek language 
added letters to the Semitic alphabet representing vowels, giving it added precision 
over the non-vocalic system of the Hebrews.
39
 
 The impact of alphabetic language is hard to overestimate in the development 
of philosophy. First, accurate representation of thought can be expressed through 
words. Second, those words can be recorded for mutual dialogue with others, at 
different times and places. Third, critical analysis of words can be accomplished and 
reasonable discussions can be held based on an unchanging text.
40
 Fourth, 
transmission of ideas between groups can happen easily and in a trustworthy manner. 
                                                           
     
38
 Ibid., 480.  
 
     
39
 Geoffrey C. Horrocks, Greek: A History of the Language and Its Speakers (Boston: Addison 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1997). 
 
    
40
 Although Plato says in his Phaedrus that oral communication is superior to the written word, 
especially in the accuracy of the oral word over the written word, without Plato’s written word, 
Western philosophy would have largely missed the impact of Plato’s ideas. Certainly the written word 
can be misinterpreted in ways that the spoken word cannot, but the written word can be analyzed in 
ways the spoken word cannot. 
  
 85 
Without a developed Greek language at hand, the influence Greek philosophers 
would have been minimized.
41
  
 History. The Hebrews developed a novel approach to history, understanding 
time from a teleological perspective. The typical cyclical pattern of history 
understood by most ancient societies (especially those built on river systems with 
recurrent flood and drought seasons), endlessly repeating itself, inhibits creativity and 
progress, and limits historical story to repetitious myths.
42
 The Hebrew linear 
approach to history gave the Greeks another philosophical tool for their own 
understanding of history and of human and social development. “Since time is no 
longer cyclical but one-way and irreversible, personal history is now possible and an 
individual life can have value.”
43
  
 Unity. While perhaps not unique to the Hebrews, the formula “God is One” 
indicates the strong Hebrew commitment to a unity within creation, showing that 
there is continuity in the universe. “From this insight will flow not only the 
integrating and universalist propensities of Western philosophy but even the 
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possibility of modern science . . . We do not live in a fragmented universe.”
44
 This 
view of unity does not however make God identical with creation. There is no 
materialistic monism in Hebrew thought. There is an inherent dualism between the 
eternal and the temporary, as we see in the pre-Socratic writings, but this dualism 
does not invade the sphere of purpose; there is continuity between God and the world, 
not division. As we will see, both Plato and Aristotle wrestle with the idea of dualism 
within a system that still has coherency. 
 Leisure. The fourth of the Ten Commandments given to the Hebrews 
institutionalized the idea of rest and reflection found in the concept of the Sabbath. 
The Hebrews were commanded to observe this gift for their own good and prosperity. 
This idea of leisure was more structured than we might suppose by today’s definition; 
it was in fact a call to personal consideration of the eternal qualities of life and in so 
being was an educative experience.  
Israel being the first human society to so value education and the first to 
envision it as a universal pursuit—and a democratic obligation that those in 
power must safeguard on behalf of those in their employ. The connections to 
both freedom and creativity lie just beneath the surface of this commandment: 
leisure is appropriate to a free people . . . leisure is the necessary ground of 
creativity.
45
  
 
 Theology and ethics. The Hebrews’ writings show that consideration of a 
relation with God cannot be divorced from relationships with people. The Old 
Testament prophets as well as the wisdom literature of the Hebrews are replete with 
examples that emphasize love for God is evidenced by love for one’s neighbor. When 
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we hear Socrates later say, “the one who knows the good, will do the good,” we hear 
echoes of the Hebrew connectedness of all of life. 
 Individualism. The use of the personal pronoun “I” is notably absent in 
ancient literature. Corporate identity overshadows the individual in most early 
societies. Most would say the first autobiography does not occur in literature until 
Augustine’s Confessions in the late fifth century A.D. But in the Hebrew Scriptures 
we see the self reflecting “I” (for example in Book of Psalms) that becomes the 
hallmark of later Western thought. 
 Creativity. That a “new thing” can be conceived is a mainstay of Hebrew 
thought. The ruach or spirit of God can initiate life where there is death, hope where 
there is despair. The possibility of imagination is another of the gifts of Hebrew 
thought. 
 Humanism. The Hebrews presented a unique portrait of humanity and their 
place in the world. While most ancient religions present the gods in opposition to 
human progress, the Hebrew God desires a personal relationship with His people. 
Humans are in fact created in the image of God himself. As such, there is a unique 
optimism fused into Hebrew anthropology that uplifts the ideas of each person and 
makes his or her life significant in the eyes of others. 
 Cahill summarizes this discussion of Hebrew cultural and intellectual 
influences: “Most of our best words, in fact—new, adventure, surprise; unique, 
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individual, person, vocation; time, history, future; freedom, progress, spirit; faith, 
hope, justice—are gifts of the Jews.”
46
    
 
 To summarize this section, I have shown that the early Greek thinkers 
certainly did not work in a vacuum and that the intellectual context of the pre-Greek 
world is significant to the development of Greek thought. My thesis that non-Western 
influences affected the development and transmission of Greek sources of philosophy 
to the West begins here. While I will later move to the center of my discussion, 
involving the place of the Islamic Empire in Western thought, the influence of 
“eastern” minds is obvious already at this pre-classical period in Greek history. 
Thomas notes in her own research: 
The goal of this study suggests another characteristic of classical culture: the 
Greek tradition was in itself a product of growth and accretion. Elements 
worked into the final product described as classical Greek culture were drawn 
from a wide geographical area and a variety of contemporary cultures. In fact, 
for most of antiquity, civilization in Greece moved in close harmony with that 
of Near Eastern cultures; only in the centuries between 700 and 350 B.C. did 
Greek culture follow a distinctively different course . . . A failure to 
understand the close, enduring relationship of ancient Greece and the Near 
East yields an inaccurate view of more than 3000 years of history.
47
  
 
 But to balance this perspective and to move to the next section, Robert Hahn 
reminds us, “No doubt it [Greek philosophy] was partly an inherited wisdom, from 
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Egypt, Babylon and elsewhere, but the archaic Greeks in Ionia transformed that 
vision and so also its meaning.”
48
 Bertrand Russell goes on to say, siding with Hahn, 
 In all of history, nothing is so surprising or so difficult to account for as the 
 sudden rise of civilization in Greece. Much of what makes civilization had 
 already existed for thousands of years in Egypt and in Mesopotamia, and had 
 spread thence to neighboring countries. But certain elements had been lacking 
 until the Greeks supplied them. What they achieved in art and literature is 
 familiar to everybody, but what they did in the purely intellectual realm is 
 even more exceptional.
49
 
 
 Eby and Arrowood provide this concluding statement: 
 
 By navigation the Greeks were quite early brought into intimate contact with 
 the culture of Egypt, Phoenicia, and the progressive cities of Asia Minor. But 
 at the same time they were sheltered from any influences that tended to 
 submerge or stereotype their burgeoning civic and cultural life. Thus the 
 Greek habitat made at once for stability and change, discipline and versatility, 
 domesticity and travel.
50
 
 
 
2.3 The Philosophical Priorities of Platonic and Aristotelian Thought 
 I have shown that there indeed was a rich context out of which Plato and 
Aristotle developed their ideas. This background is more than a mere introduction to 
my research, it serves to further my thesis that what we call Greek (or Western) 
thought has many subtexts that are not all necessarily European (or Western) in 
origin. But now it is time to focus on our two key thinkers, Plato and Aristotle, and to 
see how they uniquely used the intellectual context of their day to form something 
                                                           
     
48
 Robert Hahn  Anaximander and the Architects: The Contributions of Egyptian and Greek 
Architectural Technologies to the Origins of Greek Philosophy (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2001), 166. 
 
     
49
 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: A Touchstone Book, Simon and 
Schuster, 1945), 3.  
 
     
50
 Eby and Arrowood, History and Philosophy of Education: Ancient and Medieval, 162. 
 
 90 
new and foundational, so much so that they are considered the founding fathers of 
Western philosophy.
51
 For as much as Plato and Aristotle did not work out of a 
vacuum, neither did they merely transmit what was given to them. They were creative 
innovators of philosophical systems of thought that have served Western thought and 
its progenitors well for over 2000 years. 
 The classical age in Greek philosophy starts with the rather strange and 
enigmatic character of Socrates (470–399 B.C.), the street philosopher of Athens. 
What we know of Socrates comes entirely from his students, particularly Plato; none 
of his writings have survived the ages, if indeed he wrote at all. Some have even 
suggested Socrates never existed at all, that he was simply a rhetorical device used by 
Plato.
52
 Socrates ran afoul of the ruling Sophist teachers because of his incessant 
questioning of both their educational method and content. He posited the reality of 
absolute Truth in the face of their rampant relativism and embarrassed them in the 
realm of moral integrity. For Socrates, mind and heart went together; the “good” 
mind was also the “good” person, since the idea of good was a unified concept that 
pervaded all facets of reality. Socrates differed substantially from the Sophists, 
building though on the work of other pre-Socratics, in both his metaphysics and 
epistemology. Socrates is most well-known for his critical thinking tools whereby he 
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carefully investigated issues in life, in opposition to the rhetorical tools that were the 
primary method of the Sophists. By claiming to be the “most ignorant of all,” 
Socrates proved that he deserved the title of “wisest man in Athens,” never shying 
away from close examination of his and other’s presuppositions about reality. 
 When the Sophists had had enough of his “gadfly” approach to education, 
they accused him of treason. In his defense, recorded by Plato, he explains that the 
role of philosopher is to prod society to look inside itself and not be satisfied with a 
“status quo” depth of thought. He, through critical dialogue (later known as the 
Socratic Method), had hoped to improve Greece. But the Sophists saw his work as a 
danger to the young of Athens and to the health of the city itself. Socrates was 
declared guilty, given hemlock and died in prison, maintaining his ideas to the end 
but allowing the laws of his society to take authority over him. 
 Perhaps the most notable, and important, quote from Socrates that lies at the 
base of Western philosophy is his famous statement: “The unexamined life is not 
worth living.” In this single sentence, we see intellectual clues that will remain part of 
the Western foundation for thinking—critical thinking, freedom, individualism, 
creativity, reason—picked up by both Plato and Aristotle in their own work in their 
own ways.
53
  
 Now moving directly to the works and ideas of Plato and Aristotle, I will not 
attempt to provide a full review of their philosophical systems. The secondary 
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literature on these two thinkers is vast and well-known.
54
 I will simply outline their 
key ideas, especially their metaphysical and epistemological perspectives, so that we 
can track them through the centuries to medieval Europe.
55
 I will use these key ideas 
as a kind of philosophical “tracer,” analyzing how these “Greek ways of thinking” 
moved through time and space to finally arrive firmly planted in Western tradition. 
As well, I will provide a complete list of the actual writings of both Plato and 
Aristotle, so I again can trace their use and translation down through the centuries 
between their creation in the fourth century B.C. to the time of Aquinas in the twelfth 
century A.D. My analysis will concern both textual transmission and ideological 
transmission of Plato’s and Aristotle’s works and ideas. 
 
2.31 Plato 
Plato (427–347 B.C.) was a student of Socrates, a writer of philosophical 
dialogues, and founder of the famous Academy in Athens. Plato lectured extensively 
at his Academy, and wrote on many philosophical topics, dealing especially in 
metaphysics, epistemology, politics, and ethics. Socrates is often a character in 
Plato’s dialogues. How much of the content of any given dialogue is Socrates’ point 
of view, and how much of it is Plato’s, is heavily disputed, since Socrates apparently 
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did not write anything of his own. However, Plato was no doubt strongly influenced 
by Socrates’ teachings; many of the ideas presented, at least in his early works, were 
probably adaptations of Socrates’ own ideas. Plato became a pupil of Socrates in his 
youth, and attended his master’s trial. He was deeply affected by the treatment of 
Socrates; it is suggested that much of his ethical writing describes a society where 
similar injustices could not occur. During the twelve years following the death of 
Socrates, Plato traveled extensively in Italy, Sicily, Egypt, and Cyrene in a quest for 
knowledge. Plato was also deeply influenced by a number of prior philosophers, 
including the Pythagoreans, whose ideas of numerical harmony find clear echoes in 
Plato’s concept of the Forms; Anaxagoras, who taught Socrates and who held that the 
mind, or reason, pervades everything; and Parmenides, who argued for the unity of all 
things and may have influenced Plato’s concept of the soul. 
 After his return to Athens at age forty, Plato founded one of the earliest 
known organized schools in Western civilization, named the Academy. It operated 
until A.D.529, when it was effectively closed by Justinian I of the Byzantium Empire, 
who saw it as a pagan threat to the foundations of Christianity. Many important 
scholars were educated in the Academy, the most prominent being Aristotle himself.  
 Before we move into a brief examination of Plato’s key ideas, Tarnas provides 
us with a much needed analytical perspective. 
To approach Plato, we must bear in mind his unsystematic, often tentative, 
and even ironic style of presenting his philosophy. We should bear in mind 
too the inevitable and no doubt often deliberative ambiguities inherent in his 
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chosen literary mode, the dramatic dialogue. Finally, we must recall the range, 
variability, and growth of his thought over a period of some fifty years.
56
 
 
 Metaphysics. Plato’s ideas have traditionally been interpreted as a form of 
metaphysical dualism, often referred to as Idealism (or perhaps more understandable, 
Idea-ism, since Plato is emphasizing ideas not ideals).
57
 Plato’s metaphysics divides 
reality into two distinct aspects: the intelligible world of “forms,” and the perceptual 
world we see and sense around us. The perceptual world consists of imperfect copies 
of the intelligible forms or ideas. The forms are unchangeable and perfect, and are 
only comprehensible by the use of the intellect, a capacity of the mind that does not 
rely on sense perception. It is important to point out that Plato’s doctrine states that 
Forms exist independently of whether or not we have seen evidence of its pure form 
in the material world.  
 In the Republic (Books VI and VII) Plato uses a number of metaphors to 
explain his metaphysical views: the metaphor of the sun, the well-known allegory of 
the cave, and most explicitly, the metaphor of the divided line. In the perceptual 
world, the particular objects we see around us bear only a dim resemblance to the 
more ultimately real forms of Plato’s intelligible world; it is as if we are seeing 
shadows of cut-out shapes on the walls of a cave, which are mere representations of 
the reality outside the cave.  
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 Plato’s metaphysical views had many societal implications, especially related 
to the idea of an ideal state or government. Plato asserts that societies have a 
tripartite, pyramidal class structure corresponding to the appetite/spirit/reason 
structure of the individual soul (classified as Bronze, Silver, and Gold). Productive 
workers (the Bronze) correspond to the “appetite” part of the soul and account for the 
majority of a society’s population. Protective warriors (the Silver) correspond to the 
“spirit” part of the soul and account for a smaller segment of the population than the 
workers. Governing rulers or Philosopher/Kings (the Gold) correspond to the 
“reason” part of the soul and are very few in number, but always plural.  
 According to this model, the principles of Athenian democracy (as it existed 
in his day) are rejected; only a few are capable of ruling. Instead of rhetoric and 
persuasion, Plato says reason and wisdom should govern. This does not equate to 
tyranny, despotism, or oligarchy, however. As Plato puts it: 
 Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and 
 leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political 
 power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at 
 present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, 
 cities will have no rest from evils . . . nor, I think, will the human race. 
 (Republic 473c-d)  
 
 Plato describes these “philosopher-kings” as “those who love the sight of 
truth” (Republic 475c). A large part of the Republic then addresses how the 
educational system should be set up to produce these philosopher kings. For Plato, his 
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plans are never separated from practical reality. Philosophy, politics, ethics, and 
education are all part of a whole.
58
 
 Epistemology. Plato had influential opinions on the nature of knowledge and 
learning which he states in the Meno. Here he begins with the question of whether 
virtue can be taught, and proceeds to explain the concept of recollection or 
reminiscence, learning as the discovery of pre-existing knowledge. Plato stated that 
knowledge is essentially justified true belief, an influential belief which informed 
future developments in epistemology. Truth is to be discovered by looking inward not 
outward. The way to rediscover true ideas is to go beyond mere sensory exploration, 
which can be so fickle and untrustworthy, and to reach into one’s mind through 
dialogue with other minds to move ever closer to absolute reality and good. Plato’s 
use of dialectical discussion is fundamental to his epistemological system. 
 Our minds, not our senses, are the legitimate path to discovery. Plato’s 
allegory of the cave shows that most people are content to stay in the world of 
shadows and half-truth, relying on their imperfect senses to reach out to “know” their 
world. But Plato pronounces that a few brave souls will make their way out of the 
cave of sensory illusion into the bright light of true knowledge. These brave truth-
explorers will feel obligated to go back into the cave to encourage their peers to 
unchain themselves but, like Socrates experienced himself, few will let go of the 
comfort zone of the dark cave and will even resent the “teacher’s” attempts to change 
their perceptions and assumptions. 
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 Plato argued with the Sophists over whether the intention of education should 
be of a general nature or of a technical nature. Plato’s Protagoras presents his case 
for a general, liberal (i.e., liberating) kind of education. “The dialogue concludes with 
a victory for Socrates [Plato’s mouthpiece], who argues that a genuinely and 
generally educated person will choose that which is the best . . . What Socrates 
accomplishes is the integration of knowledge and virtue.”
59
 
 Tarnas provides this concise conclusion:  
The belief that the universe possesses and is governed according to a 
comprehensive regulating intelligence, and that this same intelligence is 
reflected in the human mind, rendering it capable of knowing the cosmic 
order, was one of the most characteristic and recurring principles in the central 
tradition of Hellenic thought. After Plato, the terms logos and nous were both 
regularly associated with philosophical conceptions of human knowledge and 
the universal order.
60
 
 
 
2.32 Aristotle 
Aristotle (384- 322 B.C.) was a student of Plato and his work is especially 
noted as both a synthesis and a rebuttal of Plato’s philosophical ideas; Aristotle’s 
position commonly labeled Realism. He lectured and wrote works on many subjects, 
including physics, poetry, logic, rhetoric, government, biology, and zoology. He 
created a second key educational institution in Athens, named the Lyceum, where he 
lectured extensively.
61
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From age 18 to 37, Aristotle remained in Athens as a pupil of Plato and 
distinguished himself at the Academy. No doubt there were divergences of opinion 
between Plato, who took his stand on idealistic principles, and Aristotle, who showed 
a preference for the investigation of the facts and laws of the physical world. After the 
death of Plato, Aristotle was considered as the next head of the Academy, a position 
that was eventually awarded to Plato’s nephew. He was summoned to Pella, the 
Macedonian capital, by King Philip II of Macedon, to become the tutor of Alexander 
the Great, who was then 13. Plutarch wrote that Aristotle not only imparted to 
Alexander knowledge of ethics and politics, but also of the most profound secrets of 
philosophy. Alexander provided Aristotle with ample means for the acquisition of 
books and the pursuit of his scientific investigation. About 335 BC, Alexander 
departed for his military campaigns, and Aristotle, who had served as an informal 
adviser since Alexander ascended the Macedonian throne, returned to Athens and 
taught at the Lyceum. It was also called the Peripatetic School because Aristotle 
preferred to discuss problems of philosophy with his pupils while walking around; the 
Greek for “walking around” is peripateo (peripatevw). During the thirteen years    
(335–322) which he spent as teacher of the Lyceum, Aristotle composed most of his 
writings.  
The new School was no mere replica of that which Plato had left behind him. 
The Academy was devoted above all to mathematics and to speculative and 
political philosophy; the Lyceum had rather a tendency to biology and the 
natural sciences . . . [Aristotle went on to provide] a synthesis of knowledge 
and theory as no man would ever achieve again till Spencer’s day, and even 
then not half so magnificently . . . If philosophy is the quest of unity, Aristotle 
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deserves the high name that twenty centuries gave him: Ille Philosophus: The 
Philosopher.
62
   
 
 Metaphysics. Aristotle’s view of reality differed from Plato’s in regard to the 
beginning point of that search for reality. While Plato placed value on the reality of 
ideas over the mere phenomenological world around him, Aristotle believed that a 
world of objects exist external to us and to our knowing them. “Through our senses, 
and our reason, human beings can come to know these objects and develop 
generalizations about their structure and function. Truth is a correspondence between 
the person’s mind and external reality. Theoretical knowledge based on human 
observation is the best guide to human behavior.”
63
 Or, as Tarnas says, “With 
Aristotle, Plato was, as it were, brought down to earth.”
64
 While Plato’s metaphysics 
shaped his epistemology, it could be said that Aristotle’s epistemology shaped his 
metaphysics. “[Aristotle] is resolved to concern himself with the objective present, 
while Plato is absorbed in a subjective future.”
65
 
 At the center of Aristotle’s metaphysics is his ideas about matter and form. 
According to Aristotle, all reality is structured into matter and form. Everything we 
perceive through our senses is matter. But matter is always arranged according to 
form. Without matter, nothing exists. Without form, nothing is actualized. Matter has 
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the property of potentiality, which means it can become something only when it takes 
on form. 
 Aristotle was interested in how matter moved from potentiality to actuality. 
He explained this change according to a theory of causation. The major kinds of 
causes come under the following divisions: 
 The Material Cause is the matter from which a particular object is made and 
from which a thing comes into existence from its parts, constituents, substratum or 
materials. The Formal Cause is the form the object has and what defines the object. 
The Efficient Cause is the agent that brought about the change from matter to form. 
The Final Cause is the purpose for which the action of the Efficient Cause was 
enacted. This final cause or telos is the purpose or end that something is supposed to 
serve. 
 For Aristotle, the movement from potentiality to actuality gives purpose to the 
universe. Everything is moving to an appropriate and meaningful end. For humans, 
that means that life is meaningful and can be influenced by rational choices. Aristotle 
then moves to two further categories related to causation: substance, the stable 
element, and accident, the variable element. These two qualities further define how 
change works on matter.  
 Related to his matter-form dualism, Aristotle wrote several works on ethics, 
the major one being the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle believed that ethical 
knowledge is not certain knowledge, like metaphysics, but general knowledge. 
Because it is a practical discipline rather than a theoretical one, he argued that in 
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order to become “good,” one could not simply study what virtue is; one must actually 
do “good” or virtuous deeds. In order to do this, Aristotle first established what he 
meant by the word “virtuous.” He started by stating that everything was done with 
some goal in mind and that goal was “good.” The ultimate goal he called the Highest 
Good. 
 Aristotle thought that happiness could not be found entirely in pleasure or 
honor. He finds happiness by ascertaining the specific function of man. But what is 
this specific function? To determine this, Aristotle theorized that the soul had three 
parts: the Nutritive Soul (plants, animals, and humans), the Perceptive Soul (animals 
and humans) and the Rational Soul (humans only). Thus, a human’s function is to do 
what makes it truly human, to be good at what sets it apart from everything else: the 
ability to utilize reason or nous. Aristotle believed that every ethical virtue is an 
intermediate condition between excess and deficiency (The Golden Mean). This does 
not mean Aristotle believed in moral relativism, however. He set certain emotions and 
certain actions as always wrong, regardless of the situation or the circumstances. 
 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle focuses on the importance of always 
behaving virtuously and developing virtue rather than simply committing specific, 
isolated good actions. This can be contrasted with later Kantian ethics, in which the 
primary focus is on the intent of the actor, or Utilitarianism, where the consequences 
of the act are given moral value. Aristotle believed that eudaimonia (eujdaimoniva; 
happiness) is the end of life and that as long as a person is striving for goodness, good 
deeds will result from that struggle, making the person virtuous and therefore happy. 
 102 
Deciding how to make appropriate choices is guided by phronesis (fronevsiV), the 
virtue of practical wisdom. 
 Epistemology. Aristotle believed the mind has the ability to discover 
meaningful information from the environment through the senses. Just as his 
metaphysics is dualistic, so too is his epistemology.
66
 It is divided between sensation 
and abstraction; sensation is the process of acquiring information; abstraction is the 
process of organizing and making sense of this information. So for Aristotle, in 
contrast to Plato, we come to know reality through our senses followed by the 
organization of that material by our mind. Aristotle is sometimes referred to as the 
“first scientist” because of his emphasis on sensory investigation and his wide array 
of work on science topics. But he was not an experimenter and did not use what we 
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today refer to as the “scientific method.” Instead, using observations and reason, he 
reached rational conclusions.
67
 
 Aristotle’s desire to categorize his observations of the world necessarily leads 
to defining a body of growing knowledge and “facts,” which in turn must be mastered 
and passed on to future generations. While Aristotle agreed with Plato in a 
generalized education, his emphasis on bodies of knowledge eventually led to the 
growth of scientific specialization.  
 Aristotle is well known for his work in logic. Logic seems to have emerged 
from the dialectic tradition; the earlier philosophers used concepts like reductio ad 
absurdum as a standard, but never fully understanding its logical implications. Even 
Plato had difficulties with logic. Instead, he relied on his dialectic method. “The first 
great distinction of Aristotle is that almost without predecessors, almost entirely by 
his own hard thinking, he created a new science—Logic . . . Logic means, simply, the 
art and method of correct thinking.”
68
 
 What we call today Aristotelian logic, Aristotle himself would have labeled 
analytics. The term logic he reserved for dialectics. The assumption behind his theory 
is that propositions are composed of two terms and that the reasoning process is, in 
turn, built from propositions.  
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 The term represents something that is not true or false in its own right, as the 
words “man” or “mortal.”  
 The proposition consists of two terms, in which one term (the “predicate”) is 
affirmed or denied in relation to the other (the “subject”), and which is capable of 
truth or falsity. A proposition may be universal or particular, and it may be 
affirmative or negative. Thus there are just four kinds of propositions: 
 A-type: universal and affirmative (“All men are mortal”).  
 I-type: Particular and affirmative (“Some men are philosophers”).  
 E-type: Universal and negative (“No philosophers are rich”).  
 O-type: Particular and negative (“Some men are not philosophers”).  
 The syllogism is an inference in which one proposition (the “conclusion”) 
follows of necessity from two others (the “premises”). In traditional Aristotelian logic 
or deductive reasoning, the conclusion is derived through previously known facts, the 
premises: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. This is as opposed to 
inductive reasoning, where the premises may predict a high probability of the 
conclusion, but do not guarantee that the conclusion is true.
69
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 With this collective summary in mind, Durant provides an abridgment of the 
impact of Aristotle’s work:  
 We must not expect of Aristotle such literary brilliance as floods the pages of 
 the dramatist-philosopher Plato . . . Instead of giving terms to literature, as 
 Plato did, he built the terminology of science and philosophy; we can hardly 
 speak of any science today without employing terms which he invented; they 
 lie like fossils in the strata of our speech: faculty, mean, maxim . . . category, 
 energy, actuality, motive, end, principle, form—these indispensable coins of 
 philosophic thought were minted in his mind.
70
  
 
 Tarnas gives this conclusion about the place of Aristotle, especially in relation 
to Plato: “By replacing Plato’s Ideas with universals . . . Aristotle turned Plato’s 
ontology upside down . . . Plato’s Ideas were for Aristotle an unnecessary idealist 
duplication of the real world of everyday experience, and a logical error.”
71
 
 With this brief review of the essential philosophical positions of Plato and 
Aristotle, I have provided a summative and condensed chart of some of the 
differences between Platonic and Aristotelian thought.
72
 That Plato and Aristotle have 
many common beginning points is obvious, but through extrapolation these two 
men’s views can be placed on a continuum of opposites, as reflected in the following 
chart. The Realism column especially reflects that tradition as it has come to be 
understood, especially since the time of Aquinas. This chart will be used later in the 
dissertation as we explore how the ideas of Plato and Aristotle were transmitted to 
medieval Europe. As the chart shows, there is a certain balance and tension between 
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Plato and Aristotle, between “spiritual” intuition and empirical analysis, a 
philosophical duet beautifully portrayed in Raphael’s painting, The School of 
Athens.
73
 In the center of the painting stand the two Greek masters, Plato with his 
hand pointing to the heaven, reminding us of the transcendent qualities of reality, and 
Aristotle with his hand pointing outward, reminding us of its immanent features.
74
  
 This chart is followed by a listing of the works of both Plato and Aristotle. 
That section will be used later in the dissertation as we explore how the texts of these 
two men were transmitted to medieval Europe. 
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 Yeats, in well-known poem Among School Children, described the difference between these two 
philosophers this way:  
Plato thought nature but a spume that plays  
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things; 
Soldier Aristotle played the taws 
Upon the bottom of a king of kings. 
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 IDEALISM 
 
Socrates--Plato 
Academy 
the mind 
the laws of truth 
humanities classes 
distrust your senses 
there is more to life than what you can see 
Socratic method 
self directed 
look in 
everything you know comes from inside 
universals 
group learning 
cooperation 
informal environment 
education 
teacher is a guide 
   teacher brings information out of students 
personal 
more thinking 
more talking 
freedom 
 human basically good 
abstract goals 
dialogue 
generalization 
less technology based 
character 
the library 
ideas 
student is the key 
right thinking 
more hierarchical 
students more active 
conceptualization 
less materialistic 
the good person 
Perennialism 
nature, predisposition 
Augustine, Descartes, Hegel, Kant 
REALISM 
 
Aristotle 
Lyceum 
the world 
the laws of nature 
science classes 
trust your senses 
you have to deal with the world you see 
scientific method 
other directed 
look out 
everything you know comes from outside 
particulars 
individual learning 
competition 
formal environment 
schooling 
teacher is an expert 
teacher puts information into students 
impersonal 
more looking 
more writing 
discipline 
humans basically bad   
measurable goals 
tests 
specialization 
more technology based 
vocation 
the laboratory 
facts 
subject matter is the key 
right answers 
less hierarchical 
students more passive 
organization 
more materialistic 
the informed person 
Essentialism 
nurture, environment 
Aquinas, Bacon, Locke 
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2.4 List of Works by Plato 
 Plato’s writings were primarily dialogues, and scholars believe that most if not 
all of his writings have survived into modern times. They have been published in 
several formats over time. One ancient tradition regarding the arrangement of Plato’s 
texts uses tetralogies. A tetralogy is a compound work that is made up of four distinct 
works, based on the Greek Attic theater, where tetralogies were designed for one 
sitting. This arrangement of Plato’s works was composed in the early first century 
A.D. by Thrasyllus. 
 In the list below, works by Plato are marked (*) if there is not a consensus 
among scholars as to whether Plato is the actual author, and (**) if scholars generally 
agree that Plato is not the author of the work, and rather the work is composed by a 
student or school associated with Plato. Unmarked works are assumed to have been 
written by Plato. 
 Tetralogies: 
 I.    Euthyphro, (The) Apology (of Socrates), Crito, Phaedo (modern title:  
 Trial and Death of Socrates) 
 II.   Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman  
 III.   Parmenides, Philebus, (The) Symposium, Phaedrus  
 IV.   First Alcibiades*, Second Alcibiades**, Hipparchus **, (The)  
  (Rival) Lovers**  
 V.    Theages**, Charmides, Laches, Lysis  
 VI.   Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno  
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 VII.  (Greater) Hippias (major)*, (Lesser) Hippias (minor), Ion, Menexenus  
 VIII. Clitophon*, (The) Republic, Timaeus, Critias  
 IX.    Minos**, (The) Laws, Epinomis**, Seventh Letter*.  
 The remaining works were transmitted under Plato’s name, but most of them 
already considered spurious in antiquity, and were not included by Thrasyllus in his 
tetralogical arrangement. These works are labeled as Notheuomenoi (“spurious”) or 
apocryphal: Axiochus, Definitions, Demodocus, Epigrams, Eryxias, Halcyon, On 
Justice, On Virtue, Sisyphus. 
 The generally agreed upon ordering of Plato’s works among modern scholars 
is as follows: 
 Early Dialogues: Socrates is a key figure in all of these, and they are 
considered the most faithful representations of the historical Socrates. They are also 
called the Socratic dialogues. Most of them consist of Socrates discussing a subject, 
often an ethical one with a friend or with someone presumed to be an expert on the 
topic. The reader is often left to determine for himself or herself the conclusion 
Socrates intends to make. This period also includes several works surrounding the 
trial and execution of Socrates. 
• Apology 
• Crito 
• Charmides 
• Laches 
• Lysis 
• Euthyphro 
• Menexenus 
• Lesser Hippias 
• Ion  
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The following are often considered transitional dialogues: 
• Gorgias 
• Protagoras 
• Meno 
  
 Middle Dialogues: Later in the early dialogues Plato’s Socrates begins 
supplying answers to some of the questions he asks. This is generally seen as the first 
appearance of Plato’s own views. What becomes most prominent in the middle 
dialogues is the idea that knowledge comes from understanding the unchanging forms 
or essences, paired with the attempts to investigate such essences. The immortality of 
the soul, and specific doctrines about justice, truth, and beauty, begin appearing here. 
The “Symposium” and the “Republic” are considered the centerpieces of Plato’s 
middle period. 
• Euthydemus 
• Cratylus 
• Phaedo 
• Phaedrus 
• Symposium 
• Republic 
• Theaetetus 
• Parmenides  
 
 Late Dialogues: In most of the remaining dialogues the theory of forms is 
either absent or at least appears under a different guise. Socrates is either absent or a 
minor figure in the discussion. An apparently new method for doing dialectic known, 
as “collection and division,” is also featured, where questioners attempt to discern the 
similarities and differences among things in order to get a clear idea about what they 
in fact are. The late dialogues are also an important place to see Plato’s mature 
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thought on most of the issues dealt with in the earlier dialogues. The later works are 
agreed to be difficult and challenging pieces of philosophy.  
• Sophist 
• Statesman 
• Philebus 
• Timaeus 
• Critias 
• Laws 
 
 
 
2.5 List of Works by Aristotle 
 
 Though we are told that Aristotle wrote many elegant treatises (Cicero 
described his literary style as “a river of gold”), the originals have been lost. It is 
believed that we have access to about one-fifth of his total works. Of his dialogues, 
no more than fragments of these have survived. The works of Aristotle that still exist 
today are in treatise form and were, for the most part, unpublished texts. These were 
probably lecture notes or texts used by his students, and were almost certainly revised 
repeatedly over the course of years. As a result, these works tend to be eclectic, dense 
and difficult to read. The story of the original manuscripts of his treatises is described 
by Strabo in his Geography and by Plutarch in his Parallel Lives, Sulla. The 
manuscripts were left to Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus. From Theophrastus they 
went to Neleus of Scepsis; from Neleus to his heirs. Their descendants sold them to 
Apellicon of Teos, a famous book collector in Athens. When the Roman general Sulla 
occupied Athens in 86 BC, he carried off the library of Appellicon to Rome. Here 
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Aristotle’s works were first published in 60 BC by the grammarian Tyrranio of 
Amisus and then by the philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes. 
 The “Corpus Aristotelicum” refers to the traditional ordering and 
categorization of the works of Aristotle, dating back to the second century A.D. The 
only major work of Aristotle’s not in the Corpus Aristotelicum is the “Constitution of 
the Athenians.” The extant works of Aristotle are broken down according to the five 
categories in the Corpus Aristotelicum. Although the works were all considered to be 
genuine until recently, not all of these works are considered genuine by modern 
scholars, but differ with respect to their connection to Aristotle, his associates and his 
views. Some are regarded as products of Aristotle’s “school” and compiled under his 
direction or supervision. Other works may have been products of Aristotle’s 
successors at the Lyceum. Still others acquired Aristotle’s name through similarities 
in doctrine or content. Those works that are seriously disputed are marked with an 
asterisk (*). Note the Latin names in parenthesis; it is still common to list Aristotle’s 
works with their Latin titles, even though he wrote and spoke in Greek, due no doubt 
to their later use in medieval Europe under the guidance of the Latin (Roman) 
Church. 
 
Logical Writings 
 Organon (collected works on logic):  
  Categories (Categoriae)  
  On Interpretation (De Interpretatione)  
  Prior Analytics (Analytica Priora)  
  Posterior Analytics (Analytica Posteriora)  
  Topics (Topica)  
  On Sophistical Refutations (De Sophisticis Elenchis)  
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Physical and Scientific Writings 
 Physics (Physica)  
 On the Heavens (De Caelo)  
 On Generation and Corruption (De Generatione et Corruptione)  
 Meteorology (Meteorologica)  
 On the Cosmos (De Mundo)*   
 On the Soul (De Anima)  
 Little Physical Treatises (Parva Naturalia):  
  On Sense and the Sensible (De Sensu et Sensibilibus)  
  On Memory and Reminiscence (De Memoria et Reminiscentia)  
  On Sleep and Sleeplessness (De Somno et Vigilia)  
  On Dreams (or De Insomniis)*   
  On Prophesying by Dreams (De Divinatione per Somnum)  
On Longevity and Shortness of Life (De Longitudine et Brevitate 
Vitae)  
  On Youth and Old Age (On Life and Death) (De Juventute et  
   Senectute, De Vita et Morte)  
  On Breathing (De Respiratione)  
 On Breath (De Spiritu) *  
 History of Animals (Historia Animalium)  
 On the Parts of Animals (De Partibus Animalium)  
 On the Gait of Animals (De Motu Animalium)  
 On the Progression of Animals (De Incessu Animalium)  
 On the Generation of Animals (De Generatione Animalium)  
 On Colors (De Coloribus) *  
 On Things Heard (De Audibilibus)  
 Physiognomics (or Physiognomonica) *  
 On Plants (De Plantis) *  
 On Marvelous Things Heard (Mirabilibus Auscultationibus)*  
 Mechanical Problems (Mechanica) *  
 Problems (Problemata) *  
 On Indivisible Lines (De Lineis Insecabilibus) *  
 Situations and Names of Winds (Ventorum Situs) *  
 On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias (or MXG) *  
 
Metaphysical Writings 
 Metaphysics (Metaphysica)  
 
Ethical Writings 
 Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nicomachea)  
 Great Ethics (Magna Moralia) *  
 Eudemian Ethics (Ethica Eudemia)  
 Virtues and Vices (De Virtutibus et Vitiis Libellus) *  
 Politics (Politica)  
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 Economics (Oeconomica)  
 
Aesthetic Writings 
 Rhetoric (or Ars Rhetorica)  
 Rhetoric to Alexander (Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) *  
 Poetics (Ars Poetica)  
 
A work outside the Corpus Aristotelicum 
 The Constitution of the Athenians (or Athenaion Politeia) * 
 
 To summarize the unique contribution of Plato and Aristotle to Western 
thought, Gutek reminds us: 
 Greek philosopher-educators, especially in Athens, debated the nature of the 
 good human being and the kind of education needed to develop him. For 
 Athenian culture, the good man possessed and exhibited arete, defined as 
 generalized excellence in all those characteristics that comprised human 
 nature. For more cerebral theorists, such as Plato and his student Aristotle, the 
 good man was most excellent in rationality, the power of reason that defined 
 the human being.”
75
  
 
 The Greeks did indeed develop a rational system of thought based on open 
dialogue, free inquiry, critical questioning, abstract thought, syllogistic logic, and 
developed writing, undeveloped in most of their predecessors and essential for their 
successors. This is truly what it means to “think in Greek ways.” “It was an attempt to 
know. The Greeks . . . were peculiarly gripped by the passion to understand, to 
penetrate the uncertain flux of phenomena and grasp a deeper truth. And they 
established a dynamic tradition of critical thought to pursue that quest.”
76
 
Inquisitiveness, desire for clearness of ideas, freedom from prejudices, 
readiness in adopting the new, passion for the dissimilar, open-mindedness, 
the comparative attitude of mind—all these characteristics which attend 
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intelligence of a higher order were present in unusual measure in the Greeks    
. . . Plato puts into the mouth of one of his interlocutors the statement, “Let us 
follow the argument whithersoever it may lead.”
77
  
 
 Continuing within this Greek tradition, the significant work of Plato and 
Aristotle related to metaphysics—the one and the many, the eternal and the temporal, 
the real and the false, the unchangeable and the mutable—will provide a forum of 
investigation for Western thinkers until modern times. And in spite of their dualistic 
formulations about reality, they both keep in hand a unity within their metaphysical 
deliberations; seeing purpose and Truth as attainable goals in all realms of life. Their 
uniquely developed epistemologies—whether with Plato and the realm of mind or 
Aristotle and the realm of the senses—will provide Western thinkers a set of 
boundaries from which to launch their own theories of how the world is known.  
 Although Plato and Aristotle provided a systematic and written approach to 
the questions of metaphysics and epistemology, this by no means implies that any or 
all human thinkers do not have their own presuppositions about how the world works. 
The debt we owe to the early Greeks is not that they created new, never-before-
thought ideas but that they took these ideas and explored their implications and 
questions in a critical and disciplined way. One of the great joys of philosophers 
today is to retrace the ground walked on by great thinkers of days gone by. The 
reason we are able to walk those same paths is the fact that all human minds are 
structured similarly, otherwise we could not share our insights with each other in 
comprehensible ways. 
                                                           
     
77
 Eby and Arrowood, History and Philosophy of Education: Ancient and Medieval, 177.  
 116 
 As Williams summarizes: 
We might say that the classical philosophers Plato and Aristotle are classics in 
the sense that it has been impossible, at least up to now, for philosophy not to 
want to make some living sense of these writers and relate its positions to 
theirs, if only by showing why they have to be rejected . . . But they might be 
said also to define a classical style of philosophy—meaning by that a 
philosophical, not a literary style. They are both associated with a grand, 
imperial, synoptic style of philosophy.”
78
 
 
 
2.6 What Do We Mean by “Western” Tradition? 
 Now that I have provided an overview of the essential elements of early Greek 
thought, especially that of Plato and Aristotle, I want to reconnect our discussion to 
the thesis at hand: How did the philosophical and educational themes of the classical 
Greek thinkers reach Western thought, and in what ways did it come into Western 
tradition? The real question before us at this stage of the analysis is to first ask 
ourselves the question: What do we mean by the term “Western”?  
 In a way, to try to define what we mean by “Western” culture or tradition may 
seem painfully obvious. The simple definition would say that those who are part of 
the Western perspective are those cultural groups who derived their identity from the 
European Renaissance which in turn laid claim to the cultural and intellectual heritage 
of the Roman Empire and the Greek civilization. But once we start to pull this 
definition apart it soon becomes apparent that to be part of the Western way of 
thinking is much harder to pin down than the simple definition above indicates. 
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 The ancient Hellenic contrast between Greeks and “barbarians” divided the 
Greek-speaking culture of the Greek populations around the Mediterranean from the 
surrounding non-Greek cultures. When the great Greek historian Herodotus examined 
the Persian Wars of the fifth century B.C., he described a conflict between Europe 
and Asia. The terms “West” and “East” were not used by any Greek author to 
describe that conflict. In fact, an anachronistic application of those terms to that time 
period reveals a logical contradiction, given that, when the term West appeared, it 
was used to refer to groups in opposition to the Greeks and Greek-speaking culture.  
 When the Romans conquered Greece, the Roman Empire was effectively split 
into two halves, the western spoke Latin and the eastern spoke Greek. When Rome 
was finally defeated by northern barbaric invaders, this East-West division became 
more pronounced. The Roman Empire continued on in Constantinople but Europe 
became a fragmented map of competing kingdoms, using Latin occasionally but more 
often using the variety of local languages that were regionally influenced. 
Charlemagne succeeded in unifying parts of Europe under the banner of the Holy 
Roman Empire in 800, but the cultural connection to ancient Greece and even to the 
old Roman Empire was functionally severed.
79
 In 1054, the split between the east and 
west vestiges of the old Roman Empire was finalized as the Latin Catholic Church 
and the Greek Orthodox Church completely parted ways. To speak of the East was to 
speak of the lands of Greece, Turkey, and eastern Europe. To speak of the West was 
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to speak of the lands of Italy, France, Germany, and later of Scandinavia and the 
British Isles. Spain was added when the Muslims were finally removed in the 
thirteenth century. 
 This brief historical review reveals a plain fact. Today when we speak of the 
West, the modern countries of France, Germany, and England (and other western and 
central European nations), and the key colonial countries related to England (the 
United States, Canada, and Australia) are typically in mind. However, their direct 
connection to either ancient Greece or the Roman Empire is tenuous. The West, as 
defined here, neither speaks Greek nor carries Roman lineage. It speaks European 
dialects, primarily English, and its lineage is primarily northern European.
80
 When we 
speak of the West today, we do not speak so much of a particular compass direction 
as we do of a particular mindset. What we can say is that Western culture has 
borrowed certain elements of Roman and Greek thought, focused through the lens of 
the Renaissance period but gathered through a mixture of perspectives prior to the 
Renaissance, which is, of course, one of the prime targets of my present research.  
 To define the idea of Western culture demands that its roots be carefully 
examined. If the West stakes claim to Greek and Roman ideas and ideals, the path of 
that claim should be of interest to Westerners. In reality, Western philosophy has 
taken a rather eclectic approach to the appropriation of both Greek and Roman 
culture. We have already seen a blending of Oriental and Occidental perspectives as 
we have looked into the roots of Greek thinking earlier in this chapter. To speak of a 
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Western intellectual tradition requires a quite flexible definition, one that only 
partially is tied to Greek beginnings. It has borrowed certain ideas from the Greeks 
but others it has ignored. It does not use, nor has it always used, everything from its 
Greek ancestors. No one calls for the creation of Plato’s utopian Republic today or 
finds Aristotle’s scientific work very scientific. There are few today who would 
describe themselves as strict idealists or realists. Our ideas about democracy differ 
greatly from the Athenian democracy of the fifth century B.C. Yet within these 
philosophical systems, Western tradition has found tools and content worth learning 
and using.  
 The language of the Western tradition today is largely considered to be 
English, a borrower language par excellence, made up of a dizzying array of parent 
languages, making it one of the most difficult languages in the world to learn. What 
we find in Western intellectual tradition is also an eclectic collection of thoughts. 
From the Greeks? Of course. From a variety of other contributors? Yes. That the 
Greeks deserve primary attention is appropriate. That a recognition that the line 
linking Western tradition to the Greeks in nonlinear is also appropriate. “This path 
from antiquity is not a direct route through Rome into medieval Europe, since most 
first hand knowledge of Greece was lost to the west by the end of the sixth century 
A.D.”
81
 Once the Greek connection was established in Europe, even then Western 
tradition took these ideas in different directions. The French emphasized a Greek 
rational examination of nature. The Germans found a home in Greek reason as well as 
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in Greek imagination and passion. The English took hold of the practical concerns of 
Greek thought. “The juncture of such individual paths as the British, German, and 
French cultural traditions has resulted in knowledge of classical Greece that is, in 
many ways, more detailed than that possessed by the ancient Greeks themselves” 
(emphasis added).
82
 Interestingly, Western tradition is both less and more than the 
sum of early Greek thought.
83
 As Thomas clearly points out, 
Aristotle argued that it was not enough to consider the form of the essence of 
things; proper investigation of nature must include the ends toward which 
things strive. That rule can serve as a maxim for the study of the classical 
tradition. In its own time and context the elements of Greek culture took on a 
definite form . . . Not so readily examined or understood are the ways in 
which the elements of classical culture were employed by the producers . . . 
the legacy of classical Hellas will be seen in later cultures, retained in part but 
never fully. What is as important as its retention is the analysis of its use by 
the heirs . . . As Tom Jones said in a lecture on the classical tradition in the 
spring of 1982, “It is not enough to be able merely to identify the elements 
that survived from the Classical period. Far more important is an 
understanding of the particular stimuli for new departures and creativity that 
have been provided in various periods by those meager fragments drifting 
ashore from the wreck of antiquity.”
84
  
 
 Thomas goes on to present a theoretical schema that can help us assess the 
nature of the classical Greek influence on subsequent cultures.
85
 She defines three 
categories of such influence that the Greeks have had on subsequent civilizations: 
configurative, cosmetic, and legitimizing. Societies that use Greek thought in a 
configurative way base their identity and culture firmly and indisputably within 
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Greek tradition. Societies that use Greek thought in a cosmetic way merely use Greek 
external reference points to provide texture for their own ideas. Societies that use 
Greek thought in a legitimizing way also create their own culture but use Greek 
thought to support and give authority to these ideas. It is not clear to which category 
Thomas assigns Western civilization, but she seems less inclined to put it in the 
configurative arena and more inclined to place it in the legitimizing and even 
cosmetic spheres. This reminds us that the use of the Greek legacy in Western 
thought is indeed eclectic and that Western tradition draws on other legacies, as well 
as infusing its own unique ideas into its borrowing of others’ ideas. 
 The term “Western philosophy” was created in the last two hundred years as a 
way of emphasizing a Eurocentric perspective on thought and ideas. The early Greek 
philosophers would likely find such a classification irrelevant if not misleading. They 
knew the value of listening to voices that were different from their own. They 
understood that the search for understanding is a universal journey common to all 
humanity. The ancient philosophers would not have categorized philosophy based on 
a vague geographical term that is imprecise and rarely specifically tuned to any 
particular philosopher, nation, language, religion, or line of argument. Perhaps, in our 
growing world climate of multiculturalism, the meaning and use of the adjective 
Western may fall into disuse.  
  Can we then define in simple terms what the Western philosophical and 
educational tradition believes at its core? Perhaps we can build a general outline of 
this definition. It is built on individualism, freedom, critical thinking, logic, balance, 
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democracy, practicality, holism, reason; all connected to a unique Greek foundation, 
but all having evolved and developed and, importantly, been transformed from their 
original impetus. Western civilization is forever indebted to the Greeks but we are not 
Greek; we are more and we are less. This fact ties us back to my main thesis: without 
the influence of an “Eastern” society, namely Islam, Western society might have 
taken a very different course of development. 
 It may sound as if, in the preceding comments, I have tried to minimize both 
the impact of Greek thought on later European development as well as a definitive 
Western tradition of thinking. I actually affirm both of these propositions as factual 
and important. What I have done is to widen the discussion pertaining to Greek roots 
and Western thought. But let me summarize this chapter by defining the key element 
in both Greek and European philosophy that remains a unique feature of Western 
tradition. What sets the Greeks and Western thought apart from other systems of 
thought is its inherent ability to avoid the excesses of extreme subjectivism on the one 
hand and extreme dogmatic control on the other. Russell defines this enduring and 
identifying feature as “liberalism.” 
Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too 
much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other 
hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an 
individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation impossible   
. . . The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless 
oscillation. The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not 
based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more 
restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community.
86
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 The ability and, more importantly, the desire to critically engage in open 
conversation about the nature of our world are the hallmarks of the classical Greek 
legacy and the overriding evidence of what it means to participate in the Western 
philosophical tradition.
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Chapter 3  
 
Hellenism, the Roman Empire, and the Propagation of Christianity  
 
 
 I am continuing my analysis of how the classical Greek philosophical tradition 
moved through history and among changing societies, from its general beginning 
point of Plato and Aristotle to medieval Western Europe. I will later move into my 
main historical topic of the Islamic Empire’s place in this philosophical journey. 
However, in order to show how and why the Islamic Empire is indeed important to 
this discussion, the intervening historical bridge must be reviewed, connecting the 
historical dots, so to speak. Having developed the background of Greek thought by 
examining the context in which classical Greek philosophy flourished, and having 
briefly reinforced the significant place both Plato and Aristotle played within that 
intellectual tradition, this chapter will follow the path that Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
works and ideas took next during the early Hellenistic period, from the time of 
Alexander the Great’s military conquests to the conquest of Greece by Rome, and the 
later Hellenistic period, from the Roman Empire up to the reign of Constantine.  
 It is difficult to find a consensus among scholars concerning the dating of the 
Hellenistic era. Some will limit this period to the time before the start of the Roman 
period and others will extend it to the time of Christian so-called suppression of 
Greek philosophy in the Byzantine period (A.D. 529 to be exact). For purposes of this 
dissertation, I will define the early Hellenistic period as beginning with the defeat of 
Athens by Philip of Macedonia (Alexander’s father) in 338 B.C. and ending with the 
fall of the last Greek-related kingdom, the kingdom of Ptolemaic Egypt, in 31 B.C. I 
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will define the later Hellenistic period as beginning with the reign of the first Roman 
emperor, Octavian (Caesar Augustus) in 27 B.C. and concluding with Constantine’s 
Edit of Milan in A.D. 313, proclaiming Christianity a legal religion and establishing a 
beginning point for what would be later termed the Byzantine Empire.
1
  
 We will find that during this time period, one that typically receives little 
attention in both philosophical and educational histories, the ebb and flow of Greek 
thinking and its migration to the West, is an intriguing story with many unexpected 
narrative turns. We will see how the work of Plato and Aristotle moved early into 
mainstream society and education among the Greeks. Then we will review the 
unlikely account of how Greek thought and philosophy traveled to the far reaches of 
the Mediterranean world, first through the military success of Alexander the Great 
and then through the willing accommodation of the Roman Empire. The pathway of 
Greek thinking into Western Europe seemed assured at this point. However, the fall 
of Rome and the rise of Christianity, both unlikely stories themselves, add some 
confusion and contention regarding the propagation of Greek sources of thinking. 
This chapter will end with a description of how Greek philosophical and educational 
foundations found themselves at an intermediate stage of continuity with Western 
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tradition; the next chapter will spell out how this intermediary stage changed direction 
dramatically and almost fatally for Western civilization. 
 
3.1 Definition of Hellenism 
 
 Hellenism and Hellenization both are derived from the Greek word used by 
Greeks to describe their own ethnicity, Hellas (   {EllaV), and both depict the spread 
of Greek thought, ideals, and practice throughout the eastern Mediterranean region 
following the conquests by Alexander the Great, notably through Persia and as far 
east as India.
2
 Generally, when one nation conquers another, the stronger imposes its 
culture on the weaker. But when Alexander, a Macedonian,
3
 invaded Greece, he 
adopted its superior culture, ideas, and even language. Alexander was intent, not only 
in building a world kingdom, but also on spreading this unique Greece culture to 
every region of his rapidly expanding empire. “‘Hellenic’. . . carries a connotation, 
not so much of a diluted Hellenism, but rather of a Hellenism extended to non-
Greeks, with the clash of cultures which that inevitably implies.”
4
  
After Alexander died in 323 (in Baghdad, interestingly), his kingdom was 
divided among three successors (the Diadochoi; diavdocoi) roughly approximating 
Alexander’s empire in Egypt, Asia, and Europe: the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt 
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based at Alexandria; the Seleucid dynasty in Syria and Mesopotamia based at 
Antioch; the Antigonid dynasty in Macedon and central Greece. When these three 
Greek kingdoms were later overrun, by the Parthians in the East and the Romans in 
the West, Greek language and culture survived and thrived in many of these areas. 
“Greek culture alone had the capacity to embrace and interpret all the rest of the 
world; its spirit made a universal appeal through poetry, art, and philosophy.”
5
 
 Hellenization was never a case of Greek ideas completely replacing the native 
ideas in the areas where Greek armies had assumed authority. While Greek culture 
and language became popular in many of these foreign cities, there was always a 
mixture of Greek and non-Greek thought, resulting in a kind of cultural amalgam; a 
resultant syncretism of ideas and a relatively free atmosphere for thought and 
philosophy. How far or in what direction this exchange of ideas went is a matter of 
some debate. For example, Eby and Arrowood note, when speaking of the library at 
Alexandria, “for the first time in history there intermingled freely and tolerantly 
scholars from many races and nations: Greeks, Hindoos [sic], Persians, Jews, Syrians, 
and Egyptians.”
6
 Burstein also clearly recognizes that, “beneath the superficial 
uniformity of hellenistic Greek life there were significant differences between the 
culture of the Aegean Greece and that of the new kingdoms of Asia and Egypt.”
7
 He 
further states that, “hellenistic civilization has often been described as the product of a 
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synthesis of Greek and ancient Near Eastern intellectual traditions, and undoubtedly 
some interchange of ideas took place in the new cosmopolitan cities of the hellenistic 
east such as Alexandria where Egyptians, Greeks, Jews, and Syrians . . . mingled.”
8
 
However, Burstein departs from the more traditional picture of mutual cultural 
diffusion in his premise that this diffusion was primarily one-way: from Greek to 
non-Greek, but not the opposite way around.
9
 Burstein correctly points out that not 
only was Greek the common language of these multicultural groups, they shared as 
well a reverence for the classical Greek thinkers, but in a way not known to the 
ancient Greeks themselves. These early non-Greek groups admired the Greek 
tradition “which both inspired and intimidated them, as models of perfection which 
could never again be equaled, let alone surpassed. In their own works they 
proclaimed their role as continuators of the Greek tradition by studding their writings 
with learned allusions to the masterpieces of the past while eschewing any attempt to 
rival them.”
10
  
 Whether the path of Hellenism was one-way or two-way, either concept plays 
directly into my thesis, that Greek thought did intermingle with non-Greek thought 
and so created a variant form of classical Greek philosophy that captured the essence 
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but not always the nuance of writers like Plato and Aristotle, and it was this kind of 
synthesis that moved on through Europe during the Middle Ages.
11
 While the Greek 
culture was diffused over the entire eastern Mediterranean region, Greek culture was 
itself, in some regards, diffused by its contact with other cultures. Later these non-
Greek societies would move from sheer awe to active engagement with the classical 
Greek philosophers from their own unique cultural perspectives. 
 A clear example of this diffusion process is found in the Greek language 
specifically. The classical Greek in which Plato and Aristotle composed their 
philosophical treatises and dialogues was written in the Attic dialect. But as 
Alexander’s armies pressed ever further from the Greek home base, Attic Greek 
transposed into a more conversational dialect of the language, known as the Koine 
(koinhv) dialect, which means in Greek “common.” Koine Greek became the lingua 
franca of not only the Greek Empire but also, later, of the Roman Empire.  
 Koine was more practical than it was academic, putting stress on clarity rather 
than eloquence. Its grammar was simplified, inflections were dropped or harmonized, 
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and sentence construction made easier. Koine was the language of everyday life and 
not of philosophical books.
12
  
Hellenistic Greek began with Alexander’s troops who came from all the 
regions of Greece. The troops, then produced a leveling influence . . . In a 
word, Greek became simpler . . . The language tended toward shorter, simpler 
sentences. Some of the syntactical subtleties were lost or at least declined. The 
language replaced the precision and refinement of classical Greek with greater 
explicitness.”
13
  
 
As Koine replaced Attic, Greek culture and philosophy itself experienced a 
leveling effect as its key ideas were addressed and contextualized into settings that 
had little direct knowledge of its classical roots. “The culture of Hellenistic Egypt and 
the Near and Middle East was a colonial culture, that is, a simplified version of Greek 
culture.”
14
 Walbank succinctly concludes, “The Greeks influenced barbarians, and 
barbarians Greeks. It is indeed in this clash and coming together of cultures that one 
of the main interests in the period lies.”
15
 The key to understanding the place and 
power of Hellenization was its elastic ability to transfer Greek ways of thinking to a 
broad population base of non-Greeks and to introduce key Greek writers, at least in 
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basic form, to a wide and diverse audience, who in turn digested these ideas within 
their own cultures and traditions.  
 
3.2 Competing Schools of Philosophy 
 It is important to remember that during and after the time of Plato and 
Aristotle, there were several competing schools of philosophy in existence in Greece, 
specifically in Athens, each adding to the definition of Hellenization. These schools 
established Athens as the educational hub of the Mediterranean region; students of 
many cultural backgrounds coveted the opportunity to travel to Greece to be trained 
by the Scholarchs, and Greek teachers were welcomed in regional cities. Besides the 
Sophists described in the last chapter, the following philosophical groups gathered 
many of their own disciples. Stoicism, founded around 308 B.C. by Zeno, held that 
all things, properties, and relations are governed by unvarying natural laws, and that 
the wise man should follow virtue alone, obtained through reason, remaining 
indifferent to the external world and to passion and emotion. Cynicism held that 
virtue is the only good, and stressed independence from societal conventions. 
Members of this group were highly critical (cynical) of the rest of society and its 
interests. Epicureanism, founded in 306 B.C., held that the goal of man should be a 
life of calm pleasure, regulated by mortality, temperance, serenity, and cultural 
development. Because Epicureanism affirmed the value of life and the values of the 
material world, it is often associated with “eating and drinking,” and other sensuous 
pleasures. Skepticism, advocated by Arcesilaus who eventually took over as head of 
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Plato’s Academy, affirmed that all knowledge must always be in question, and that 
inquiry must be a process of doubting.
16
 
 That there is some continuity between the Hellenistic philosophers and the so-
called Socratic thinkers is clear.
17
 Yet the early Hellenistic philosophers tended to 
focus on the abstract dimensions of reality and allowed the more practical matters of 
Plato and Aristotle to take a back seat. They were especially interested in ethical 
systems that would enable a person to find happiness and control in life. Plato’s 
allegory of the cave concluded that the person who discovered the true essence of 
reality was obligated to go back to the cave and help his friends find the light. The 
early Hellenistic writers would question the necessity and purpose of this more 
practical and community oriented action. “Severing in this way the link that had 
bound classical philosophy to the polis inevitably tended to narrow the focus of 
Hellenistic philosophy and to eliminate from it that vigorous concern for the problems 
of everyday social and political life that strikes every reader of Plato and Aristotle.”
18
  
 As well, the early Hellenistic period is often criticized for it slavish worship of 
past authority in philosophy. “What did the master say?” was of more concern than 
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“What do we think?” Old ideas were rehashed and stereotyped, often reduced to 
commentaries of previous thinkers. New ideas were sparse. However, there is another 
side to this evaluation. “These criticisms are largely justified, but they do not appraise 
at a fair value the critical editorial work accomplished by the scholars of the 
Alexandrian age. The sifting of texts, the culling out of errors, the work of accurate 
interpretation, and the study of language were indispensable accomplishments.”
19
 
 An abbreviated list of the key Hellenistic writers prior to the time of 
Constantine includes the following Greek and Roman names: 
 
 Greek 
• Menippus (3rd century B.C.) 
• Archimedes (c. 287-212 B.C.) 
• Chrysippus (280-207 B.C.) 
• Carneades (214-129 B.C.) 
• Philo of Larissa (160-80 B.C.) 
• Posidonius (135-51 B.C.) 
• Aenesidemus (1st century B.C.) 
• Philo of Alexandria (30 B.C.- A.D. 45) 
• Plutarch (A.D. 45-120) 
 
 Roman  
 
• Cicero (106-43 B.C.) 
• Lucretius (94-55 B.C.) 
• Seneca (4 B.C.-A.D. 65) 
• Musonius Rufus (A.D. 30-100) 
• Epictetus (A.D. 55-135) 
• Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) 
• Clement of Alexandria (A.D. 150-215) 
• Alcinous (2nd century A.D.) 
• Sextus Empiricus (3rd century A.D.) 
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• Alexander of Aphrodisias (3rd century A.D.) 
• Ammonius Saccas (3rd century A.D.) 
• Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) 
• Porphyry (A.D. 232-304) 
• Iamblichus (A.D. 242-327)  
 
 These competing philosophical viewpoints held sway among portions of the 
Greek and Roman population during the Hellenistic period, but by the time of the 
Byzantine period, and certainly during the Middle and Modern ages, they were held 
by only a few, while the ideas of Plato and Aristotle survived. Burstein, commenting 
on this interesting insight, says,  
To understand the Greek contribution to the development of western 
civilization one must constantly be aware not only of the splendid intellectual 
and artistic achievements of the ancient Greeks but also of the fact that the 
Greek tradition that has had so great an impact on the development of 
European thought since the Renaissance comprises only a limited selection 
from the products of the multi-faceted creative activity of ancient Greece . . . 
at the same time that the cultural path laid down in the Classical period 
broadened into a complex network on intersecting highways, feeder roads and 
occasional culs-de-sac during the succeeding Hellenistic and Roman periods 
of Greek history, one  particular branch was singled out for special 
maintenance and care so that it remained in use long after the system as whole 
fell into disrepair and was abandoned.
20
 
 
 The reasons for their literary collapse (but not necessarily of their key ideas) 
and conversely for Plato and Aristotle’s work to continue are found in both pragmatic 
and ideological categories. First, Plato and Aristotle produced (including, for 
Aristotle, the production of his pupils) much of their work in written form. Their 
writings and ideas were well known and well circulated, and their popularity well 
established. Plato and Aristotle wrote in the Attic dialect. Later Hellenistic 
                                                           
     
20
 Burstein, “The Greek Tradition: From Alexander to the End of Antiquity,” in Paths from Ancient 
Greece, ed. Thomas, 28.  
 
 135 
philosophers used the current dialect, Koine, to compose their writings. As the 
ancient world began an important book-making shift, from papyrus scrolls to 
parchment codices,
21
 a natural filtering process occurred. Decisions were required 
concerning which manuscripts would be put into the new codex format, all done of 
course by meticulous hand copying. Those manuscripts that did move into codex 
form tended to survive into later history, while those which remained in scroll form 
tended to be lost. One key deciding factor to whether a manuscript was deemed 
worthy of codex transmission during the Hellenistic period is the principle of 
Atticism. Atticism is the literary doctrine of this period that preferred the older and 
more academic Attic dialect to the more popular and current dialect of Koine. Since 
Plato and Aristotle wrote in the preferred dialect, their works moved into codices 
while the Hellenistic Koine writers’ works generally did not. Atticism became a 
dominant literary force in the first century A. D. and continued through the Roman 
and Byzantine periods. “Since Greek education always emphasized the imitation of 
proper stylistic models as the best way to develop a good writing style, the prevalence 
of Atticism . . . would undoubtedly tend to result in the increasing neglect and 
eventual loss of much of Hellenistic literature.”
22
 Interestingly, while the Attic dialect 
helped Plato and Aristotle’s works survive, it also made their work more inaccessible 
to readers who knew only Koine, especially the intricacies of the arguments. Later we 
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will see where the place of commentators helps fill this linguistic gap, while at the 
same time removing the student, by one layer, from the original texts. 
 Second, the metaphysical priorities that exist within Plato and Aristotle’s 
systems, exhibiting absolute rather than relative positions on the existence of Truth, 
gave later Christian thinkers a positive handle. While the tendency of the Hellenistic 
philosophers to downplay political agendas and to uplift moral relativity and 
abstraction limited Christian interest in them, Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics, on 
the other hand, assisted the ability and desire of later Christian writers to pick up 
elements of classical Greek philosophy and to put them to use within their own 
philosophical systems. Dunn notes as well, “The Christian church drew on the works 
of Plato and Aristotle to defend its religious beliefs. In contrast . . . the cynics, stoics, 
skeptics, and epicureans were anathema to the Christian church because these 
philosophies affirmed the values of the physical or material world, denied or at least 
questioned the possibility of immortality, and did not support the Christian belief in a 
provident God.”
23
 Once Christianity had taken hold of the Roman Empire after 
Constantine, one key path for the ancient Greek ideas to remain relevant was through 
some kind of dialogue with Christian theologians.  
 Third, the prevalence of patrons within the Hellenistic period was of major 
importance to the survival of the classic Greek writers. That their works were 
transposed into codices is one thing; that these books were put into long-term safe- 
keeping is another. The tradition of Greek cultural patronage goes back to the fifth 
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century, but notably we find in Alexander the Great a passion for keeping the Greek 
intellectual tradition alive. He built a new Greek city at the mouth of the Nile, named 
after himself, designed to promote Greek culture. Alexandria, under the supervision 
of Alexander’s successor in Egypt, Ptolemy, soon rivaled Athens as the center of 
scholarly activity. It is here that we begin to see a new concept in the way cultural 
artifacts could be preserved: the great library of Alexandria and the Temple of the 
Muses—the Musaion or Museum, based to some degree on Aristotle’s Lyceum. Here 
“distinguished scholars, supported by government stipends, pursued their studies in 
congenial surroundings. The royal library, whose collection is said to have ultimately 
reached 700,000 papyrus rolls and to have included copies of virtually every book 
written in Greek, offered unprecedented resources for scholarly research in every 
field of intellectual endeavor.”
24
 Similar libraries of the classic works of Greece were 
built in other key cities in the Hellenistic world: Pergamon and Tarsus (both in Asia 
Minor), the island of Rhodes, and Antioch (in Syria). While these libraries and 
museums would have preserved manuscripts from both the Attic and Koine periods, it 
is obvious from the discussion above that Attic-style writings would have received 
preferential treatment. “Their editorial and literary criticism preserved, for the future, 
editions of the ancient poets and other classical writers. The world today would know 
far less of the ancient literatures had it not been for the astonishing diligence and 
productive scholarship of these Alexandrian professors.”
25
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3.3 The Roman Period 
What I have termed the later Hellenistic era coincides with the dominance of 
the Roman Empire, first over the Greek territories along the eastern Mediterranean 
coast, then over Western Europe. The Roman Empire was the phase of ancient 
Roman civilization that succeeded the 500 year-old Roman Republic (510 B.C.—1st 
century B.C.). Several dates are commonly proposed to mark the transition from 
Republic to Empire, including the date of Julius Caesar’s appointment as perpetual 
dictator (44 B.C.), the victory of Caesar’s heir Octavian at the Battle of Actium (31 
B.C.), and the Roman Senate’s granting to Octavian the honorific title Augustus (27 
B.C.). The Latin term Imperium Romanum indicates the part of the world under 
Roman rule. From the time of Augustus to the fall of the Western Empire, Rome 
dominated Western Eurasia and Northern Africa. Roman expansion began long 
before the state was changed into an Empire and reached its zenith under Emperor 
Trajan with the conquest of Dacia in A.D. 106. The transition from the early to the 
later Hellenistic period and from the partitioned Greek Empire to the Roman Empire 
was precipitated by the Battle of Actium when the kingdom of Ptolemaic Egypt and 
Mark Antony were utterly defeated by the Romans and Octavian (Caesar Augustus).  
Prior to the full defeat of Greece by Rome, schools of Greek grammar and 
rhetoric were developed in Roman cities.
26
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Rome was the mistress of the Mediterranean, and became a thoroughly 
cosmopolitan city. This period [before 132 B.C.] is frequently called ‘the 
period of transition,’ because it witnessed the development of Rome from an 
Italian state to the great power of the world, and the transformation of Roman 
culture from a local one, scarcely literary at all, into a cosmopolitan culture, 
employing the Latin language and Greek . . . scholarship.”
27
  
 
Like Alexander, but not to the same extent, the Romans admired Greek 
culture and thinking and allowed the process of Hellenization to proceed at its own 
pace throughout its growing territories. Whether or not Rome had a choice in this 
matter is debatable. But the Romans were wise in allowing Greek culture to continue 
its function as a conduit of trade and education rather than attempting to eradicate or 
supersede it.
28
  
During the early Hellenistic period, appeal to Greek thinking tended to uplift 
the abstract and the oratorical elements of the classical age of the Greek masters. 
However, under Roman rule, Greek ideas were put to a more practical use, allowing 
the bureaucratic forces of Rome to do what they did best, organize, and control. This 
sharp contrast between abstract and practical thought can be said to have 
characterized what soon became a subtle (later a radical) division between the 
western and eastern portions of the Roman Empire. The Latin-speaking West was 
typically concerned with administrative affairs of the Empire while the Greek-
speaking East was more interested in the “why” and “how” of life.
29
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However, Rome adopted the same attitude toward Athens as the Macedonians 
had; they respected this unique city as a center of culture and ideas. Romans flocked 
to Athens to take advantage of the philosophical schools located there, as early as the 
third century B.C. Plutarch, writing in the second century B.C., records the visit of 
Greek philosophers and in Rome and their enthusiastic reception. Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius in A.D. 176 traveled to Athens himself, later establishing eight 
professorships, including two each in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Roman 
students were advised to study Greek before studying their native language of Latin; 
translation became a key educational activity. Education was so fused that the 
adjective “Greco-Roman” is often used for this period of education.
30
 
Representative of Roman education in the period 100 B.C. to A.D. 100 are the 
writings and work of Marcus Quintilianus (A.D. 35-97), who served as a professor of 
rhetoric and oratory.
31
 Quintilian, as he is commonly known, continued the Roman 
desire for a more practically based, utilitarian education over a more theoretically 
attuned education. However, in contrast to the intent of both Plato and Aristotle, “by 
the beginning of the Christian era, instruction had gotten completely away from life 
and action, and had lost its moral significance. This condition gave rise to the oft-
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repeated criticism of Seneca, ‘we learn our lessons not for life but for the schools.’”
32
 
Here is Seneca’s complete thought: 
We dull our fine edge by superfluous pursuits; these things make men clever, 
but not good. Wisdom is a plainer thing than that; nay it is clearly better to use 
literature for the improvement of the mind, instead of wasting philosophy 
itself as we waste other efforts on superfluous things. Just as we suffer from 
excess in all things, so we suffer for the lecture-room (Non vitae sed scholae 
discimus) . . . Betake yourself, therefore, to philosophy if you would be safe, 
untroubled, happy, in fine, if you wish to be,—and that is most important—
free.
33
    
 
L.D. Reynolds and N.G. Wilson go on to state a concern about the state of 
classical education and the general educational climate of the second and third 
centuries. “The absence of works of literature and a decline in the monumental and 
epigraphic remains of the period is ominous, for it would be curious if this lack of 
creative energy and the general cultural disruption did not entail a corresponding 
apathy towards the reading and copying of the literature of the past.”
34
 
While Roman education in itself is a topic worthy of study, Rome’s place in 
the continuity of Western thinking is best seen as a great transmitter of culture, 
especially Greek, but always with its own personality.
35
 It could be said that Roman 
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philosophy added nothing of importance to the world’s deposit of speculative 
thought, but the Roman Empire provided an avenue on which the cosmopolitan ideas 
of the Mediterranean region could make their way into western and northern Europe. 
While the deepest debt of Western civilization is owed intellectually perhaps to 
Greece, Rome certainly played the central role in the West’s structure as well as a key 
transmitter of the Greek heritage. Rome provided later Europe, with its largely Celtic 
and Teutonic populations, with a foundation from which to appreciate and appropriate 
Greek ideals. As Rome passed on its acquired intellectual properties, it did so with its 
own unique stamp on them. “Roman higher scholarship was taken, initially, from 
Greece. But Rome clothed scholarship in the Latin tongue; its organization and aims 
were Roman. Thus adapted it lost much of its Greek character.”
36
  
One of the pathways for Greek thought into Europe was of necessity the 
Roman Empire, but as I will develop in the next chapter, this path became largely 
blocked after the fall of Rome in the fifth century and during the so-called Dark Ages. 
As I have just shown, this Greek heritage had passed through a Roman filter during 
the later Hellenistic period in the West and this Latin perspective will later shape the 
way in which Greek thought is reintroduced into Europe in the Middle Ages. Yet 
Rome laid an intellectual foundation that later Europe could find at least a tentative 
footing, an atmosphere of toleration of opinion and thought.
37
 “Conqueror and teacher 
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of some of the most virile peoples in the world, Rome was able . . . to play a central 
role in the fusion of arts, forms of thought, and ways of feeling in all of Western 
Europe in the centuries during which she dominated its life.”
38
 
 
3.4 The Rise of Christianity 
 In the person of Jesus and in the propagation of his teachings among his 
disciples in the first half of the first century A.D., Christianity finds its beginning 
point and its stunning tenacity against insurmountable odds of survival. From its 
remarkably small beginnings in Judea, in the southeast corner of the Roman Empire, 
it became the official religion and guiding philosophy of the Empire within 400 years, 
in spite of numerous attempts to extinguish its message and messengers.
39
 The central 
tenets of Christianity had their roots in Judaism
40
 and Hebrew history, but took on 
creative elements as it grew up among Hellenistic overseers. The language of 
adolescent Christianity was Greek and its primary proponents after its initial founding 
in Jerusalem were largely Hellenized converts in Asia Minor and Greece. The 
Christian movement was furthered by Paul of Tarsus who through his missionary 
travels took Christianity to many areas of the Roman world. While Rome became, 
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over time, the leading Christian city, Christianity’s theological foundation was always 
in the eastern Greek-speaking regions of the Empire. All major Christian councils and 
most early major Christian thinkers were found in the East. 
  The impact of Christianity on Western thought cannot be overemphasized. As 
Eby and Arrowood point out, “In the progress of western education, Christianity has 
been the supreme influence. It is impossible to understand the institutions and culture 
of occidental civilization during the past two thousand years without this new ethical 
force.”
41
 That conclusion would not have seemed plausible if we were viewing 
Christianity’s prospects from a first-century perspective. This religion was first 
hounded by the Jewish leadership, with imprisonments and occasional executions 
common in the first decades. Roman leadership tended to ignore Christianity at first, 
treating it much like it treated Judaism, a religio licta, or legal sect—permission to 
follow one’s own religion in the Roman Empire was granted as long as that religion 
did not interfere with Roman authority. The first concerted backlash against 
Christianity is thought to have been the persecution that arose from Nero’s false 
accusation of Christian guilt in the fire that destroyed a portion of Rome in the 60s. 
From this time until Constantine, Christianity was treated as an illegal religion and, 
though sporadic, official persecution of Christianity generally increased over the next 
two centuries. The worst persecution was under Diocletian, emperor from 303 to 311.  
Instead of Christianity declining during these troubled times, it actually 
multiplied. The early Church Father Tertullian is legendary for his more than 
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predictive quote in the early 200s: “The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the 
church.” Some estimates state that as much as 10% of the Roman Empire was 
Christian by the early 300s.
42
 By 313, Emperor Constantine had decided that 
Christianity could be a partner rather than an enemy of the state. In the Edit of 
Milan,
43
 Christianity was granted legal status. By 379, under the rule of Theodosius I, 
Christianity became the official religion of the empire, and now “pagan” religions 
were persecuted.
44
 
 While Christianity itself is rooted firmly in the life of Jesus and the writings of 
both the Old and New Testaments, this religion has often intersected with the 
discipline of philosophy. In the history of Christian theology, philosophy has 
sometimes been seen as a natural complement to theological reflection, while at other 
times the advocates for the two disciplines have regarded each other as mortal 
enemies.  
Some early Christians rejected any merger between Christianity and 
philosophy. The conflict between the two modes of thought is recorded in scripture, 
in Paul's encounters with Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in Athens,
45
 his diatribe 
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against Greek philosophy in his letter to Corinth (the wisdom of the Greeks compared 
to the foolishness of God),
46
 and his warning against philosophy to two Asian (Minor) 
churches.
47
 Later, the church father, Tertullian (160–225) declared, “What has Athens 
to do with Jerusalem?” to show that Greek philosophy has nothing to do with 
Christianity and any intrusion of secular philosophical reason into theological 
reflection was out of order. This hostile reaction toward Greek philosophy happened, 
not accidentally, more often in the West than the East. The West saw in speculative 
Greek philosophy an enemy of clear practical thinking and living. In addition, the 
western Church Fathers believed that the “fall of humanity” had perverted human 
reasoning to such an extent that it could not be trusted. Greek philosophy distorted 
truth rather than uncovering it. The following lengthy quote from Tertullian shows 
the western Christian mind at work, and later (see next chapter) a similar mind-set 
would influence parts of eastern Christianity as well. 
These are “the doctrines” of men and “of demons” produced for itching ears 
of the spirit of this world’s wisdom: this the Lord called “foolishness,” and 
“chose the foolish things of the world” to confound even philosophy itself. 
For it (philosophy) is that which is the material of the world’s wisdom, the 
rash interpreter of the nature and the dispensation of God. Indeed heresies are 
themselves instigated by philosophy. From this source came the Aeons, and I 
know not what infinite forms, and the trinity of man in the system of 
Valentinus, who was of Plato’s school. From the same source came Marcion’s 
better god, with all his tranquility; he came of the Stoics. Then, again, the 
opinion that the soul dies is held by the Epicureans; while the denial of the 
restoration of the body is taken from the aggregate school of all the 
philosophers; also, when matter is made equal to God, then you have the 
teaching of Zeno; and when any doctrine is alleged touching a god of fire, 
then Heraclitus comes in. The same subject-matter is discussed over and over 
again by the heretics and the philosophers; the same arguments are involved. 
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Whence comes evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? and in 
what way does he come? Besides the question which Valentinus has very 
lately proposed—Whence comes God? Which he settles with the answer: 
From enthymesis and ectroma. Unhappy Aristotle! Who invented for these 
men dialectics, the art of building up and pulling down; an art so evasive in its 
propositions, so far-fetched in its conjectures, so harsh, in its arguments, so 
productive of contentions—embarrassing even to itself, retracting everything, 
and really treating of, in the sense of conclusively settling, nothing! Whence 
spring those “fables and endless genealogies,” and “unprofitable questions,” 
and “words which spread like a cancer?” From all these, when the apostle 
would restrain us, he expressly names philosophy as that which he would have 
us be on our guard against. Writing to the Colossians, he says, “See that no 
one beguile you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, 
and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy Ghost.” He had been at Athens, and 
had in his interviews (with its philosophers) become acquainted with that 
human wisdom which pretends to know the truth, whilst it only corrupts it, 
and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its 
mutually repugnant sects. What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? 
What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between 
heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from “the porch of Solomon,”    
who had himself taught that “the Lord should be sought in simplicity of 
heart.” Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, 
Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after 
possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our 
faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is 
nothing which we ought to believe besides.
48
 
 
While Tertullian does not completely dismiss all non-Christian philosophy out 
of hand, “he clearly sees in philosophy as a comprehensive method and world view 
the most serious threat to Christian orthodoxy.”
49
  
However, the early eastern Church Fathers were generable favorable toward 
Greek philosophy as long as it did not contradict biblical teachings. Even Paul tips his 
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hand that he has enjoyed a Greek education by occasionally quoting from Greek poets 
and philosophers.
50
 Over time, as Christianity spread throughout the Hellenic world, 
an increasing number of church leaders were educated in Greek philosophy, leading 
to a fusion of the two modes of thought. Justin Martyr (c. 100–165), for example 
believed that God scattered “the seeds of his Logos [Word]” throughout the world 
before sending Jesus. Thus, Justin believed that the world had experienced some 
truths of God through philosophy even before Jesus came into the world. Justin also 
held that Christianity brought to fulfillment some of the insights of classical 
philosophy including that of Platonism.
51
 Another church father, Clement of 
Alexandria (c. 150–215), asserted that God gave philosophy to the Greeks in order to 
prepare them for the coming of Christ. Thus, Greek philosophy was not a competing 
worldview. According to Clement, Jesus was the fulfillment of philosophy. 
“Philosophy, he contended, was as much a revelation from God to the Greeks as the 
Old Testament was a revelation to the Jews.”
52
 Christian centers of learning, where 
Hellenic literature was recognized and used, were found in Alexandria, Caesarea, 
Antioch, Edessa, and Nisibis in the second-third century. (These last two cities were 
located on the border between Syria and Persia and will play a prominent role in the 
Byzantine period.) Origen (185–254), one of the most distinguished early Church 
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Fathers, teaching in Alexandria and then in Caesarea, gave this advice to one of his 
students regarding the appropriate place of Greek philosophy: 
But I am anxious that you should devote all the strength of your natural good 
parts to Christianity for your end; and in order to this, I wish to ask you to 
extract from the philosophy of the Greeks what may serve as a course of study 
or a preparation for Christianity, and from geometry and astronomy what will 
serve to explain the sacred Scriptures, in order that all that the sons of the 
philosophers are wont to say about geometry and music, grammar, rhetoric, 
and astronomy, as fellow-helpers to philosophy, we may say about philosophy 
itself, in relation to Christianity.
53
 
 
But even in the East, not all Christians were ready to merge Greek and 
Christian thought. Here again we will see this kind of attitude grow as we enter the 
Byzantine period in the next chapter. The Apostolic Constitutions, written in Syria 
sometime in the third century, condemned the use of pagan works in very clear terms: 
Abstain from all the heathen books. For what hast thou to do with such 
foreign discourses, or laws, or false prophets, which subvert the faith of the 
unstable? For what defect dost thou find in the law of God, that thou shouldest 
have recourse to those heathenish fables? For if thou hast a mind to read 
history, thou hast the books of the Kings; if books of wisdom or poetry, thou 
hast those of the Prophets, of Job, and the Proverbs, in which thou wilt find 
greater depth of sagacity than in all the heathen poets and sophisters, because 
these are the words of the Lord, the only wise God. If thou desirest something 
to sing, thou hast the Psalms; if the origin of things, thou hast Genesis; if laws 
and statutes, thou hast the glorious law of the Lord God. Do thou therefore 
utterly abstain from all strange and diabolical books.
54
 
 In addition to the place of Greek philosophy generally, Christian converts also 
had to decide specifically what kind of schools and what kind of education they 
wanted for themselves and for their children. Since official elementary Christian 
schools did not exist in this pre-Constantine era, the only choices were no education 
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or pagan education. With this dilemma in front of them, even Tertullian relented and 
advised Christians to take advantage of pagan schools as long as they did not 
compromise their salvation. The key aversion to these schools was not so much their 
philosophy as their intimate link to Greek/Roman religion. So a liberal education was 
desired but not at the expense of losing one’s religious compass. The claim that 
Christians were obscurantist and little interested in a full cultural education during 
this period has many advocates but this claim is seriously flawed and overstated. 
Christianity from its beginning was an educative institution; however, it is true that its 
educational philosophy did have strong nonnegotiable presuppositions that impacted 
the way in which it interacted with non-Christian ideas. In some ways, it could be 
said that Christianity and Greek philosophy worked in unrelated, but not necessarily 
antagonistic, realms of how to understand reality, so comparisons of the two must be 
done thoughtfully. “Christianity does not stand in opposition to Greek philosophy as 
one doctrine against another doctrine. The natural, spontaneous form of Christianity 
is not written, didactic instruction . . . The teaching of Christ . . . stands in stark 
contrast to Hellenism by virtue of its total lack of reasoned, theoretical views 
concerning the universe and God.”
55
 This is neither a positive nor a negative 
evaluation, according to Emile Brehier. Christianity did offer the development of 
philosophical speculation tools with which to focus on that which is essentially 
subject, as opposed to the object-centered ontology of Aristotle, and a view of linear 
history and a resultant byproduct that can be called “progress.” To say, for instance, 
                                                           
     
55
  Emile Brehier, The Hellenistic & Roman Age, trans. by Wade Baskin (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1965), 218, 219.  
 
 151 
that Christianity is “irrational” and therefore an enemy of philosophy indeed forces 
Christianity to respond to an irrelevant question. We will encounter Christian ties to 
Greek philosophy more fully in the next chapter as we consider the place and effects 
of the Byzantine Empire in the story of Western intellectual development.  
I have described in the last chapter the beginnings of the two schools created 
and staffed by Plato (the Academy) and Aristotle (the Lyceum). I will now follow the 
progress of these two learning institutions through the Hellenistic period, 
remembering that one indication of the continued use of these two philosophers will 
be found, though not exclusively, through the life of their representative schools.
56
  
 
3.5 Plato and the Academy through the Later Hellenistic Period 
 The history of the Plato’s Academy is often divided into three periods, 
corresponding to different points of emphasis in its philosophical priorities. The first 
phase is known as the Old Academy. Plato was the first scholarch or leader of the 
Academy, keeping this active post for forty years. Plato appointed Speussipus 
(leadership dates: 347–339), his nephew, as his successor. (Afterward the scholarch 
was elected for life by the members of the school.) These early Academy scholarchs 
developed metaphysical and ethical systems inspired by the positive arguments 
contained in dialogues such as the Republic and the Phaedo. Speusippus especially 
studied the theory of logical classifications and the science of numbers. The third 
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scholarch was Xenocrates of Chalcedon (leadership dates: 339-314) who emphasized 
Platonic theology. The fourth scholarch was Polemon (or Polemo) of Athens 
(leadership dates: 314-269) who studied Plato’s ethics. In 268, Crates briefly ruled the 
Academy; he was especially interested in ethics. Other students (students were 
sometimes called Academicians) who contributed to the fame of the Old Academy 
were Heraclides of Pontus, Eudoxus of Cnidus, Philippus of Opus, Crantor of Soloi 
(the first commentator of Plato’s Timaeus, discussed later), and of course Aristotle 
himself (who was passed over as the scholarch after Plato and started his own 
school). The key to this early period of the Academy was its direct dependency and 
continuation of Plato’s own ideas. 
 During the second Academy period (sometimes called the New Academy, 
sometimes called the Middle Academy), the school departed significantly from 
Plato’s teachings and moved in the direction of Scepticism when Arcesilaus (315–
240) became the sixth Academy scholarch. This change in the Academy’s priorities 
and presuppositions represents a shift away from exegesis of Plato’s doctrines and 
metaphysical speculation. Arcesilaus turned away from the system-building emphasis 
of the Old Academy and instead attacked the arguments of others. According to 
Cicero, the aim of such attacks was to produce epoche, or suspension of judgment. 
Arcesilaus held that only subjective certainty of the truth is available. Some have 
asked if this shift in the Academy was actually an abandonment of Plato’s essential 
doctrines. Later, Carneades (214–129), perhaps the most prominent head of the 
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skeptical Academy, continued and expanded the “suspension of judgment” trend and 
proclaimed a theory of probability in contrast to a search for metaphysical realities.  
 The third Academy period (sometimes referred to as the New Academy or 
Middle Platonism
57
) begins after Philo of Larissa held the position of scholarch 
(leadership dates: 88-79) and the later leadership of Antiochus of Ascalon (130-69). 
The Academy tried to return to Plato’s original teachings, while moderating the 
positions of Scepticism, allowing for the possibility of some absolute knowledge of 
reality. It restored, in come measure, the declining reputation of the Platonic school. 
The Academy was inclined toward eclecticism and often combined the most 
acceptable views of the Stoics, Sceptics, Platonists, and later even some of the 
Peripatetics (from Aristotle’s school) as well. Many of their discussions centered 
around the interpretation of Plato’s so-called Unwritten Doctrines, inspired by 
Pythagorean philosophy and involving an original, pair of first principles—the One 
and the Dyad—and how to understand this doctrine in light of the creation discussion 
given in the Timaeus dialogue. The most important Middle Platonists were Philo of 
Alexandria (30 B.C- A.D.45), Plutarch of Chaeronea (A.D. 45-125), and Albinus (fl. 
149-157) whose handbook of Platonic philosophy is an interesting example of Middle 
Platonic eclecticism. 
The thinkers comprising the philosophy referred to as Middle Platonism held 
widely varying and sometimes even divergent ideas. One might wonder why we 
would even call some of these thinkers Platonists at all. However, it must be 
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remembered that Plato did not create a set of doctrines for his students and 
successors; his legacy is seen rather in a series of problems that have filled the minds 
of philosophers for over two millennia. Platonism, therefore, should not be thought of 
a simple explanation of Plato’s doctrines, but rather as a creative engagement with 
Plato’s texts and with certain doctrines handed down by the Academy as belonging to 
Plato.  
The Academy developed in different cities and, notably, these offshoots were 
not always directly connected with the Athenian home of Plato’s Academy. There is 
some discussion about whether the Academy was actually functioning from 85 BC 
until the 2
nd
 century AD. After a lapse of some kind during the early Roman 
occupation, the Academy was “refounded” as a new institution by some outstanding 
Platonists of late antiquity who presented themselves as an uninterrupted tradition 
reaching back to Plato.
58
 The last philosophers of the revived Academy taught in the 
6th century and were drawn from various parts of the Hellenistic cultural world, 
suggesting a broad syncretism of the common culture. This takes us to the time of the 
closing of the Academy under Byzantine leadership, covered in the next chapter.  
However, to continue our view of the flow of Platonic thought and to show 
that Platonic philosophy exhibited continuity during this period, I will end this section 
by introducing the neo-Platonic school which found it beginning point in the third 
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century.
59
 Ammonius Saccas (d. c. 242) is regarded as the initiator of neo-Platonism. 
Plotinus (204–270) was his disciple for eleven years in his Alexandria school. The 
philosophers described as neo-Platonists did not found a school as much as attempt to 
preserve the teachings of Plato.
60
 They regarded themselves as Platonists, pure and 
simple. Neo-Platonism is generally regarded as a religious philosophy, and neo-
Platonists can be considered a type of mysticism. Neo-Platonism is a form of 
idealistic monism also called theistic monism (but not pantheism) even though for 
most, because it separated spirit and body so far apart, that it functionally became 
dualistic in practice.
61
 Neo-Platonism is sometimes described as “the final form of 
Greek philosophy,”
62
 and by others a last-ditch attempt “to revive and restate classical 
philosophy as a viable alternative to the Christian faith.”
63
 Neo-Platonism was 
especially attractive to certain Christian thinkers because it allowed them to use 
Plato’s ideas as a way to talk about both the transcendence and immanence of God. 
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We will see that neo-Platonism was soon rejected by Christian orthodoxy because of 
its overemphasis on rationality and a troubling dualism between spirit and body. 
As we move further into the Roman period and away from the classical Greek 
period, the decline of the uniquely humanistic Greek mindset is advancing. The 
reasons for this decline are diverse but ultimately that can be gathered together into 
one general problem: the inquisitive mind was replaced by the dogmatic mind, as is 
often the case in the decline of culture generally.  
The teachers of the day taught formulated statements, rules, definitions in 
place of direct experience with reality. In place of concrete experiences, 
memorizing was made to take the place of creative effort. They had too much 
reverence for ancient authorities and too little regard for their own abilities. 
This procedure indicated that Hellenism had exhausted its resources, and did 
not possess the power of inner regeneration.”
64
  
 
Actually, this high view of the classic philosophers did enable them to take on 
an air of immutability and allowed their works to pass generally unchanged and 
unimpeded through the Hellenistic period. The fact that they were seen as 
academically “untouchable” is a key fact to their longevity. However, with neo-
Platonism there was one brave attempt to take the basic Platonic philosophical 
schema and to mold it into a slightly altered form. “Each generation produced fewer 
creative thinkers than the preceding one. During the first Christian centuries there 
were few great scholars in literature and science and only the Neoplatonists in 
philosophy.”
65
 Neo-Platonism was one of the few attempts to enliven the 
philosophical world of later Hellenism and represented a purposeful effort to 
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reinterpret the basic metaphysical and epistemological stance of Plato. It provides for 
us an important connecting path for the thought of Plato between the time of early 
Hellenism and the later Byzantine period. 
 In sum, the third period of Plato’s Academy, the Middle Platonic period, that 
both recaptured the essence of Plato’s original thought and added new energy to 
Platonism, giving it the ability to adapt to the next installment of Platonic thought, 
neo-Platonism, and facilitating its journey into Christian thought, in one form or 
other, during the Byzantine period.  
 
3.6 Aristotle and the Lyceum through the Later Hellenistic Period 
Aristotle joined Plato’s Academy at age 17 in the year 367 B.C. He 
maintained a writing career through 343, when he moved to Macedonia to tutor 
Phillip’s son Alexander. In 335, he returned to Athens and began attracting students, 
using a location named the Lyceum.
66
 For nearly the remainder of his life, it was here 
that Aristotle lectured, wrote most of his philosophical treatises and dialogues, and 
systematically collected books for the one of the first libraries in European history. 
He lectured in the peripatos, a shaded walkway area. Later Aristotle’s followers 
would be called the peripatetics, referencing Aristotle’s place and style of lecture.
67
 
“Aristotle does not seem as much concerned to change the world. Plato’s Academy 
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was a revolutionary club, Aristotle’s Lyceum was more like a university.”
68
 Toward 
the end of his life, he left the school under charges of impiety and died one year later 
in 322.  
 Theophrastus served as the second head of the school, to whom Aristotle’s 
own library was bequeathed. When Theophrastus died, he gave instructions for his 
and Aristotle’s library to be continued at the Lyceum, under the care of one of his 
students, Neleus. But Neleus moved back to Scepsis, in Asia Minor. The ancient 
historian Strabo tells us that Neleus, “bequeathed [the library] to his heirs, ordinary 
people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they 
heard how zealously the Attalic [local] kings . . . were searching for books to build up 
the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench.”
69
 
From the time of Aristotle until 86 B.C., there was a continuous succession of 
philosophers in charge of the school in the Lyceum but the institution was seen by 
most as in decline, perhaps because Aristotle’s literary works were not as easily 
accessible, perhaps the leadership was not as capable, perhaps negative eternal effects 
created distractions. But, according to Laughlin,  
the fundamental cause of the decline [of the school and] the study of 
Aristotle’s work on logic was this: The philosophers and scholars in the 
school after Straton [third leader of the Lyceum, 285-269] did not value 
Aristotle’s work . . . enough to advance it. They did not value it enough to 
study it. They did not value it enough even to preserve it for the next 
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generation . . . Within two generations, the school had become a dry 
riverbed.
70
 
 
Straton’s successors were not familiar with the full range of Aristotle’s works 
and there existed no tightly systematized summary of Aristotle’s philosophy. Students 
who attended the Lyceum often were even hostile to Aristotelianism. For almost 200 
years Aristotle’s own work was for all practical purposes largely unused, while his 
general ideas were discussed in only a nonsystematic way.
71
 Regarding Aristotle’s 
own library that had been buried and hidden, Strabo gives further comment: 
But much later [c. 100 B.C.], when the books had been damaged by moisture 
and moths, their descendents [Neleus’ relatives] sold them to Apellicon of 
Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of 
Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and 
therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he 
made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the 
books full of errors.
72
  
 
 Apparently, Aristotle’s works were published, especially in the Athens area, 
during this period of recovery and the Lyceum was able to work again with his direct 
ideas, even if the copies of his books sometimes contained errors. 
The school was sacked by Roman general Lucius Cornelius Sulla in 86 B.C., 
destroying much of the Lyceum and disrupting the life of the school considerably. 
Plutarch says Sulla, “seized for himself the library of Appellicon the Teian. This 
library contained most of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, of which good 
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editions were not then in circulation.”
73
 Tyrannion later gained access to this library 
and examined and arranged the manuscripts, copies of which were received by 
Andronicus, who is often credited with the production of the first reliable edition of 
Aristotle; an edition that exercised an enormous influence on a return to Aristotle. 
Andronicus accomplished two actions that helped ensure passage of Aristotle’s ideas 
to the future. First, he provided and published a moderately accurate edition of 
Aristotle’s works. Second, he led a network of Aristotelian scholars, likely in Rome 
rather than in Athens. Various individual philosophers kept alive the Aristotelian 
tradition, both at the Lyceum and in other areas of the region, for example on the 
island of Rhodes. Notable among them is Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. A.D. 175-
225), sometimes called the last true Aristotelian philosopher of the ancient world, 
more often called The Exegete (The Interpreter) and “the second Aristotle.”
74
 After 
Alexander, Aristotle’s writings continued to be studied by some but few fully 
separated his ideas from Plato’s philosophy. Most obviously, the neo-Platonic 
scholars of the third century often used portions of Aristotle’s ideas, sometimes 
inappropriately, to support their own ideas and thus kept Aristotle in the philosophical 
picture at large. “Fortunately, their presentations of Aristotle’s doctrines on logic 
were little corrupted by their Neo-Platonic views.”
75
 While it is true that the works we 
have today from Aristotle may have passed through many hands and minds in these 
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early centuries, there is reasonable confidence that when we read Aristotle today, we 
are in the company of authentic Aristotelian thinking. 
The Lyceum may have been re-founded later in the first century B.C. by 
Andronicus of Rhodes, but this is uncertain. By the second century A.D., the Lyceum 
was again a flourishing center of philosophical activity. The Roman emperor Marcus 
Aurelius appointed teachers to all the main philosophical schools in Athens, including 
the Lyceum. The destruction of Athens in A.D. 267 probably ended this renaissance 
of scholarly activity. The work of Peripatetic philosophers continued elsewhere, but it 
is unclear whether they returned to the Lyceum. Nothing certain is known about the 
Lyceum during the remainder of the third through early sixth centuries A.D. Any 
remaining philosophical activity there would certainly have ended in A.D. 529, when 
the emperor Justinian closed the philosophical schools in Athens.  
 
3.7 Ancient Textual Transmission and Early Greek Commentators 
As we conclude this section of our historical analysis, it is important to remind 
ourselves how ancient manuscripts managed to survive down through the years of 
those early periods of human history that knew nothing of the modern book making 
methods or the printing press. Manuscript production was always done by hand, with 
its accompanying tedium and time-consuming labor. The common material for early 
books was papyrus rolls, which was a tenuous textile easily ruined or destroyed.
76
 As 
old manuscripts literally wore out, new ones had to be produced, manually. We who 
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today leisurely select a book from our library or purchase a work from an Internet site 
owe a great debt to those scribes who so meticulously copied original works, one 
careful letter at a time. These copies circulated and begat other copies which enabled 
the Greek tradition to move ever forward. Those who made these copies, whether the 
owners, the buyers, the borrowers, or professional copyists, maintained the stream of 
textual tradition on which we are so dependent today. We know none of the copyists 
by name, but we know their presence by virtue the works of Plato and Aristotle we 
read today. 
 To aid the reader in understanding more fully the text of a non-original 
manuscript, copyists, and editors began a system of margin notations. The obelos was 
a horizontal stroke placed in the margin just to the left of a verse, indicating that verse 
was considered spurious. The diple was an arrow or an X indicating a noteworthy 
point of content. The dotted diple referred to a different translation. The asteriskos, an 
X with four dots in the sign’s spaces, marked a verse incorrectly repeated in another 
passage. The asteriskos in combination with an obleos marked the interpolation of 
verses from another passage. Finally, the antisigma, a sideways U, marked passages 
in which the order had been disturbed.
77
 In the later Hellenistic period, the use of 
“subscriptions” allowed a copyist or editor to make a brief statement at the end of the 
manuscript indicating what kind of work he had done on the text. The practice of 
comparing manuscripts for accuracy likely happened in very early times, especially as 
book collecting and book selling began to flourish in the early Roman Empire period. 
                                                           
     
77
 The science of determining the most correct version of an ancient text is typically termed textual 
criticism and was especially prominent in the ancient world at the Library of Alexandria.   
 
 163 
Beyond those who simply copied original works, one important mode of 
philosophical transmission and expression, from the Hellenistic period and on 
through the Middle Ages, was the philosophical commentary.
78
 This activity 
presupposes the availability of Plato’s and Aristotle’s works in a form that suited the 
interests and needs of the time. Though meager, the information in our possession 
suggests that an intense editorial activity took place in the 1st century B.C.  
During the Hellenistic period, Plato and Aristotle were regarded as 
philosophical authorities and their works were subject to intense study.
79
 The primary 
purpose of a commentary was to explain a text. Typically, the text was divided into 
lemmata. A lemma is that which is quoted from a text in order to explain and interpret 
it. Sometimes the text was quoted in its entirety; other times only its beginning 
sentences were quoted. The lemma was always followed by an analysis of the text. 
The study of philosophers in the form of the commentary did not mean the cessation 
of scholarly philosophical thought. Quite the contrary; authors customarily used the 
commentary format not only to expound the works of Plato and Aristotle, but also as 
a vehicle for original philosophical theorizing. These commentaries were not always 
intended for publication, and were usually used by a small group of friends and 
students. We sometimes see the existence of two commentaries written in a different 
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format on the very same treatise by the same author, to be understood in the light of 
the fact that these commentaries were teaching tools. They were used to teach 
students with different skills and different levels of familiarity with the early Greek 
thinkers. Commentaries were written one after the other as part of a consolidated 
exegetical practice. Each generation of commentators read and interpreted Plato and 
Aristotle in the light of their own theoretical constructs, only to be replaced by the 
next generation of commentators, relying on their predecessors’ work to a greater or 
lesser degree. The commentary eventually became the standard form of exegesis. 
Most of these commentaries have been lost today. One remarkable exception is 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. His commentaries survive because they were adopted as 
exemplary models by later commentators.  
Alexander was a Peripatetic philosopher and commentator, active in the late 
second and early third century A.D.
80
 He continued the tradition of writing 
commentaries on Aristotle’s work established in the first century B.C. by Andronicus 
of Rhodes, the editor of Aristotle’s “esoteric” writings. This tradition reflected a 
gradual revival of interest in Aristotle’s philosophy, beginning in the late second 
century B.C., and helped to reestablish Aristotle as an active presence in 
philosophical debates in later antiquity. Aristotle’s philosophy had fallen into neglect 
and disarray in the second generation after his death and remained in the shadow of 
the Stoics, Epicureans, and Academic skeptics throughout the early Hellenistic age. 
Andronicus’ edition of what was to become the Corpus Aristotelicum consolidated 
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this renewed interest in Aristotle’s philosophy. Alexander became known as the 
exemplary commentator throughout later antiquity and the Middle Ages. As stated 
above, he is often referred to simply as “the commentator,” later sharing this title with 
Averroes. Alexander is not only regarded as the best of the ancient commentators but 
also as the last strictly Aristotelian one, whose aim was to present and defend 
Aristotle’s philosophy as a coherent whole, well suited to engage contemporary 
philosophical discussions. We must keep in mind that in the eyes of “the 
commentator,” Aristotle was an authority quite outside the common order. The 
doctrine of the Master was not the product of an ordinary human mind, subject to trial 
and error, but a unique achievement in a class of its own. As the translations of his 
work, first into Arabic and then into Latin, show, he continued to be treated as a 
leading authority and his work influenced the Aristotelian tradition immensely 
throughout late antiquity and the Middle Ages.
81
 
The later Hellenistic commentators on Aristotle were members of the neo-
Platonist schools and concentrated on documenting the substantial agreement 
between Platonic and Aristotelian thought, and to integrate Aristotle’s work into their 
neo-Platonist philosophical system.
82
 Their primary aim was no longer to recover and 
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preserve Aristotle’s thought for its own sake, but for the sake of finding agreement 
between Aristotle and Plato and presenting them as part of one and the same 
philosophical outlook. The study of Aristotle through close textual reading of his 
works continued, if not increased, in later Hellenism. So did the supply of 
commentaries on all the major works of Plato and Aristotle. Unlike Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, most of these commentators regarded themselves as Platonists. For 
them, Plato’s philosophy was superior to all the systems of thought that came later. In 
addition, they believed that all these later systems started out as developments of 
Plato’s philosophy. Aristotle was no exception to the rule. These commentators 
viewed Aristotle as a true descendant of Plato. This explains why, by reverting to 
Plato, they did not mean to reject Aristotle. On the contrary, they were convinced that 
Aristotle’s philosophy could be integrated into a Platonic framework. The fact that 
Aristotle was often read before Plato was not neutral with respect to a certain view of 
the nature of logic. By this time, logic was regarded as a tool for philosophy. The 
Platonism of late Hellenism was so comprehensive as a system of thought that it 
could harbor Aristotle’s philosophy. For most of these commentators, the 
disagreement on specific issues between Aristotle and Plato did not preclude harmony 
between the two philosophers on a deeper level. In reality, the reconciliation of Plato 
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and Aristotle attempted by these commentators consisted in a use of Aristotle’s works 
as a pre-requisite for the study of Plato’s philosophy.
83
 
Besides commentaries,
84
 other helpful works were produced that added to the 
transmission of both text and ideas of Plato and Aristotle: prolegomena, 
introductions, explanatory notes, discussion outlines, abridgements, compilations 
(compendia), and paraphrases. However, the commentary remained the primary 
resource for this and the succeeding periods of history. Classical scholars today owe a 
great deal to this entire group because they preserved, even if second-hand and in 
fragmentary form, a considerable amount of literature that may have otherwise been 
lost. “Moreover they handed a life-line to following centuries by furnishing them with 
the tools for maintaining a basically classical education.”
85
 
 
As I have shown, the path of Plato and Aristotle through the Hellenistic period 
is complex and has many high and low points, as we might expect over this long, 
600-year period of time. We have seen interest in the Greek classical philosophers 
stay in focus throughout the period, with these interesting focus points: 
                                                           
     
83
 The relationship between Plato and Aristotle has always been complex. Is Aristotle a logical 
extension of Plato, meaning that Plato must be read before Aristotle? Is Aristotle’s logic a prerequisite 
to fully exegeting Plato, meaning Aristotle must be read before Plato? Or are both systems different 
enough that each stands alone? This set of questions will surround our discussion throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation. Because of this concern, the primacy of either Plato or Aristotle in 
philosophical discussion will ebb and flow depending on current historical priorities. “It helps to 
recognize that, in some periods of history, Plato’s ideas and attitudes make obvious sense to thinking 
people, while in others, Aristotle’s vision of the world seems far more realistic and inspiring,” 
Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children, 49.  
 
     
84
 The term scholia is found in the research literature. Usually scholia refers to margin notes while 
commentary refers to a separate book of notes, often including the text or parts of the text. 
 
     
85
 Reynolds and Wilson, Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin 
Literature, 33. 
 168 
• Plato and Aristotle have attained a maximal status where they are read and 
revered but seldom challenged or developed. This pattern of thinking leads 
to a kind of philosophic sterility by the later Hellenistic age. In fact, by the 
end of the Hellenistic period, cultural aptitude in general is on the decline.  
• Hellenism has spread the ideology of Plato and Aristotle far and wide 
across the now Roman Empire. Greek philosophy is no stranger to the 
East or West, at least in basic outline. But this outflow has also allowed 
non-Greek ideas to mingle with Greek thought creating dynamic 
syncretistic variations of Plato and Aristotle, especially along geographical 
boundary zones. 
• The advent of Christianity is the most influential aspect of how Greek 
thought will move forward in Western thought. This new religion 
approaches the Greek writers with caution, but it does approach them. 
• With the Roman Empire still vital in A.D. 300, the advance of Greek 
thought to its western provinces seems assured. But two unanticipated 
events will change the course of Western civilization and the course of 
Greek philosophy to the West—the Fall of Rome and the domination (and 
split) of Christianity within the former Roman Empire.  
 
Brehier summarizes for us the complex period we have just passed and points 
us to the next part of our historical analysis: 
Nothing is harder to disentangle than the history of intellectual thought during 
the first two centuries A.D., which witnessed the brief but brilliant 
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resurgence—under Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—and subsequent 
disappearance of the great post-Aristotelian dogmatisms. The two centuries 
also witnessed the rebirth of Athenian idealism as it had existed during the 
fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Philo of 
Alexandria at the beginning of the first century A.D., Plutarch of Chaeronea 
(49-120), then the commentators on Plato, particularly Albinus (about the 
middle of the second century), and the commentators on Aristotle were its 
new exponents. At the same time a Pythagorean literature, impregnated with 
Platonism, came into existence. But alongside the great philosophical schools, 
how many new trends of thought took shape and penetrated the mainstream of 
civilization! The interpenetration of Hellenism and the Near East was 
continuous. The Alexandrian Jews, including Philo, were the first to make 
their influence felt. Then came Christianity, which produced simultaneously 
the great Gnostic systems and the apologists Justin, Tatian, and Irenaeus. Less 
conspicuous but no less active were the Eastern religions, particularly 
Mithraism, which had not only their forms of worship and mysteries but also 
comprehensive views of the world and of human destiny.
86
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Chapter 4 
The Fall of Rome and the Byzantine Era 
 
 A synthetic history is necessarily a lengthy process; a brief review of where 
we started and how far we have come seems appropriate at this juncture, 
approximately halfway between the Greek classical period (our basic beginning 
point) and the time of the 12th century European renaissance (our basic ending point). 
The impetus for this study arises from questioning how the classical Greek 
philosophical/educational tradition made its way to Western Europe to become the 
foundation of the Western intellectual tradition. (My assumption has been, as outlined 
in Chapter 1, that philosophical streams of thought are historically-bound and 
geographically influenced.) If the path between these two points were direct and 
obvious, there would be little reason to pursue this analysis. However, a preliminary 
review of the literature indicates that this path was actually quite nonlinear and 
surprisingly coincidental, what might be termed an accident of history.  
 With that initial direction and promise of potential discovery, I started my 
study with the two most studied Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. I placed 
these two thinkers within their own Greek tradition, but I also did more than this. I 
offered evidence that confirms perhaps the obvious but often ignored fact that Greek 
philosophy did not arise in a vacuum; indeed the Greek philosophical tradition played 
the role of borrower and adapter from a variety of civilizations that lay to the south 
and east of Greece, a point important to my later thesis. With this necessary context in 
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place, I demonstrated that the Greek mind did indeed produce creative, new ideas, 
providing an overview of Plato’s and Aristotle’s related but divergent philosophical 
systems. I traced the flow of Greek philosophical thought through the early 
Hellenistic era, on through the early Roman period, concluding with the rise of the 
yet-illegal religion of Christianity and later Hellenism. From the time of Plato and 
Aristotle, in the fourth century B.C. until the end of the Hellenistic period (according 
to my preferred definition) in A.D. 313 and Constantine’s Edit of Milan, the pathway 
of Plato and Aristotle toward modernity is unsurprisingly direct. These philosophical 
masters were studied and valued, to greater and lesser degrees, by Greeks and 
Romans alike. While the fate of their actual works was at times tenuous, their 
reputation and intellectual impact on cultural progress was generally steady through 
this period. Competing philosophies and creative synthesizers played their roles 
within this historical stream, but Platonic and Aristotelian ideas continued to be 
recognized as clearly significant in most educational settings. 
 With the fluidity of Hellenism and the domination Roman power, Greek ideas 
filled not only the Mediterranean basin but also regions in the Mesopotamian and 
European geopolitical arenas as well.
1
 The path of Greek philosophy to our target 
area, Western Europe, appears to be, at this point in history, in reasonably good 
condition. The only concerns that a hypothetical futurist from this period of time 
might raise about the advance of Greek philosophy are: 1. The increasing military 
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instability on Rome’s northwestern borders due to relentless pressure from Teutonic 
barbarians and 2. The curious rise of a new religion, Christianity, which seems to 
multiply in the face of concentrated effort to eliminate it and which has serious 
misgiving concerning so-called pagan philosophy. Those concerns will soon become 
nearly insurmountable obstacles to the progress of Greek philosophy.  
In this chapter, I will trace the path of the work and ideas of Plato and 
Aristotle during this most unique of historical periods. I will follow the thought of 
these Greek thinkers in both the west and east portions of the Roman Empire and will 
show that their philosophical works, systems of thought, and the fact of critical 
inquiry itself will find themselves in jeopardy.
2
 The next chapter will outline the 
unusual remedy to this double roadblock, namely the evolution of the Islamic Empire 
and its unlikely contact with Western Europe, with Greek philosophy in hand. This 
chapter then describes the heart of the problem associated with my research question. 
The following chapter will provide the solution to this question, which becomes the 
major thesis and premise of this dissertation. 
 
4.1 The Roman Empire Divided 
 In order to understand the next section of Greek philosophical transmission, 
we must look closely at Roman history in the early fourth century, for it is here that 
we find a major transition point in European history with great consequences for its 
near and far status. The Roman Empire (Imperium Romanum), beginning officially in 
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the years just prior to the birth of Christ, continued to grow at an accelerated pace, 
reaching its zenith in the reign of Trajan in the early A.D. 100s with the conquest of 
Dacia (roughly modern Romania). At the peak of their territorial conquest, Rome 
controlled the entire Mediterranean basin, including Asia Minor, Palestine and even, 
briefly, Mesopotamia in the east, North Africa to the south, the Iberian peninsula to 
the west, and as far to the northwest as the modern countries of France and England. 
Hadrian’s Wall across northern England still marks the northern limit of Rome’s 
advance against the fierce Scots. The basic northern dividing line between Roman 
control and barbarian influence is roughly drawn by the Rhine and Danube rivers, 
which bisect Europe from the northwest to the southeast.
3
 In the literary lilt of 
Edward Gibbon, the majesty and triumph of Rome are described in full color: 
In the second century of the Christian era, the empire of Rome comprehended 
the fairest part of the earth, and the most civilized portion of mankind. The 
frontiers of that extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient renown and 
disciplined valour. The gentle, but powerful, influence of laws and manners 
had gradually cemented the union of the provinces. Their peaceful inhabitants 
enjoyed or abused the advantages of wealth and luxury. The image of a free 
constitution was preserved with decent reverence. The Roman senate appeared 
to possess the sovereign authority, and devolved on the emperors all the 
executive powers of government.
4
 
 
Prior to the establishment of the Empire, the territories of the Roman Republic 
were divided among the “Second Triumvirate,” composed of Octavian (later called 
Augustus), Mark Antony, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. Antony received the 
provinces in the East: Achaea, Macedonia and Epirus (roughly modern Greece), 
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Bithynia, Pontus and Asia (roughly modern Turkey), Syria, Cyprus, and Cyrenaica. 
These lands had been conquered by Alexander the Great and, thus, much of the 
leadership in this region was of Greek/Macedonian origin. This whole region, 
especially the major cities, had largely assimilated Greek culture; Greek was the 
majority language of the East. Octavian, on the other hand, obtained the Roman 
provinces of the West: Italia (modern Italy), Gaul (modern France), Gallia Belgica 
(parts of modern Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), and Hispania (modern 
Spain and Portugal). Lepidus received the minor province of Africa (roughly modern 
Tunisia), which Octavian soon took away. These western provinces were largely 
Latin-speaking. 
After the defeat of Antony, Octavian controlled a united Roman Empire. 
While the Roman Empire featured many distinct cultures, all experienced gradual 
“Romanization.” While the predominantly Greek culture of the East and the 
predominantly Latin culture of the West functioned effectively as an integrated 
whole, eventually political and military developments would realign and divide the 
Empire along these East/West cultural and linguistic lines. A brief review of how the 
Roman Empire split into two sections will be helpful at this point in order to show 
what impact this historical shift had on Western philosophical development. 
As the Roman Empire expanded its political reach geographically, its most 
distant provinces, measured from its capitol in Rome, became less interested in 
subservience to the Romans and more eager to revolt and assume self-rule. Pressure 
from entities outside the Empire on its borders and even opportunistic Roman 
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generals added to these border challenges. By the third century, the Empire was faced 
with such a series of disputations that the Roman system faced near collapse. The 50-
year period of time from 235-284 is commonly called the “Crisis of the Third 
Century” or sometimes simply the period of “military anarchy.” In complete contrast 
to the Pax Romana of the first century, the third century saw both internal and 
external conflict, often bordering on civil war, due in great part to a lack of a 
systematized approach to the succession of Roman leadership. Between the years just 
mentioned, no fewer than 25 different emperors ruled Rome, providing an 
atmosphere of instability and chaos. This time of real crisis came to an end with the 
accession of emperor Diocletian in 284. 
Diocletian’s decisions regarding how the Empire should be managed played a 
most significant role in the later shape of Euro-Byzantine relations, the seeds of 
which he may have envisioned but whose full growth no one could have fully 
anticipated.
5
 In 286, Diocletian recognized what had become painfully obvious—the 
Empire was too large to efficiently manage from one central leadership location. He 
created a new system of governance that in effect divided the Empire into two 
administrative halves, one a western “Latin” section, the other an eastern “Greek” 
section. Each section had its own leader, called an “Augustus” (in effect creating two 
co-equal Emperors) and two “vice-emperors” called “Caesars,” who would move into 
the Augustus position when the current Augustus died or resigned. This group of four 
leaders, two in the West and two in the East, was affectionately known as the 
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Tetrarchy. While the Roman Senate remained in the traditional capitol of Rome, 
Diocletian, administering the eastern portion of the Empire, established a capitol in 
Nicomedia (in northwest Asia Minor) and Maximian, administering the western 
portion established a capital in Milan (in northern Italy). The system of the Tetrarchy 
quickly devolved into chaos again in 306, with an overabundance of claimants to the 
roles of Augusti and Caesars. Through a series of battles, Constantine emerged as 
victor of a reunified Empire. But the idea of a divided Empire persisted. 
Constantine’s decision in 324 to transform the ancient city of Byzantium
6
 into 
his new capitol of the entire Roman Empire was the key to a new era of eastern 
influence and western diminution. Constantinople (literally, “Constantine’s city”) 
became the new capitol of the Roman Empire, the Nova Roma. Roman resources 
were consistently shifted toward the eastern portion of the Empire, leaving the 
western provinces increasingly vulnerable. The Empire was again divided into two 
administrative sections—by 395 and especially after 408—and the split by this point 
was, for all practical purposes, permanent. The eastern Roman Empire, which we will 
now begin referring to as the Byzantine Empire,
7
 remained a viable entity until its 
                                                           
     
6
 Byzantium was an ancient Greek city, which, according to legend, was founded by Greek 
colonists in 667 B.C. and named after their king Byzas or Byzantas. The name “Byzantium” is a 
Latinization of the original name Byzantion. It was a key trading city due to its strategic location at the 
Black Sea’s only entrance on the Bosporus Strait, which connects the Black Sea with the Sea of 
Marmara, which, in turn, is connected by the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea, and thereby to the 
Mediterranean Sea. It is here that Asia and Europe met.  
 
     
7
 While Constantine I is sometimes hailed as the first Byzantine emperor, commonly Constantius II 
(337-361) who focused most of his power in the East, is often regarded as the first emperor of the 
Byzantine Empire, although the term “Byzantine Empire” was not used until the 19
th
 century. While 
the Roman Empire yet retained two halves, this portion was simply known as the Eastern Roman 
Empire or, by its Western contemporaries, as the Empire of the Greeks. To those who lived here, it was 
simply the Roman Empire and its emperors continued the unbroken succession of Roman leadership 
 177 
capture by the Ottomans in 1453, and Constantinople was renamed Istanbul. The 
future of the western Roman Empire however was already tenuous at the time of the 
East/West administrative split and it would collapse in the next century completely.   
For our purposes, the division of the Roman Empire into East and West 
partitions helps us understand a preliminary major difficulty in the transmission 
pathway of Greek philosophy to the West. As the Empire divided geographically, it 
also divided culturally. The strong Greek intellectual foundation found itself more 
and more isolated in the East and less and less attached to the West. This situation 
became more explicit in the 400s. 
 
4.2 The Fall of Rome and the Barbarian Invasion of the West 
 As Roman power became more consolidated in the East, the West quickly 
showed its vulnerability to its old nemeses, the so-called barbarian
8
 tribes to the 
north. Generally described as Teutonic, these tribes historically came from 
Scandinavian and Germanic homelands, on the northeast side of the Rhine and 
Danube rivers. Earlier Roman military leaders had tried, but unsuccessfully, to 
subdue these foreign forces. With the West weakened by a number of factors, not the 
least of which being its military potential, these barbarian tribes moved into Roman 
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territory in increasing waves of conquest. The first Germanic tribe to move into Italy 
was the Visigoths (west Goths) who succeeded in doing something that had not 
happened in 800 years—the sacking of Rome. The Caput mundi (“Capital of the 
World”), la Città Eterna (“The Eternal City”), had been overrun by unworthy 
barbarians. The citizens of Rome and indeed the entire western Roman arena were 
shaken to its foundations.
9
 The Christian writer Jerome summarizes the feelings of 
this period by Romans when he pens, “My voice sticks in my throat; and, as I dictate, 
sobs choke my utterance. The City which had taken the whole world was itself 
taken.”
10
 
 The Visigoths moved on to occupy Spain. But they were followed by another 
barbarian group, the Vandals, who pillaged Rome in 455 and finally settled in the 
former Roman provinces of North Africa. The Ostrogoths (East Goths) came next, 
fully occupying Rome. In 476, the generally accepted date of the fall of the western 
Roman Empire, the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustus, was 
disposed and replaced by a German, Odoacer, followed by the more well-known 
Theodoric the Great, “king of the Ostrogoths.” Other barbarian groups would overrun 
Western Europe and Great Britain, each grabbing a share of the former Empire—the 
Lombards, Burgundians, Franks, and Anglo-Saxons. Even the Mongol Huns, from 
Asia, tried to take a piece of the Roman corpse, but their stay was short. While the 
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East would occasionally make attempts, some successful for periods of time, to retake 
portions of the West, the Roman Empire was never the same again, and the West was 
in essence orphaned from its long-held stately position.
11
 
 It is true that these new non-Roman leaders still relied heavily on Roman laws 
and structure. While there were periods of anarchy, these barbarians knew enough to 
keep organizational systems alive. As well, many of these barbarian tribes had been 
Christianized to some extent by earlier missionaries. While most of these invading 
tribes ascribed to a brand of Christianity called Arianism, a type of theological heresy 
that treats the nature of Jesus Christ inappropriately, they did accept most ethical 
tenets of the Gospels. Eventually many moved to a position of orthodoxy, recognizing 
the one steady force in all of this time of upheaval, namely the leadership of the 
bishop of Rome, who would later become known as the head of the Western, Latin 
Church, or the Pope. The period of time, beginning with the acceptance and 
domination of Christianity in the Roman Empire, instituted by Constantine (more on 
him later in the chapter) and continuing through the fall of the western Roman Empire 
and its resolution under Teutonic leadership cannot be understood apart from 
comprehending the close association of Church and State during these centuries.
12
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This period of time is sometimes referred to as the Dark Ages, perhaps more 
appropriately called the early Middle Ages. 
 For sake of definition, and to orient ourselves historically, I will use Dunn’s 
useful set of definitions at this point to focus our next step of the discussion: 
The Middle Ages cover a 900-year period from the political collapse of the 
Roman Empire in the 5
th
 century to what is considered the beginning of 
modern times in the 14
th
 century. This era in Western history is often 
conveniently divided into two time periods. The Early Middle Ages, known 
also as the Dark Ages, cover the period from the 5
th
 to the 10
th
 centuries. This 
is generally considered to be a period of disorder and decline, characterized by 
the steady growth of Christianity and a far degree of pious acceptance of what 
was taught. The High Middle Ages cover the period from the 11
th
 to the 14
th
 
centuries. This latter period was characterized by advancements in civilization 
and a renewed intellectual vitality . . . Thus the Middle Ages can be said to 
mark the transition from ancient cultures to those of the modern world.
13
 
 
 
 
4.3 The Fate of Greek Philosophy after the Demise of the Western Roman Empire 
 It is important to note that though barbarians controlled the western portions 
of the former Roman Empire after the 5th century, that fact in itself does not prescribe 
a complete destruction of law and order or of cultural integrity. If one looks carefully 
at Western European history during this time period, glimmers of hope and advance 
can be found.
14
 However, it must be admitted that the West did fall prey to a 
tremendous intellectual-eating monster, as long established patterns of living 
dissolved, not necessarily immediately but relentlessly. 
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They employed Roman civil servants, drew up written codes of law, and 
permitted cases involving Romans to be tried by Roman law. But the integrity 
of ancient civilization had been destroyed, and nothing could restore or save 
ancient culture from complete wreck. Tyranny stalked the kingdoms erected 
by the barbarians, and was rather stimulated than arrested by the 
assassinations and civil wars which it provoked. Cities and villages wasted 
away. Roads and lines of shipping were abandoned, and western Europe 
settled down to the centuries of religious devotion, of local and personal 
government, and of farming . . . Before a body of responsible rulers could 
once more be built up, centuries of government by public enemies and 
consequent anarchy were to intervene.
15
 
 
Adding to this rather dismal portrait, while Durrant’s philosophical 
evaluations may not always be accurate, I do like the palate of literary colors he 
chooses to describe the decline of the western Roman Empire: 
Whatever the cause, the wealth of Rome passed into poverty, the organization 
into disintegration, the power and pride into decadence and apathy. Cities 
faded back into the undistinguished hinterland; the roads fell into disrepair 
and no longer hummed with trade; the small families of the educated Romans 
were outbred by the vigorous and untutored German stocks that crept, year 
after year, across the frontier; pagan culture yielded to Oriental cults; and 
almost imperceptibly the Empire passed into the Papacy.
16
 
 
 Here we have now arrived at a point of crisis and departure for the West, with 
the fall of Rome as a historical anchor point. What challenges will the Western mind 
face in continuing within the Greek philosophical/educational tradition in light of the 
barbaric advances into the once, but now deficient, Roman-Greco stability of former 
times? Let me outline these challenges in brief: 
• Lack of political and social stability. With various Germanic tribes and 
individual leaders vying for authority and extension of territory, an 
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atmosphere of chaos and a priority on survival often trumped attempts at 
sustained philosophical thought and sapped intellectual energy.  
• Barbarian domination brought with it an inherent lack of cultural 
appreciation and financial support, as was common under former Roman 
rule. 
• Lines of communication and dialogue, always important factors in 
intellectual growth, both internally in Western Europe and externally to 
the eastern Roman Empire, were limited as provincialism increased in 
Europe and lines of commerce with the East faltered.  
• Public education was downplayed as social cohesiveness in general 
decayed. Education was shifted to the isolation of monasteries, removed 
for all practical purposes from daily life. 
• The study of the Greek language fell into disuse and the lack of adequate 
translations in Latin of most of the key Greek philosophical works 
suffocated study of this literature. With the advance of vulgar, regional 
languages, this problem of translation deepened. 
• The western Roman mind, even prior to the fall of Rome, was biased 
toward practical-based thought over against speculative thought. While 
both Plato and Aristotle have practical aspects in their works, the genius 
lies in metaphysical exploration. 
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• While Hellenism had impacted much of the Roman Empire, its effects 
were amplified in the East; after the fall of Rome, this cultural influence 
faded rapidly in the West. 
• With the rapid rise of Christianity in the West, the Church provided one 
important point of continuity and stability during this period. 
Christianity’s goals at this time where primarily oriented around the goals 
of biblical education and the spread of orthodox thinking. Critical studies 
were not a priority during this time and in many cases could be seen as 
antithetical to the authority of the Church and the Pope, whose purposes 
were aimed at convergent not divergent thought. 
With this catalogue of factors inhibiting the continuity and use of Greek 
philosophy in the now-fragmented West, it is easy to see how the influence of Plato 
and Aristotle would cease to be a major player in the intellectual development of 
Europe. “The ravages of conquest and barbarism made the prospects for cultural life 
extremely bleak, and within the narrowing world of culture the place allotted to 
classical . . . literature was insecure.”
17
 These factors describe well the decline and 
virtual disappearance of Greek thought in the West at this time. Here lies my key 
research question: If Greek philosophy was effectively blocked from the West in the 
early Middle Ages, how then did it later come to provide a foundation for the Western 
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intellectual tradition? That question will be addressed in the next chapter, but for now 
it is enough to realize and admit that such a problem did exist historically in Europe. 
Before moving on to the philosophical environment of the eastern Roman 
Empire after the fall of Rome, I will show that the West was not completely without 
witnesses to the classic Greek tradition or to intellectual activity.
18
 There were 
creative minds and faithful transmitters in the West, as I will show below, but these 
connectors to the Greek tradition were few and isolated and in the end would have 
been inadequate to bring Greek thought fully into Western thinking. But they are 
worthy of a brief survey within the scope of my fuller discussion. Again, note that 
each of the following philosophical “candles” is Christian and reflect the priorities of 
Christianity, namely faith over reason.
19
 To greater or lesser degrees, they allowed the 
Greek mindset to augment their Christian metaphysics and epistemology but all are 
first a Christian, second a philosopher.  
We have already seen in the last chapter the opinion of early western Church 
fathers like Tertullian who opposed any allegiance between Greek philosophy and 
Christian theology. Later western Fathers continued this general aversion to Greek 
thought around the time of the fall of Rome. For example, Jerome (ca. 340-420), 
renown for his remarkable Latin translation of the Bible known as the Vulgate, 
enjoyed the works of secular writers like Cicero as a young man. However, later in 
life, he was unable to reconcile his love of “pagan” literature with his devotion to 
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Christ. He asked himself, “What communion hath light and darkness? What concord 
hath Christ with Belial? What has Horace to do with the Psalter, Virgil with the 
Gospels and Cicero with Paul? . . . We ought not to drink the cup of Christ and the 
cup of devils at the same time.” He recalled a dream he once had: 
Suddenly I was caught up in the spirit and dragged before the judge’s 
judgment seat: and there the light was so dazzling and the brightness shining 
from those who stood around so radiant, that I flung myself upon the ground 
and did not dare to look up. I was asked to state my condition and replied that 
I was a Christian. But He who presided said: “Thou liest; thou art a 
Ciceronian, not a Christian. For where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be 
also.”
20
  
 
 The opposition of Western Christianity deepened as time went on. For 
example, in 398, the Fourth Council of Carthage declared the reading of secular 
works prohibited. In the sixth century, Gregory the Great, bishop of Rome and 
sometimes considered to be the first Pope (i.e., the first bishop of Rome to wield the 
full authority of the papal see) continued this advocacy of nonuse of pagan literature. 
Even though he had received a good education himself, he was opposed to liberal 
culture that depended on Greek thought. Having seen the endless controversies, often 
based on Greek reasoning, in the eastern portion of the Church, Gregory desired unity 
and harmony over even the potential for schism. While Gregory the Great, no doubt, 
had as part of his early education an introduction to the Greek classics, it is reported 
that Gregory, even though ambassador to the Eastern Patriarch at Constantinople for 
six years, never bothered to learn Greek. 
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 With Christianity the ever-present overseer of philosophical energy in the 
West in the early Middle Ages, the stream of Greek intellectual activity can be seen 
reduced to a trickle in the following examples. 
 
4.31 Augustine 
 Augustine (354-430) is easily the most prominent of the later western Church 
Fathers. His route to Christianity was long and eventful and was not fully embraced 
until his 30s. His education included classical studies, mostly in Latin but some in 
Greek.
21
 He floated between several philosophical positions as a young adult, finally 
becoming part of a neo-Platonist group. Later he abandoned the neo-Platonists but his 
attraction to Plato was long-lasting. This is not surprising. Plato’s idea of the Forms 
was easily transferable into Christianity’s idea of God, as One who was above the 
level of mere physical existence, with all of its limitations and imperfections. 
Augustine’s classic work, City of God, written in the shadow of the sack of Rome in 
410, shows his desire to discover an unchanging Truth that perseveres beyond the 
accidents of history and sensory perception.
22
 “Now that I had read the books of the 
Platonists and had been set by them towards the search for a truth that is incorporeal, 
I came to see Your invisible things, which are understood by the things that are 
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made.”
23
 “He draws on classical literature and philosophy alike, applying them to his 
work as a pastor, a controversialist, an exegete, an ethicist, and a speculative thinker 
more broadly. He is the only Latin church father with a truly philosophical mind, who 
enjoys thinking as an activity in its own right.”
24
 
For Augustine, Platonic thought would help him conclude that reality 
consisted in a type of body-spirit dualism that would (and still does) affect Christian 
theology in strong and often negative ways. Augustine was the premier theologian of 
the Latin Church until the time of Aquinas, and his study of Plato played no small 
part in this designation. “Largely because of his more spiritual interpretations of 
Plato’s works, Augustine is often referred to as a spiritual idealist. Among the 
important Platonist concepts that Augustine incorporated into his writings were the 
Plato’s idea of Form and sense perception, his views on the immortality of the soul, 
the theory of how humans acquire knowledge, and the need for a life of 
contemplation.”
25
 
 While Augustine always insisted on the superiority of Scriptures as a source 
of knowledge, he did acknowledge the place of non-Christian writings unless there 
was direct disagreement between the two. Aquinas later commented, “Whenever 
Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrine of the Platonists, found in their 
writings anything consistent with the faith, he adopted it; and whatever he found 
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contrary to the faith, he amended.”
26
 As Rubenstein states, rather strongly, “For the 
next seven centuries, while Greek philosophy faded from memory, literate Christians 
ranked the works of the North African saint just below the Gospels themselves, rarely 
recognizing that they owed almost as much to Plato and Plotinus as to Saint Paul.”
27
 
However, Augustine himself was always careful not to give Plato undue credit for his 
work. Citing the Church Father Ambrose, Augustine agreed that Plato’s ideas had 
come by virtue of his contact with Jeremiah, the Old Testament prophet, during a 
time of shared residence in Egypt (although it appears now the historical confluence 
of their time in Egypt does not match). “Nonetheless, the Christian interpretation of 
Plato’s philosophy exerted a tremendous influence on education over the centuries. 
Even Augustine’s plan for studies remained in effect throughout much of the 5
th
 
through 12th centuries.”
28
 Dunn continues, “For Augustine, true philosophy was not 
possible without both faith and reason and, consequently, there was no distinction 
between philosophy and theology. Augustine believed that all wisdom was Christian 
wisdom and all of his writings are concerned with defending or explaining 
Christianity.”
29
 An important addition to Dunn’s thought is that Augustine argued that 
philosophical reflection complemented theology, but only when these philosophical 
reflections were firmly grounded in a prior commitment to the underlying truth of the 
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Christian faith. “Thus, the legitimacy of philosophy was derived from the legitimacy 
of the underlying faith commitments.”
30
 More negatively, Eby and Arrowood give 
this summary of the influence of Augustine: “The net result of Augustine’s writing on 
education was to retard free scholarship. He advocated limiting study to the narrowly 
utilitarian and to theology.”
31
 
Regarding the medieval Platonic tradition as a whole, especially as rooted in 
Augustine, Raymond Klibansky reminds us, 
it is much too complex to be described indiscriminately as either Platonism, as 
was formerly, or Neoplatonism, as is now, the rule. The first view fails to 
recognize the difference which separates every form of mediaeval Platonism 
from Plato’s own thought. The second, a reaction against the first, commits 
the opposite error . . . Just as often, however, we find a kind of Platonism 
which is neither the doctrine of Plato nor that of Plotinus or Proclus, but, 
based on Hellenistic thought, nourished by the religious experience, Christian, 
Jewish or Islamic, of later centuries, and intimately fused with teachings from 
Stoic and other philosophies, is, in fine, something new and individual, 
difficult to bring under a simple heading.”
32
  
 
 
4.32 Boethius 
 Plato lived on, to some small extent, through Augustine, “while Aristotle 
became a vague, disembodied legend—an ancient wizard, once very powerful, whose 
ideas were now all but forgotten . . . That anything at all remained of Aristotle’s work 
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in the West . . . was largely the result of one man’s effort [namely, Boethius].”
33
 
Boethius (480-524) has sometimes been given the title, “Last of the Roman 
philosophers and the first of the scholastic theologians,”
34
 which describes his 
importance as a transitional figure after the fall of Rome. Boethius was minister under 
Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths and ironically was put to death by this same 
administration for allegations of conspiracy with the Byzantines. Boethius received a 
classical education and may have studied in Athens, and perhaps Alexandria. His 
acknowledged accomplishment in Greek was remarkable given the reduced 
knowledge in this area, which accompanied the end of the Western empire.
35
 
 The lifelong project of Boethius was a deliberate attempt to preserve ancient 
classical knowledge, particularly philosophy. He intended to translate all the works of 
Aristotle and Plato from the original Greek into Latin. Education in Greek was 
growing increasingly precarious. How would people in the West study philosophy if 
they had no knowledge of its language? No one had translated the complete works of 
Plato and Aristotle. The loss of literacy in Greek was therefore a real and present 
catastrophe for Western society. “The very idea that this translation was needed is 
eloquent testimony both to Boethius’ conviction of the importance of philosophy in 
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the intellectual lives of Christians and to the waning of instruction in Greek in the 
west.”
36
 
 In Boethius’s own words, here was his plan: 
My fixed intention is to translate into Latin every work of Aristotle that comes 
to my hand and furnish it with a Latin commentary. Thus I may present, well 
ordered and illustrated with the light of comment, whatever subtlety of logic’s 
art, whatever weight of moral experience, and whatever insight into natural 
truth, may be gathered from Aristotle. And I mean to translate all the 
dialogues of Plato, or reduce them in my commentary to a Latin form. Having 
accomplished this, I shall not have despised the opinions of Aristotle and 
Plato if I evoke a certain concord between them and show in how many things 
of importance for philosophy they agree.
37
 
    
Falling far short of his magnificent dream, his completed translations of some 
of Aristotle’s works, 
38
especially on logic, were indeed the only significant portions 
of Aristotle available in Europe until the 12th century! Some of his translations were 
mixed with his own commentary, which reflected both Aristotelian and Platonic 
concepts. Boethius also wrote a significant commentary on the Isagoge (an 
Introduction to the work of Aristotle) by the neo-Platonist Porphyry, which 
highlighted the existence of the problem of universals and Aristotle’s metaphysics. 
His most important personal creation was the Consolation of Philosophy, a work in 
which “Lady Philosophy” is employed as “the handmaid of religion,” a common 
Christian construct during this period, but where the elements of Socratic argument 
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are present, similar to the work of Augustine’s dialogues. Boethius also translated the 
basic Greek curriculum of the age into Latin, the quadrivium, which became standard 
reading during the medieval period.
39
 
 Eby and Arrowood describe the significance of Boethius for our current 
discussion: “The importance of Boethius lies in the fact that he combined competence 
in classical scholarship and the ability to write popularly with the interests and point 
of view of Latin Christianity . . . he brought to the service of the Church a grasp of 
ancient learning not equaled by any of his literary contemporaries of western 
Europe.”
40
 Boethius did succeed in transmitting at least a few of the tools of the 
Greek philosophers, Aristotle’s logic. But few of his contemporaries had enough 
interest or enough skill to use his hard work. “Prospects for Boethius’ writings were 
dim. In fact, all of Boethius’ translations of Aristotle’s treatises on logic disappeared, 
at least temporarily, from historical record. Some re-emerged, but only after three 
centuries of tenuous, obscure survival.”
41
 
 
4.33 Western Monasteries 
 Throughout religious history, people have at times renounced the priorities 
and pressures of society and retired into solitude to achieve a measure of personal 
holiness through contemplation and asceticism. During the period of decay, including 
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moral, of the Roman Empire in the third and fourth centuries, monasticism made a 
powerful appeal to many. Monasticism in the West differed from that in the East and 
rather than appealing to isolated individuals who sought solitude in wilderness 
settings, western monastics typically gathered into groups or cloisters in buildings 
soon known as monasteries. The greatest leader of Western monasticism was 
Benedict (ca. 480-543), who provided basic guidelines that many monasteries 
adopted. Monasteries grew across Western Europe and attracted some of the best 
minds of the Christian church. Monasteries helped keep a semblance of scholarship 
alive during the period between 500-1000, as urban life was disrupted and as books 
were lost.
42
 One key interest of monks was the preservation of ancient manuscripts, 
mostly religious but occasionally secular. One important example of this kind of work 
is found in the person of Cassiodorus (478-573) who devoted his later life to the task 
of collecting, translating, and copying both patristic and classical literature (including 
the work of Boethius). The scriptorium, a room dedicated to the painstaking work of 
copying by hand manuscripts, became a regular feature of the better monasteries. 
“For centuries the monasteries of Europe were the chief sources of fresh copies of 
books, as well as principal preservers of them.”
43
 These transmitters “whether 
inadvertent or deliberate, produced the texts that connected early medieval thinkers to 
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the classical and Christian traditions. The places where these texts were taught, 
studied, commented on, and copied became, in this period, monasteries.”
44
 But, as 
Rubenstein admits, “For the next five centuries, they [classic texts] are copied and 
recopied by monks who hardly know what they are preserving, or why.”
45
  
Eby and Arrowood continue with this rather negative summary of the 
survivability of Greek philosophical tradition: 
The decline of Latin and Greek scholarship, to which many factors had 
contributed, had been greatly accelerated by the victories of the barbarians; so 
that teaching and learning were at a low ebb in the age of St. Gregory. The 
victory of the Church, moreover, had meant a revolution in education. Pagan 
schools had been closed; and since the literature and learning of ancient 
Greece and Rome were either pagan or secular, they were regarded with 
disfavor. The authority of the Church in all matters touching the welfare of 
souls was strongly maintained, and teaching and scholarship were such 
matters. The Church regarded as praiseworthy only that learning which 
contributed to the growth of Christian character and of the Church. Beyond 
this, the only learning considered allowable was that which, while it did not 
interfere with the Church’s work or with Christian living, was necessary for 
practical ends. Secular scholarship, as such, was of real but subordinate 
interest in the Church. The authority of the Church in matters of opinion, 
scholarship, and teaching was conceded on all sides; education had become 
virtually a clerical monopoly [emphasis added].
46
 
 
 
 
4.34 Irish Centers of Learning 
 The development of Celtic Christianity is a fascinating story, too long to tell 
adequately here except in its barest outline. Britain was controlled by the Roman 
Empire by the first century A.D. and in turn was influenced by Christianity as the 
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Empire later adopted this new religion as its own. Later, the pagan Anglos and 
Saxons overran the island and forced many Christians to escape to Ireland. In the fifth 
century, Patrick evangelized Ireland, creating a unique and zealous brand of 
Christianity, not always in agreement with the Latin church based in Rome but 
instilled with a sense of literacy and learning that would create the conditions that 
allowed Ireland to become “the isle of saints and scholars,” and thus help preserve 
Western culture while Europe was being overrun by barbarians. Irish monks and 
scribes copied manuscripts of Greek and Latin writers, both pagan and Christian, 
while libraries and learning on the continent were reduced to minimal activity. 
“Between 550-600, they [Irish monks] began sending missionaries of their own to 
Scotland, England, France, Switzerland, and northern Italy. To the monasteries which 
they founded, the Irish monks brought a fierce desire to learn and to copy ancient 
pagan as well as Christian books.”
47
 
Some have presented the thesis that it was Irish scholars, isolated in the far 
corner of northwest Europe, who kept alive certain Greek philosophical priorities and 
works, while the rest of Europe languished in cultural obscurity. As Europe moved 
out of the so-called Dark Ages, the Irish helped replant the seeds of cultural literary 
and classic education.
48
 “The channel through which learning flowed back into 
northern Europe is easy to trace. From the monastic schools and libraries in Celtic 
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Ireland, it flowed to Anglo-Saxon England, and from there to Gaul.”
49
 However, in 
spite of the important influence of Irish intellectuals during the so-called Dark Ages, 
in regard to the present discussion, realistically “the amount of actual classical 
literature known in Ireland in pre-Carolingian times is much debated and appears to 
have been small indeed.”
50
 
  
4.35 The Carolingian Renaissance  
 While other small pinpoints of light could be considered in our quest to 
discover how Western Europe, internally, might keep alive a line of continuity with 
Greek philosophical priorities, I will conclude our view of the Early Middle Ages in 
the West with a short summary of the renewal of learning under the leadership of 
Charlemagne. The history of the transition from the Merovingians to the Carolingian 
regimes is fascinating but beyond the scope of this research. To compact history, in 
771, Charlemagne (Charles the Great) of the Carolingian line of kings was crowned 
king of the Franks (roughly modern France). In 800, in an alliance formed with the 
Pope, he was crowned Emperor of the Romans (Imperator Romanorum), a title later 
to evolve into the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, which was an attempt to 
remake the glory days of the old Roman Empire within the confines largely of central 
Europe (roughly France, Germany and Italy). 
 Charlemagne was an unusually capable and charismatic leader. His 
commanding personality was supplemented by his equally commanding seven-foot 
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height. He was a politician and military leader. But for our purposes, he was a man of 
culture, or at least desired to be. Not since the time of Boethius and Cassiodorus in 
the sixth century had cultural priorities been so uplifted. Charlemagne persuaded the 
great English scholar Alcuin to join his court and to assume leadership of his palace 
school, which soon attracted other able scholars such as John Scottus, (under Charles 
the Bald) knowledgeable in Greek and in the neo-Platonistic literature. Other 
contributions from this period include the development of the Carolingian minuscule, 
a style of writing that introduced the use of lower case letters. A standardized version 
of Latin was also developed that allowed for the coining of new words while retaining 
the grammatical rules of Classical Latin. This Medieval Latin became the common 
language of scholarship and allowed travelers to make themselves understood across 
Europe. 
The palace school of Charlemagne was an integral link in the chain of men 
and schools responsible for passing on to the medieval university the basic 
outlines of its curriculum, the trivium, and the quadrivium that had been 
derived from Roman higher education . . . The cultural activities of 
Charlemagne were an important step in the process by which the German 
people [especially Franks in this case] assimilated classical and Christian 
learning.
51
 
 
Cantor remarks the while “the poverty and localism characteristic of the first 
Europe make it appear insignificant in comparison with the Roman Empire and the 
contemporary civilizations of Byzantium and Islam” the Carolingian reforms, though 
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not remarkably large, “marked the starting point for the political and intellectual 
growth of later centuries.”
52
 
Unfortunately, the Carolingian dynasty lasted but a century and soon Western 
Europe was again at the mercy of feuding chieftains whose main concerns were 
personal gain rather than intellectual advancement.  
In the 9th and 10th centuries the empire [Frankish] was challenged and 
eventually devastated by constant attacks by Norsemen, Huns, and Saracens, 
and once again learning in most of northern and western Europe broke down. 
The Danish and Viking invasions, which had begun in the late 8th century and 
continued for some 200 years, destroyed many monasteries and libraries . . . 
In 867, the Danes overran much of northern England, and York was 
ransacked. Its books were scattered and its priests and scholars killed or 
driven away . . . All over western Europe the story was much the same, and 
where monasteries were not destroyed they often suffered from stagnation and 
neglect.
53
  
 
“The rulers of the Frankish and Gothic kingdoms dropped all pretense of 
being dependents of the Emperor [in Constantinople]. The independence of the 
Roman Church was asserted and maintained. Europe was about to shake itself free 
from Asia, and build independently.”
54
  
So, as we leave the West, now in the center of the Middle Ages, we find that 
Greek philosophy does have a few witnesses—but not nearly enough to transform 
Europe from its backward encounter with barbaric multiculturalism and de-emphasis 
                                                           
     
52
 Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages, 189. John Marenbon, working specifically with the 
transmission of Plato during this period, says, “Explicit references to Plato and Platonists were rare in 
the Middle Ages [in the West] before 1100, and many do not, in any case, show any engagement with 
Plato and his thought,” “Platonism—A Doxographic Approach: The Early Middle Ages,” in The 
Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages, ed. Gersh and Hoenen, 86. 
 
     
53
 Michael H. Harris, History of Libraries in the Western World (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1995), 
94-95. 
 
     
54
 Eby and Arrowood, History and Philosophy of Education: Ancient and Medieval, 576-577. 
 
 199 
on classical thinking. “The period after St. Augustine is marked not only by the 
almost universal disappearance of a knowledge of Greek, and a steady change in the 
type of Latin used, but also by a great decline in intellectual culture.”
55
 By the year 
1000, there was growth in educational institutions, respect for scholarship existed, 
and contact with the Greek world was not entirely lost. A light is still dimly lit, but it 
will take more for Greek philosophy to move into its foundational position it will 
command in later Western thought. “Aristotle’s [and Plato’s] work lay dormant while 
Europe enduring half a millennium of endemic violence, poverty, and disorder. Little 
wonder that, during this seemingly endless winter, those seeking comfort and 
meaning would turn to the certitudes of faith rather than the conundrums of 
philosophy.”
56
 Perhaps the philosophy-poor West will be able to reinstate itself 
intellectually by leaning on its former Roman cousins to the East who still possess the 
Greek masters. To that geo-political area we will now turn. Thomas helps us 
summarize our path so far in this chapter: 
All roads may lead to Rome as the last independent culture of the ancient 
Mediterranean world, and certainly Rome was a major source for the 
preservation of classical Greek culture. Still, the roads from the present back 
to Rome have been interrupted at crucial points and thus, transmission of the 
cultural legacy did not proceed directly from the Roman empire through 
medieval European kingdoms into modern western states. And there are more 
paths from ancient Greece to the modern world than the route leading through 
the Roman west. Each of them preserved certain elements of the inheritance 
and discarded others, thereby creating distinctively new products. These 
cultural products influenced subsequent societies in still other ways.
57
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4.4 The Fate of Greek Philosophy after the Rise of the Eastern Byzantine Empire 
 Having examined the Western remnants of the Roman Empire for signs of 
Greek philosophical presence, our conclusion has shown that continuity with the 
Greek classical tradition was slowed if not stopped during the 500 years after the fall 
of Rome. My research question has probed the connection between modern 
philosophical/educational foundations and the early Greek writings and ideas of Plato 
and Aristotle. While looking at the “advancement” of the Western mind during the 
early Middle Ages, the prospects of recovering the Greek masters appears dim.  
 But the prospects of a continued Greek tradition appear more likely in the 
Greek-speaking East, in the remains of the Roman Empire centered in 
Constantinople. Yet this is where the safe travel of Plato and Aristotle take a strange 
turn and where, like in the West, these Greek thinkers find a roadblock rather than 
free passage to the future or to the West. 
 The history of this period, as has already been alluded to, hinges on the figure 
of Constantine—doubly so. Not only did Constantine move the capitol of the Roman 
Empire to the eastern city of Constantinople, he is also credited with issuing the 313 
Edit of Milan, whereby Christianity became a legal religion—to become the Empire’s 
only religion before the end of the century. The first action decided the fate of Rome 
and the West by concentrating Roman power in the East and allowing the relentless 
Teutonic barbarians to take over Western Europe. But it also had the effect of 
isolating what was left of Greco-Roman culture in the East. The Greek philosophers 
were saved but they were taken captive. The isolation of the eastern portion of the 
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Roman Empire, Byzantium as it was much later termed, leads us into the second key 
decision that Constantine is credited with making, namely the establishment of 
Christianity with the Roman Empire. 
 
4.41 The Effects of Christianity on Philosophy in the Byzantine Empire 
 Constantine (ca. 285-337) received his initial indoctrination concerning 
Christianity by his mother Helena. Such a predisposition may have prompted him in 
312, when it seemed that his enemies would overwhelm him (the Battle of Milvian 
Bridge over the Tiber River against Maxentius in the year 312), to interpret a vision 
of a cross in the sky with the words “in this sign conquer” (“Εν tούτω nίκα, often 
rendered in Latin as “In hoc signo vinces”) as a favorable omen from the Christian 
God about whom he had been taught as a child. This visionary cross became 
Constantine’s military symbol and was a combination of the Greek letters chi and 
rho; the early Christian symbol consists in a kind of cross formed by the Greek letters 
chi (c) and rho (r), the first two in the name Christ (Greek: Cριστός). After winning 
this decisive battle, Constantine embarked on a policy of favoring the Christian 
church, quite the opposite approach of his predecessor Galerius who had tried to wipe 
it out between 303-305. With his co-emperor Luicinius, he issued the revolutionary 
Edit of Milan in which freedom of religion was granted throughout the Empire, 
including conspicuously Christianity. Some have attributed Constantine’s acceptance 
and endorsement of Christianity less a spiritually-derived insight and more a matter of 
political expediency; perhaps Christianity could serve as a new center of unity within 
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the Empire, saving the classic culture and security of years gone by.
58
 Whether 
Constantine’s conversion was sincere or not, Christianity definitely felt the 
repercussions of his new attitude. During the next few years Constantine issued edicts 
that restored confiscated property to Christians and even set aside the “Day of the 
Sun” (Sunday) as an official day of rest and worship. Perhaps rather arrogantly, he 
even assumed a position of leadership at the pivotal council of Nicea in 325 where 
Christian leaders debated key issues of theology.
59
 
 The sons of Constantine continued his policy of favoring Christianity. With a 
short setback during the reign of Julian (361-363), Christianity gained momentum and 
popularity. In 380 and 381 Theodosius I issued edicts making Christianity the 
exclusive religion of the Empire. The Edict of Constantinople in 392 went further and 
prohibited paganism.
60
 With these actions, Church and State began the process of 
merging into a unified entity,
61
 a process that greatly affected the flow of the Greek 
philosophical tradition in the Empire generally and in the eastern portion 
specifically.
62
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 As I have shown in the previous chapter, the reaction of eastern Christian 
writers to Greek philosophy was generally more favorable than the attitude of western 
Christians. As we move into the Byzantine period, there is ample evidence that the 
classical Greek tradition was put to use within Christian education, to some degree. 
Let me point out several of these positive supporting witnesses before discussing 
some of the moderating effects of Christianity on the advance of philosophy. By 
addressing these positive elements first, I want to show that the common conception 
of Christianity as an anti-intellectual force in the eastern Empire, whose primary role 
was to suppress and censor Greek philosophy, is overstated and often exaggerated.  
As Downey points out, in a very practical sense, 
there are observers who feel that Christianity, in order to make its way among 
Gentiles in the Graeco-Roman world, necessarily had to adopt the Hellenic 
vocabulary and modes of thought. The adoption was inevitable, it is pointed 
out, because these were the only terms in which the educated citizens of the 
Graeco-Roman civilization of those days, trained in the educational system 
begun in classical Greece and perfected in the Hellenistic period, could think 
of or discuss philosophical and religious ideas. If Christianity was to grow and 
fulfill its early mission among people whose schooling consisted of the study 
of the classic Greek authors, Christianity had no alternative.
63
 
 
Highly educated people in the eastern Empire would have had a hard time 
believing that Christian teaching could be true, since, for instance, some of the 
apostles were mere fishermen and probably poorly educated. How could cultivated 
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and well-read Roman citizens take seriously a new doctrine put forward by such 
men? Educated people in the time of Constantine, in the eastern part of the Roman 
Empire, could more readily think of religion in the established terms of the Greek 
philosophy and dialectic in which they had been trained. At the same time, there were 
not yet enough trained Christian instructors who were prepared to meet educated 
pagans on their own intellectual level. Some Christian teachers discovered that using 
existing philosophical categories could help spread their message to new converts 
who had been immersed in classical learning. Some of these Christian leaders could 
see universal elements in pagan philosophical thought which could be separated from 
pagan cult and religion, and integrated, with Christianity, to the latter’s profit.
64
 Once 
this was understood, the way was open for Christian thought to take advantage of the 
elements in the pagan intellectual tradition that could play a creative part in Christian 
education and speculation. “It was important to those educated Christians who were 
not ferociously fideist and anti-rational . . . to express their faith in such a way that it 
could be seen to be not a mere barbarian obscurantism, but the true ‘philosophy’ in 
the ancient sense.”
65
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As I have stated earlier, “paganism” and “Hellenism” came to be recognized 
among some (but not all) Christian thinkers as two quite different things. This 
differentiation has not always been understood clearly, namely the distinction which 
was often carefully made between paganism and Hellenism, and the insistence upon 
the unique value of the classical heritage. When this characteristic is lost from sight, 
unreflective and undue criticism of the intellectual tradition of the Greek Church 
results in either the belief that, 1. It was totally opposed to integration of Greek 
thought in any form and allowed the classical tradition to be buried in Byzantine 
monasteries with a resultant philosophical sterility or 2. It has given up its Gospel 
origins and its Hebrew heritage for an overlay of Hellenism, abdicating its uniqueness 
of thought and technique.
66
  
There is evidence, however, that some Byzantine Christians thinkers were 
able to make the Hellenism connection in appropriate ways and to enable rather than 
disable Greek thought. The result was that, after the initial period of hesitation, some 
Christian thinkers made it plain that there was real profit to be derived from the study 
of classical literature, if the obviously unsuitable parts of it were passed over. The 
Greek Church thus made the classical heritage, in its best aspects, a part of its own 
intellectual life to some extent. As I have already noted, many of the Greek Christian 
thinkers felt that some of the classical writers, notably Plato, had propounded such 
teachings that they were entitled to be considered forerunners of Christianity. 
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The Greek fathers, especially the Cappadocians of the fourth century, 
67
 had 
for the most part been educated in the classical tradition, and they knew enough of the 
world to see that Christianity could get real help from the classical tradition.
68
 One of 
the Cappadocians, Gregory of Nazianzen, gave this view of education and indirectly 
on secular philosophy, in his eulogy of St. Basil: 
I take it as admitted by men of sense, that the first of our advantages is 
education; and not only this our more noble form of it, which disregards 
rhetorical ornaments and glory, and holds to salvation, and beauty in the 
objects of our contemplation:  but even that external culture which many 
Christians ill-judgingly abhor, as treacherous and dangerous, and keeping us 
afar from God.  For as we ought not to neglect the heavens, and earth, and air, 
and all such things, because some have wrongly seized upon them, and honour 
God’s works instead of God:  but to reap what advantage we can from them 
for our life and enjoyment, while we avoid their dangers; not raising creation, 
as foolish men do, in revolt against the Creator, but from the works of nature 
apprehending the Worker, and again, as we know that neither fire, nor food, 
nor iron, nor any other of the elements, is of itself most useful, or most 
harmful, except according to the will of those who use it; and as we have 
compounded healthful drugs from certain of the reptiles; so from secular 
literature we have received principles of enquiry and speculation, while we 
have rejected their idolatry, terror, and pit of destruction. Nay, even these have 
aided us in our religion, by our perception of the contrast between what is 
worse and what is better, and by gaining strength for our doctrine from the 
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weakness of theirs. We must not then dishonour education, because some men 
are pleased to do so, but rather suppose such men to be boorish and 
uneducated, desiring all men to be as they themselves are, in order to hide 
themselves in the general, and escape the detection of their want of culture.
69
  
 
Great preachers like John Chrysostom made a thorough study of Greek 
rhetoric, and even studied with pagan teachers like Libanius simply because these 
teachers were at that time the best available. St. Basil wrote a small treatise entitled, 
“Address to the youth, how they can read heathen authors to their profit.” The 
emperor Justinian (527-565) was an admirer of classical antiquity and his program 
was essentially aimed at a recovery and re-establishment of the ancient strength of the 
Empire—a renovatio of the Imperium Romanum.
70
 The great Patriarch of 
Constantinople in the ninth century, Photius, realized fully the role of the classical 
tradition in forming and solidifying the national pride of the Greek people, and the 
classical revival which he led played a great part in the contemporary, but brief, 
resurgence of the physical strength of the Byzantine Empire. 
There was also distinguished literary and intellectual activity outside the 
capital, both at Alexandria, an ancient center of scholarship and teaching, and the 
little coastal city of Gaza in Palestine, which was a notable center of Hellenism. The 
significant thing about this school, for our present study, is that the teachers were 
Christians and that most of them wrote on both religious and secular subjects.  
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This is also the time when we learn about the fate of schools in Athens, where 
there were still academies that were direct descendants of those of classical Greece. It 
was here that some of the great Christian thinkers of the fourth century had received 
their training in Greek literature and rhetoric. Since the fourth century, however, 
Athens had been declining as a scholarly center, and in the time of Justinian we no 
longer hear of distinguished authors having been trained at Athens. In 529, two years 
after he became sole Emperor, Justinian issued his famous decree that resulted in the 
closing of the schools at Athens.  
Justinian’s action is characteristic, and shows us what the Christian view of 
learning, and the Church’s conception of its responsibility, had become. 
Justinian was, in fact, the first emperor who seems to have felt himself in a 
position to carry to its logical conclusion the educational policy which had 
been implicit in the Christian decision to absorb and adapt the best parts of the 
classical Greek intellectual heritage.”
71
  
 
With pagan teachers at the helm, Justinian, felt strongly such teachers might 
corrupt the minds of Christian pupils. Likewise, it was not possible to teach the 
classics properly without showing their relation to Christian truth, and a pagan 
teacher who undertook to do this was not only dangerous but morally dishonest. 
Hence, Justinian issued decrees forbidding pagans and heretics to teach any subject. 
This was, in Justinian's estimation, the only way in which he could hope to use 
education as an instrument in his campaign for the achievement of religious unity and 
orthodoxy. The story of the schools at Athens is well known. The pagan professors 
refused to become Christians in order to save their jobs, and found refuge at the court 
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of the Persian King, (which topic we will explore later).
72
 There was no attempt to 
reestablish these schools; apparently the schools, including the Academy, were 
moribund anyway, and it looks as though the flourishing centers at Alexandria and 
Gaza could provide all the instruction that was needed.  
There have been charges that it was the Christian church that was responsible 
for not only suppressing the use of classical literature, but of active engagement in 
eliminating this kind of literature altogether. Here is a quote representative of a view 
of Christianity as extremely repressive, referring to the great Library of Alexandria: 
“The Church burned enormous amounts of literature. In 391 Christians burned down 
one of the world's greatest libraries in Alexandria, said to have housed 700,000 
rolls.”
73
 In reality, the fate of the Library of Alexandria is a question of great debate. 
There is ample evidence to show that the Library was actually destroyed in part or in 
full on several occasions by civil unrest unrelated to Christian involvement. It does 
seem to be true that a small, daughter library, the Serapeum, was thought to have 
survived these earlier destructions and this structure likely was destroyed by the 
Patriarch Theophilis in 391, under the directives of Emperor Theodosius. But to 
charge the Christian church with the destruction of the most renowned collection of 
classical literature in Alexandria is a gross overstatement at best. The bottom line here 
is that the church did destroy some collections of texts, but these outbursts were not 
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typically directed against “classics” and these gestures were not wholesale but rather 
were only exceptional.
74
 
To summarize these more positive elements of the Byzantine Empire’s ability 
and desire to preserve and use the Greek philosophy classics, Downey provides this 
glowing conclusion: 
This sense of the reality of the past as part of the present was not confined to 
the tradition stemming from the Scriptures, though it was here that the 
presentness of the past was most real. It passed over into the attitude toward 
the whole literary and intellectual tradition which was the Byzantine heritage. 
So it was that the Byzantine Church kept the past alive as something which 
furnished the source and background for the present and a foundation for the 
future. Here we can see the strength of a Christian society taught and led by a 
learned Church. This history may serve to remind us of our own spiritual and 
intellectual origins through which we are linked to the ancient world and the 
ancient Church.
75
 
 
 Support for the key role of Byzantium and Christianity in preserving Greek 
philosophy for the Western tradition can be widely found.
76
 I do not deny that 
Byzantium played a key role in keeping alive the philosophical tradition of Plato and 
Aristotle, but I feel that their role in moving this philosophical tradition to the West 
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can be overstated and the positive function and attitude of the Church toward Greek 
thought can be exaggerated. Let me continue this discussion by balancing out the 
positive views expressed above with contrary opinions. 
 The predominant Greek philosophical influence on Christianity in Byzantium 
was always Plato. Plato allowed Christians to talk about spiritual realities and the 
incorporeality of spirit and soul.
77
 The influence of Aristotle during this time was 
primarily secondary and supportive of Plato’s ideas; his logic served as an 
introduction to the bigger ideas found in Plato’s thoughts. As we have discovered, 
Middle Platonic ideas evolved (or devolved depending on your perspective) in neo-
Platonism, a creative attempt to combine Plato with Christianity. Neo-Platonism had 
many strong proponents within the Christian ranks, especially at Antioch and 
Alexandria,
78
 but ultimately this syncretistic philosophy was determined to be 
heretical by orthodox Christians and as neo-Platonism was pushed aside, so was 
Plato.
79
 The problems with neo-Platonism are grounded in the Church’s earlier issues 
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with the neo-pagan doctrine of Gnosticism,
80
 which found salvation through rational 
processes and which disassociated body and spirit to such a degree that Christianity 
either fell into the equally troubling pits of legalism or antinomianism. Gnosticism is 
often considered the first heresy of the Church, alluded to at several points in the New 
Testament books of the first century. It is easy to see how neo-Platonism, once it was 
associated with the older and more insidious heresy of Gnosticism, would move many 
Christians toward an attitude of suspicion regarding Plato and philosophy in 
general.
81
 The key problems in the thought of neo-Platonism regard the age-old 
dualistic controversy between matter and spirit. Actually, neo-Platonism was accused 
by opponents on both ends of the discussion spectrum of being heretical. At one 
extreme, God was certainly separate from the world, but He was so far removed from 
creation as to be unapproachable. At the other extreme, God was connected to 
creation as part of a monistic understanding of ontology, but taken too far, this idea 
led to pantheism. Neither extreme was acceptable to Christianity, which has always 
held a tension between the transcendence and immanence of God. Closely related to 
this discussion were the heated discussions regarding the nature of Jesus Christ. Was 
He God? Was He man? What He both? These questions weighed heavily on the 
minds of the early Christian councils in the fourth and fifth centuries. The Council of 
Nicea, in 325, debated this issue and condemned the view of Arianism (which had 
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philosophical connections to neo-Platonism). These “nature of Christ” debates moved 
back and forth between strongly held positions, with the result that creeds and 
councils pronounced with authority orthodox positions and anathematized those who 
found themselves on the wrong side of the majority; sometimes the same Christian 
leader was pronounced orthodox or unorthodox several times during his lifetime.
82
 So 
while neo-Platonism kept alive the Greek philosophers, it also created a strain in 
philosophical connections with those who desired to find full harmony with Plato.
83
 
Armstrong states a negative outcome of this,  
. . . the persistence of independent Hellenistic ways of religious thinking as 
part of our traditional inheritance has often led to criticism of and resistance to 
what are generally taken as distinctively Christian attitudes, especially those 
which make sharp distinctions and oppositions between God and creation, or 
faith and reason, or church  and world.
84
 
 
Colish reminds us that the widespread fear that philosophy would lead 
Christians resurfaced in the patristic period and after, especially at the point of 
theological debate. “For, despite the constructive use of philosophy by the church 
fathers and some later thinkers, its use by heretics opened a wedge between 
philosophy and orthodox theology.”
85
  
 Before we begin to think that Aristotle will come to the forefront, now that 
Plato’s weaknesses have been discovered, Fernand Van Steenberghen reminds us, 
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The spread of Aristotelianism was not to go unopposed, nor would it fail to 
stir up great controversies. The tendency towards empiricism and agnosticism 
exhibited by Aristotle [in contrast to Plato] was destined to arouse the distrust 
of the religiously minded and would not satisfy metaphysicians; the gaps and 
obscurities in his system were to give ground for endless discussions among 
his disciples. Almost always, thinkers who have found their inspiration in the 
peripatetic philosophy have found themselves bound to correct or complete 
the view of the Stagirite [Aristotle was born in Stagirus] with ideas borrowed 
from Platonism and neo-Platonism.
86
  
 
Laughlin calls the period from 641-856 the “Byzantine Dark Age” and 
attributes a lack of creativity and even “rationality” to this time for some very good 
reasons. During this period, Byzantium saw recurrent bouts of the plague and military 
tensions with a variety of invaders, which reduced the Empire’s ability to do 
philosophical work (remembering that advances in philosophy are seldom done 
during times where mere survival becomes a priority) and taking a heavy toll in terms 
of quality of life and even life expectancy.
87
 Even though an Imperial Academy was 
created in Constantinople in 425, records reveal “no notable scholar who graduated 
from the school, no attempt to revive pagan philosophy, and no new books advancing 
philosophical scholarship”
88
 until the time of Psellus and Italus in the eleventh 
century. “Medieval Greek-speaking scholars had inherited the writings of Plato and 
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Aristotle. Most of these heirs preserved the books, but squandered their value.”
89
 
Colish reminds us of the pressure of imperial centrality still in great effect during this 
time: “During the period of intellectual decline between the seventh and ninth 
centuries, cultural production of all kinds shrank, indicating that Byzantine scholars 
and writers had not found ways of carrying out their activities by means of grass-roots 
organizations.”
90
  
Rubenstein continues this train of thought as he coxes his readers to explore 
the great possibilities of the Byzantine Empire in regard to continuing the Greek 
philosophical tradition, saying, “one might have expected a vigorous growth of 
philosophy and science. But this is precisely where intellectual history takes one of its 
strangest turns. One could call this tale ‘The Murder of Lady Philosophy.’”
91
 
 The tale is well known. Hypatia was a well-established neo-Platonist 
Alexandrian, famous throughout the East for her wisdom. Although she remained a 
pagan, many of her students were Christians. Through a series of complicated 
relationships and theological disputations, Hypatia was accused of anti-Christian 
connections and was violently killed by a mob of Christian men. “Clearly the 
Byzantine realm was becoming a dangerous place for non-Christians and 
philosophers to live. This incident in Alexandria led to further problems. Alexandria 
became a kind of “orthodoxy” center and arbiter of correct theology. When the 
Christians in Antioch debated the Alexandrians about yet another nuance concerning 
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the nature of Christ, the Alexandrians were ready for a fight. The Antiochenes were 
inclined to follow Aristotle lead and emphasize the human side of Jesus while the 
Alexandrians emphasized His divinity. The Antiochene view, called Nestorianism 
(Nestorius was one of the main supporters of this doctrine), concluded that Jesus 
Christ had two natures, one human and one divine. Both reason and faith dictate that 
these natures be separate and distinct. Alarmed by the humanistic tendencies of the 
Antiochene theologians, the Alexandrians convened a council in 431 to resolve the 
issue. The Antiochenes prevailed, with the Emperor’s blessing or at least indifference, 
and Nestorianism was condemned and Nestorius exiled. (Interestingly, the view of 
the Alexandrians, later called Monophysitism, was also condemned!) But the point of 
this historical episode, according to Rubenstein, confirms the “murder” of Lady 
Philosophy. “Despite the survival of Roman authority in Constantinople, the same 
shift from this-worldly to otherworldly concerns that marked post-Roman thinking in 
the West occurred in the East as well, although it took place more sporadically and 
slowly.”
92
 Rubenstein continues, “Many of the empire’s independent thinkers, both 
Christian and pagan . . . left for Mesopotamia and Persia, where scholars could pursue 
their researches without fear of meeting the fate of Hypatia or Nestorius.”
93
 
  
 While the East did continue to read Plato and Aristotle, the above examples 
show that the trend was conservative at best. “They commented endlessly on the 
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learning inherited from the past, but almost never doubted this learning or tried to 
move beyond it.”
94
 The reasons for this conservatism can be looked at in two related 
areas. First, “it was a result of the people’s passionate interest in matters of faith and 
their inclination to use philosophy, if at all, as a stick with which to beat their 
theological opponents.”
95
 Philosophy’s primary function was not exploration of 
unexplored speculative thought, it was rather to bolster the presuppositions already 
inculcated within the Christian tradition. Faith always trumped reason. “Thus, 
although the Greek apologists and church fathers, all thoroughly educated in classical 
rhetoric and philosophy, recast theology in classical form with no difficulty, a 
separation between secular and religious thought . . . developed in the post-patristic 
period.”
96
 Second, Byzantine culture was maintained by a top-down, Christian 
control-oriented social structure that, through sheer weigh of tradition and stability, 
squashed the life out of creative use of philosophy, for fear that it could undo the 
comfortable and known status quo. Angold comments, concerning the new editions of 
classical texts that appeared with increasing frequency from the turn of the ninth 
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within this task both the Church and the State thought of themselves as the direct heirs—in language, 
race, geographical location, law, and government—of the ancient tradition which had been infused and 
transformed by Christianity. Respect for the past, which was felt to be a natural part of the present, was 
one of the characteristic sources of strength of Byzantine Christianity,” Downey, “The Byzantine 
Church and the Presentness of the Past,” 94.   
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century offering the educated man a vast range of knowledge and experience: “This 
posed a threat to imperial authority, which rested on divine sanction but had little or 
no control over knowledge derived from the classical past. Political regimes have 
always found it expedient to control the past.”
97
 Laughlin adds, “Presumably . . . 
these teachers [at the Byzantine established colleges] presented the treatises [of 
Aristotle, for example] in the same way they presented other ancient pagan writings: 
as literature, not as a source of philosophy that is a guide to living.”
98
 Burstein says,  
“. . . a Byzantine intellectual must not forget that ‘Greek wisdom’ was the ‘outside 
learning,’ tolerated since St. Basil only to the extent that it served as useful 
preparation for the study of the ‘inside learning,’ Christian theology.”
99
 To forget this 
principle would be to expose oneself to swift punishment. 
As long as a “moderated” kind of training in Greek philosophy was 
maintained the Church and State would not interfere. These kinds of works then were 
not generally “burned”; there was no need for this kind of reaction because a stronger 
reaction could more easily be made. “Such manuscripts [Greek philosophy] were not 
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a threat to the Church or State in a culture that denied their fundamental value. The 
Church sometimes discouraged the study of ancient writings and usually devalued 
their content, but seldom banned them.”
100
  
Colish makes this strong observation: 
The single most important factor accounting for the unique uses which 
Byzantium made of these resources [including the Greek classical tradition] is 
the unbroken continuity of central imperial rule . . . its intellectual leadership 
came increasingly from the capital and the imperial court, which determined 
the character of cultural patronage. Habituated to directives and funding from 
above, Byzantine thinkers developed a mindset that precluded [emphasis 
mine] the establishment of autonomous institutions for the creation and 
dissemination of ideas independent of imperial policy.
101
 
 
 The Greek Church, and in fact the entire Byzantine educational tradition, 
became sterile and attention was devoted to the preservation of the classics rather 
than to creative activity. The chief concern of the Church was the transmission and 
teaching of the Bible and of the tradition of the Fathers; only secondarily was the 
Hellenic literary and intellectual heritage looked upon as something to be preserved 
with care and handed on. The Greek Christian Byzantines, like their predecessors in 
the pagan Graeco-Roman world, looked upon the intellectual and literary 
achievements of Greece as the highest productions of their kind, of the human spirit, 
and as achievements that were of permanent and universal value in the study of 
humankind. But these works were now viewed as a subordinate adjunct to Christian 
teaching, rather than as the sum of human knowledge, as they had been considered in 
pre-Christian times. “In the Greek-speaking world of what at any one time remained 
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of the Byzantine Empire, Greek philosophy became largely lost in a variety of 
Christian trappings.”
102
  
Laughlin states that three key steps are important for any philosophical school 
to be advanced into future generations, each step taking the process forward in more 
usable ways.
103
 Step One involves simply preserving the original works of a 
philosopher. Step Two requires that commentators beyond the time of the original 
philosopher write explanations about the original works. Step Three moves to an 
active and purposeful integration of the original ideas into current philosophical 
thought and activity, remaining true to the first premises but creating evolving 
hybrids as new ideas are interfaced into the discussion. From our discussion in this 
chapter, it is clear that Step Three was seldom if ever accomplished during the 
Byzantine period, with the exception of the neo-Platonists. Step Two was 
accomplished only in isolated instances and often controlled environments. Step One, 
preservation of manuscripts was maintained, but even this process was significantly 
slowed when compared to pre-Byzantine periods.
104
  
Let’s now summarize the key points related to the connection of Christianity 
and Byzantium:  
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• The Greek philosophical treatises were saved by the Byzantines, but used 
conservatively and in noncreative ways.
105
 
• The Greek philosophy schools were largely controlled by the imperial cult 
that was in turn controlled by Christian interests.  
• The Greek philosophers were devalued as unoriginal and only secondarily 
used when they could help support theological disputation. 
• The work of philosophy in the Byzantine Empire was not a scientific or 
reason-based exploration of reality; its purpose was to support the 
development of theology and to show the superiority of Christianity. 
• Greek philosophy was still labeled “pagan” even when used, showing a 
strong negative bias among Byzantine culture. 
• The gap between secular and sacred widened, as did the cultures of 
scholar and layman.
106
 
So, while Byzantium kept the Greek philosophical tradition alive, its viability 
as a movement to be handed to future generations outside of its sphere of influence is 
in jeopardy. The way in which Greek philosophy is handled can hardly be described 
as healthy or holistic or fully faithful to its original composers.
107
 This internal 
                                                           
     
105
 On the first part of this statement, R.R. Bolgar says, “The fact remains that if the Eastern Empire 
had not survived, most of what we know about ancient Greece would have perished,” “The Greek 
Legacy,” in The Legacy of Greece, ed. Finley, 446. 
 
     
106
 Especially seen in the changes in Greek language between scholar and layman. See Colish, 
Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition: 400-1400, 113-115.  
 
     
107
 See Cyril Mango, “Discontinuity with the Classical Past in Byzantium,” Byzantium and the 
Classical Tradition: University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies—
1979 (Birmingham, 1981), 50-51.  
 222 
problem will now be compounded exponentially by the next factor to be considered—
how will any transmission of Greek intellectual foundations find their way to the 
West, in any form, when in fact the East and West are divided? To that question, we 
now turn. 
 
4.42 The East-West Schism 
 There had always existed a natural division between the east and west portions 
of the Roman Empire, which I have already alluded to earlier in this chapter. With the 
transfer of the center of gravity from the West to the East and the consequent gradual 
suppression of the Latin language by the Greek, this division became critical. 
“However much cross-fertilization there may have been over the centuries, however 
common bilingualism may have been among the educated elite, there always 
remained two distinct cultures: one Latin and the other Greek.”
108
 The point of 
departure of this process, which determined the entire later history of the Roman 
Empire, lies undoubtedly in the founding of the new capital city, Constantinople, 
(A.D. 326)  and in the definite partition of the Empire it into western and eastern 
halves (A.D. 395) that arose from it. This sealed the permanent separation of the 
Greek East from the Latin West and was also the fundamental reason for the 
estrangement that soon followed between the Greek and the Latin Christians. Over 
the centuries, this estrangement grew to become a deep-seated aversion resulting in 
open enmity in innumerable political and ecclesiastical squabbles. The linguistic and 
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cultural dualism had already existed before Constantine and Theodosius. However, it 
was only after the founding of New Rome and the partition of the Empire that it 
received its official confirmation. It was on this basis that the division could grow 
unhindered. The contrast was especially promoted and strengthened by the rapid 
growth of the new capital city, which conferred on the Greek or Hellenized half of the 
Empire a political and geographical, and soon even a religious, social, literary, and 
artistic priority coupled with the corresponding collapse of the western part of the 
Empire, including the fall of Rome.   
 The split between East and West was focused after the rise of Christianity on 
how Latin and Greek Church centers viewed orthodox faith and practice. In the early 
church of the first century, leadership for cities or regions was given to a bishop; each 
major city had one bishop. Soon, bishops in key cities attained greater status than 
other bishops and eventually the bishop of Rome gained more power and authority in 
the West, first gaining status of a “first among equals,” later as the Pope or head of 
the Church. The reasons why the bishop of Rome gained such power are many. Peter, 
the “apostle specially commissioned by Jesus,” ministered and was martyred in 
Rome. Both Peter and Paul were connected to Rome. The strong leader Cyprian 
advanced the cause of the bishop of Rome. Rome was the early center of persecution 
and gained recognition through this. Paul wrote his longest and maybe most 
important letter in the New Testament to Rome. The largest church by 100 was in 
Rome. Rome, of course, was the capitol of Roman Empire until the fourth century. 
The Pope had more autonomy than his counterpart in the East (the Patriarch of 
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Constantinople) because Rome later had no ruling Emperor while Constantinople 
always had a usually meddling Emperor in the foreground or background of church 
issues. Finally, Rome was a center of orthodoxy in its earliest years. But the East 
continued to view all bishops on a more or less equal basis and never granted the 
recognition to the bishop of Rome that the West did.   
 As this difference in opinion in authority in the Church developed, several 
other factors made the division between the Latin and Greek churches more apparent. 
The West was more practical minded, the East more theological and philosophical. 
The West did not allow clergy to marry, the East did allow clergy to marry. The West 
used Latin, the East used Greek in worship. The West added a phrase to the Nicene 
creed “the Filioque (‘and the Son’) clause;” the East was never consulted and never 
approved of this theologically significant change. (Photius charged the West with 
heresy when they added this phrase.) The West celebrated Easter on a Sunday, the 
East celebrated on whatever day Easter fell. The West allowed images in churches, 
the East only two-dimensional icons.
109
 The West tried to interfere in Eastern Church 
appointments, greatly angering the East. 
The “last straw” occurred when the Western Church insisted on using 
unleavened bread in Communion, while the East refused. Both said they were right 
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and had authority to make such a decision. In 1054, both West and East leaders 
excommunicated (anathematized) each other and the split (schism) was complete.
110
 
 The Schism of 1054 merely gave official status to a split that had unofficially 
occurred centuries before. The Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox 
Church were separated theologically, but this idealistic division resulted in a genuine 
divide between the East and the West that affected every part of life. The greatest 
indignity of all happened during the fourth Crusade in 1204. The Emperor in 
Constantinople called on his former European cousins to assist him in resisting the 
Moslem advance on his city.
111
 The Europeans marched east to save Constantinople 
and the Holy Land from the infidels but this Crusade was sidetracked and 
Constantinople itself was taken was taken by Roman Christians from Europe! The 
Pope took over the Greek Orthodox eastern area for about 50 years. It has been often 
described as one of the most profitable and disgraceful sacks of a city in history. The 
crusaders inflicted a horrible and savage sacking on Constantinople for three days, 
during which many ancient and medieval Roman and Greek works were either stolen 
or destroyed. Despite their oaths and the threat of excommunication, the Crusaders 
ruthlessly and systematically violated the city’s holy sanctuaries, destroying, defiling, 
or stealing all they could lay hands on; nothing was spared. “Fires raged across the 
city, destroying many manuscripts. To show the superiority of swordsmen over 
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‘scribblers’ [Byzantine copyists], victorious crusaders marched through the city 
holding aloft pen, paper, and inkwell.”
112
 Stephen Marrone says of this event, “Here 
lies the origin of what is seen today as western global hegemony.”
113
 
 Speros Vryonis gives a vivid account of the sack of Constantinople by the 
Frankish and Venetian Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade: 
The Latin soldiery subjected the greatest city in Europe to an indescribable 
sack. For three days they murdered, raped, looted and destroyed on a scale 
which even the ancient Vandals and Goths would have found unbelievable. 
Constantinople had become a veritable museum of ancient and Byzantine art, 
an emporium of such incredible wealth that the Latins were astounded at the 
riches they found. Though the Venetians had an appreciation for the art which 
they discovered (they were themselves semi-Byzantines) and saved much of 
it, the French and others destroyed indiscriminately, halting to refresh 
themselves with wine, violation of nuns, and murder of Orthodox clerics. The 
Crusaders vented their hatred for the Greeks most spectacularly in the 
desecration of the greatest Church in Christendom. They smashed the silver 
iconostasis, the icons and the holy books of Hagia Sophia, and seated upon the 
patriarchal throne a whore who sang coarse songs as they drank wine from the 
Church’s holy vessels. The estrangement of East and West, which had 
proceeded over the centuries, culminated in the horrible massacre that 
accompanied the conquest of Constantinople. The Greeks were convinced that 
even the Turks, had they taken the city, would not have been as cruel as the 
Latin Christians. The defeat of Byzantium, already in a state of decline, 
accelerated political degeneration so that the Byzantines eventually became an 
easy prey to the Turks. The crusading movement thus resulted, ultimately, in 
the victory of Islam, a result which was of course the exact opposite of its 
original intention.
114
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The Latins and the Greeks were both proud of their own diverse heritages, 
both convinced beyond a shadow of doubt their brand of Christianity is correct, both 
intent on maintaining the glory of the old Roman Empire, both suspicious of the 
other’s political and military intentions, and both so busy protecting their own turf 
that striving for formal connections between each other took low priority. Sharing 
resources, including intellectual, found little support or opportunity. “It is emblematic 
of the gulf between east and west that, following the schism between the Greek and 
Roman churches in 1054, Byzantine theologians showed little interest in the work of 
their western compeers and that translations of their writings into Greek were rare and 
made late.”
115
 Sarton, in the 1950s, describes the separation in this way: “One often 
speaks today of the Iron Curtain which separates eastern from Western Europe. That 
curtain existed throughout a good part of the Middle Ages between the Greek and 
Latin worlds.”
116
 Thus, it can be seen that the great writings of the classical era, 
particularly those of Greece, were never completely lost to the Western world. They 
were always available to the Byzantines, and to those few Western peoples in cultural 
and diplomatic contact with the Eastern Empire. “However, during most of the 
Middle Ages these contacts were few and tenuous, and, for all practical purposes, 
scarcely significant.”
117
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 It is time to conclude this pivotal chapter. The West has virtually lost contact 
with its Greek foundations. The East has placed such restrictions on its use of Greek 
works that they are for all practical purposes museum pieces. In addition, even these 
museum pieces will not easily find their way to the West because the East-West 
connection has been shut down by the inability of the Latin and Greek churches to 
find common ground for compromise. Dialogue between Europe and Constantinople 
is, for this time period, disrupted. 
 So, my research question now comes into complete focus at this point. How 
will the West recover Greek philosophical foundations that it will use and profit from 
during the Italian Renaissance? The answer to that intriguing question, which has 
prompted my research and this dissertation will come from again an unlikely turn of 
history. To find the road to the West, we must travel East, outside the boundaries of 
both Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire.
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Chapter 5 
 
The Connection between Greek Philosophy and the Islamic Empire 
 
 
5.1 The Origin and Expansion of Islam
1
 
During the vacuum of power that occurred in and around the area of the 
Mediterranean basin once controlled by the Roman Empire, with the splintering of 
the West sections and the shrinking of the East portion, a new Empire sprang to life in 
the seventh century and quickly swallowed those territories unprotected by 
Byzantium or Frankish armies. The Muslims, energized by a new faith and founder, 
by a fervent desire to convert the world to their ideology, and no doubt by a hope of 
plundering the wealth and resources of cities and states that lay in their path, rapidly 
expanded from their homeland in Arabia into Mesopotamia and the eastern 
Mediterranean, North Africa, and even as far Spain at the southwestern corner of 
Europe. 
 Islam had its origin in the Arabian peninsula, an out-of-the-way location in the 
history of civilization. It was hardly an area where you would expect a major cultural 
group would find it beginning—not located on any major river systems, not abundant 
in natural resources, not well connected to the Mediterranean centers of population. 
This area of inhospitable desert forced people there to struggle with basic survival. 
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Semitic Bedouin tribes wandered from oasis to oasis with their herds and flocks. 
Intertribal conflict was common; no dominant group or religion harnessed the social 
energy of the region. 
 One of these tribesmen, Muhammad (570-632) came to the forefront of this 
region. Originally a common camel driver, by marrying into a rich family, he was 
enabled to spend time in religious meditation rather than in the hard work of 
maintaining a desert-derived living. Beginning in 610, and continuing for the last 23 
years of his life, Muhammad, who had had contact with both Judaism and 
Christianity during his travels, reported receiving revelations from God. The content 
of these revelations, known as the Qur’an,
2
 was memorized and then transcribed by 
his companions. Muslims view him not as the creator of a new religion, but as the 
restorer of the original, uncorrupted monotheistic faith of Adam, Abraham, Moses 
and Jesus. In Muslim tradition, Muhammad is viewed as the last and the greatest in a 
series of prophets—as the man closest to perfection, the possessor of all virtues. 
Muslims regard the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the words and deeds of Muhammad) as 
the fundamental sources of Islam. Islamic tradition holds that Judaism and 
Christianity distorted the messages of these prophets over time, either in 
interpretation or in text, or both, and that Islam was introduced into the world to 
correct these errors of the basic monotheistic faith. The Qur’an calls Jews and 
Christians “People of the Book,” and distinguishes them from polytheists, although 
Muslims feel Christianity has departed from strict monotheism in its doctrine of the 
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Trinity and the incarnation of Christ. Islamic theology says that all of God’s 
messengers since Adam preached the message of Islam—submission to the will of the 
one God. Islam is described in the Qur’an as “the primordial nature upon which God 
created mankind.”
3
 The word “Islam” means “submission,” or the total surrender of 
oneself to God (Arabic: Allah). An adherent of Islam is known as a Muslim, meaning 
“one who submits (to God).” Islam shares with Christianity the call to vigorous 
missionary activity.  
 Muslims consider the Qur’an to be the literal word of God, believing that the 
verses of the Qur’an were revealed to Muhammad by God through the angel Gabriel 
on many occasions between the years 610 and his death in 632. Though the Qur’an 
was written down by Muhammad’s companions, the prime method of transmission 
was oral. It was compiled in the time of Abu Bakr, the first caliph (or successors of 
Muhammad), and was standardized in the time of Uthman, the third caliph. Based on 
textual evidence, the Qur’an has not changed over the years.  
The Qur’an is divided into 114 suras, or chapters, which combined contain 
6,236 ayat, or poetic verses, with the longest chapters at the beginning and the 
shortest at the end. The chronologically earlier suras, revealed at Mecca, are primarily 
concerned with ethical and spiritual topics, while the later Medinan suras mostly 
discuss social and moral issues.  
The word “Qur’an” means “recitation.” To Muslims, the Qur’an is perfect 
only as revealed in the original Arabic; translations are necessarily deficient because 
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of language differences, the fallibility of translators, and the impossibility of 
preserving the original’s inspired style. Translations are, therefore, regarded only as 
commentaries on the Qur’an, or “interpretations of its meaning,” not as the Qur’an 
itself.
4
 “The absolute centrality of the Koran to the religious life of Muslims and its 
use in the teaching of basic literacy ensured its literary no less than theological 
influence on all subsequent Muslim authors,”
5
 including Arabic philosophers. 
 During the time of his divine revelations, Muhammad preached to the people 
of Mecca, imploring them to abandon polytheism. Although some converted to Islam, 
Muhammad and his followers were persecuted by the Meccan authorities. After 
thirteen years of preaching, Muhammad and his few followers emigrated to the city of 
Medina, in 622.
6
 There Muhammad established his political and religious authority. 
At the same time, Meccan trade routes were cut off as Muhammad brought 
surrounding desert tribes under his control. By 629, Muhammad was victorious in the 
conquest of Mecca. By the time of his death in 632, he ruled the entire Arabian 
peninsula, uniting the tribes of Arabia into a singular Arab Muslim religious polity. 
His followers were soon ready to expand outside of Arabia. 
 With Muhammad’s death, disagreement broke out over who should succeed 
him as leader of the Muslim community. Umar ibn al-Khattab, a well-known 
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companion of Muhammad, nominated Abu Bakr, who was Muhammad’s friend and 
collaborator. Abu Bakr was made the first caliph. This choice was disputed by some 
of Muhammad’s companions, who held that Ali ibn Abi Talib, his cousin and son-in-
law, had been designated his successor. Abu Bakr’s death in 634 resulted in the 
succession of Umar as the caliph, followed by Uthman ibn al-Affan and finally Ali 
ibn Abi Talib. These four are known as the “Rightly Guided Caliphs” by Sunnis. 
Under them, the territory under Muslim rule expanded deeply into Persian Empire 
and Byzantine territories, including northeast Africa, the eastern Mediterranean 
region (for example, Palestine and Syria) up to but not including Asia Minor, and 
extending to the east as far as the present-day eastern border of Iran.  
When Umar was assassinated in 644, the election of Uthman as successor was 
met with increasing opposition. In 656, Uthman was also killed, and Ali assumed the 
position of caliph. Ali was assassinated by a rogue Muslim tribe in 661. Following 
this, Muawiyah I, who was governor of Levant,
7
 seized power and began the 
Umayyad dynasty,
8
 moving the caliphate to Damascus. Syria would remain the base 
of Umayyad power until the end of the dynasty. The Umayyad dynasty prevailed for 
seventy years, and was able to add to the Muslim territories northwest Africa, what is 
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today Spain/Portugal and further east to the Indus River.
9
 Even the city of 
Constantinople was attacked during this period by Muslim forces. Within a century of 
Muhammad’s first recitations of the Qur’an, an Islamic empire stretched from the 
Atlantic Ocean in the west to Central Asia in the east. “The territory of the Muslim 
faith was extended by the sword. In this, the conquerors were as lucky as they were 
brave. Their victories were due not so much to their own strength and to their 
enthusiasm which was considerable, as to weakness and disunion of their 
adversaries.”
10
 Egypt and the Fertile Crescent region were reunited with Persia and 
India for the first time since Alexander the Great and for a period of time much longer 
than that of Alexander’s relatively brief exploits. This time of empire building is 
sometimes labeled as the time of “Pax Islamica”—a direct reference to the time of the 
more well-known “Pax Romana,” when, by its sheer weight of influence and control, 
Rome ensured a measure of peace within its domain so that the business of “living” 
could be pursued.
11
 
This expansion did not go unnoticed by Christian-led lands.  
The crescent-shaped expansion to the West and the East threatened 
Christianity with a great pincers, but expansion at the eastern end of the 
crescent was stopped by the brave defense of the Eastern empire under Leo 
the Isaurian [the Byzantine emperor] in 718. Muslim expansion on the 
                                                           
     
9
 See Appendix F. 
 
     
10
 Sarton, The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East, 24-25. The Byzantine and Persian 
empires had been tottering for centuries and indeed they had weakened one another in the period 
before Islam appeared. 
 
     
11
 The fundamental work of A.M. Watson shows that with the opening of ancient trade routes to the 
Far East that agricultural stability and innovation flooded the Middle East providing wealth and 
strength to the Islamic Empire (Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World [Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983]). 
  
 235 
Western wing of the crescent was halted by the defeat of the Muslims by the 
armies of Charles Martel at Tours [in central France] in 732.
12
 
 
Both the eastern and western sections of the Christian church were weakened 
by these encounters with the Muslims, but the Eastern churches suffered most. 
Byzantium lost its hold on North Africa, Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Land, all 
locations of strong centers of Christian influence. We will see how some of these 
former Byzantine areas figured into later Islamic contact with Greek philosophical 
sources. 
The descendants of Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, rallied 
discontented, poor Arabs, and some Shia against the Umayyads and overthrew 
them,
13
 inaugurating the Abbasid dynasty in 750. Under the Abbasids, Islamic 
civilization flourished in the “Islamic Golden Age,” with its capital at the 
cosmopolitan city of Baghdad. During this time, expansion of the Muslim world 
continued, by both conquest and peaceful proselytism into sub-Saharan West Africa, 
Inner Asia, the Malay archipelago, and, especially significant for our purposes, Sicily 
and southern Italy.
14
 While shrewd leaders in their own right, the Abbasid caliphs 
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modeled their administration on that of the Sassanids (Persians), into whose former 
territory they moved their capital.
15
 The combination of Arab vigor and Persian 
stability provided the Muslims with great ability to expand its intellectual assets.  
By the late 9th century, the Abbasid caliphate began to fracture, as various 
regions gained increasing levels of autonomy. Across North Africa, Persia, and 
Central Asia, emirates formed as provinces broke away. The monolithic Arab empire 
gave way to a more religiously homogenized Muslim world. By 1055, the Seljuk 
Turks had eliminated the Abbasids as a military power, nevertheless they continued 
to respect the Abbasid caliph’s authority. The Golden Age saw new legal, 
philosophical, and religious developments. The Islamic civilization during this period 
of the Middle Ages is considered by many to have been the most advanced in the 
world, certainly in the Mediterranean region. 
Starting in the 9th century, Muslim conquests in Christian Europe began to be 
reversed. The Reconquista was launched against Muslim principalities in Iberia, and 
Muslim Italian possessions were lost to the Normans. Beginning in the 11th century, 
a series of wars known as the Crusades brought the eastern Muslim world into 
conflict with Christendom. Successful at first in their capturing of the Holy Land, 
which resulted in the establishment of the Crusader states, Crusader gains in the Holy 
Land were reversed by later Muslim generals such as Saladin, who recaptured 
Jerusalem during the Second Crusade. The Mongol Empire put an end to the Abbasid 
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dynasty at the Battle of Baghdad in 1258. Meanwhile in Egypt, the Mamluks took 
control in an uprising in 1250. The Seljuk Turks rapidly declined in the second half of 
the 13th century. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was established 
with a series of conquests that included the Balkans, parts of Greece, and western 
Anatolia. In 1453, the Ottomans laid siege to Constantinople, the capital of 
Byzantium. The Byzantine fortress fell shortly after, officially ending the Byzantine 
Empire and the last remnants of the original Roman Empire. 
The story of the rise of the Islamic Empire is generally understated yet wholly 
remarkable. That this new religion-culture could so quickly overpower such a large 
area of land and people groups for such a long period time places them in the 
company of the Greek and Roman empires that preceded them. “The rise of Islam is 
the most striking and important event of the Middle Ages. Initially, it could be 
explained only in apocalyptical terms. Its speed and completeness still stagger 
belief.”
16
 Angold goes on to comment, “The Islamic achievement was, in some ways, 
still more remarkable, since its orbit encompassed so much a greater span than the 
Roman Empire.”
17
 That this period of history finds so little commentary in Western 
history narratives is one of the reasons for this current research. The Islamic Empire 
was a truly amazing civilization of the Middle Ages and demands a significant part in 
the story of the development of Western civilization. I agree with Sarton’s evaluation, 
“The achievements of the Arabic speaking peoples between the ninth and twelfth 
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centuries are so great as to baffle our understanding.”
18
 Southern takes this thought 
even further: “The rise of Islam as a political force is the most astonishing fact in the 
history of institutions.”
19
 
 
5.2 Greek Philosophy: From Syriac to Arabic 
In the last chapter, we saw that Christian, Greek-speaking Byzantine scholars 
were the natural inheritors of the dwindling Greek philosophical tradition. We might 
have expected, had we been living in that age, that Byzantium would have been the 
natural champion of Plato and Aristotle. They shared history, culture, language, and 
had access to their work. “However, the leaders of the Orthodox Christian Church, 
centered in Constantinople, did not value a philosophy of reason. For over 800 years 
[after the legalization of Christianity] . . . they stifled the study of philosophy and the 
application of logic.”
20
 Bolgar states, “Byzantium had more to offer than the Arabs. It 
stood closer to antiquity; and yet by a curious chance most of what the age learnt 
about the ancient world came through Arabic.”
21
 The path of Greek philosophical 
transmission now takes a strange turn, to Syria, and then to Islam, a civilization with 
no inherent roots in the classical tradition. 
When Christianity began in the first century, it quickly spread in all directions 
of the compass. While in the New Testament we hear primarily about the western 
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direction of Christian evangelism, there was also a strong move toward the east as 
well. Some of these groups in the east later developed doctrines about the nature of 
Christ and God that were considered heretical to orthodox Christians in 
Constantinople and Rome. These groups were persecuted, either in word or deed, by 
Christian authorities and were eventually isolated by the Christian society at large, 
especially as Persian control came over the areas of occupation, for example in the 
region of Syria.
22
 Other Christians joined these outcasts, as further theological 
discussions and councils placed groups like Nestorians and Monophysites in jeopardy 
within the Byzantine-controlled community. These eastern communities, having both 
a Christian background as well as remnants of a Hellenized culture from the time 
when Greece and then Rome occupied these border areas, found more freedom to 
express and explore their theological-philosophical ideas. “The political and 
geographical isolation of the Byzantines . . . shielded these Christian communities 
under Muslim rule . . . from the dark ages and aversion to Hellenism into which 
Byzantium slid in the seventh and eighth centuries.”
23
 
Not only did Christian heretics find sanctuary in the East, but pagan scholars 
formerly within the Byzantine arena also at times found room to practice philosophy 
in the eastern sections of the Mediterranean. There were also other non-Christian 
religions that flourished in these areas, adding an eclectic atmosphere to this thinking 
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community. The Sassanid Persian kings, who were at constant war with Byzantium, 
saw the opportunity to assure the loyalty of these displaced subjects and supported 
these Byzantine rejects, especially the Nestorians.  
As early as 450, Syrian Christians began translating Greek writings into the 
Syriac language,
24
 including works from the Greek philosophers. Their Hellenistic 
background, and the fact that Greek was still the lingua franca of much of this area 
and of Christianity itself, allowed them to move freely from Greek to their native 
Syrian language. When Persia (and Syria) was invaded and conquered by the 
marching Muslim armies in the 600s, these Christian translators and scholars 
continued their work in the schools and monasteries in the Syrian region. “For 
example, in the scriptorium of the Qinnesrin monastery in northern Syria, three 
translators produced Syriac copies of Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s 
Categories, as well as Aristotle’s Categories, Interpretation, and Prior Analytics.”
25
 
Generally, Islam was tolerant of other faiths in their conquered territories as long as 
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tribute was paid and subservience was observed, and these Christians were allowed to 
continue their work as Christians. “Terms of capitulation were arranged, including a 
covenant guaranteeing the faith, and somewhat limiting its public practice, of the 
subject peoples.”
26
 These eastern Christians adopted many of the views of the neo-
Platonists from Antioch and Alexandria, now also under Islamic rule, as well as the 
logic of Aristotle. While these eastern Christians were still leery about full dialogue 
with Greek philosophy, there were more opportunities for this kind of dialogue to 
happen, since they lived outside the strict control of Byzantine authority. But as 
Christians, the tension between faith and reason still kept Greek philosophy “in 
check.” Proba of Syria (425-475), Athanasius of Balad (646-696), and George 
(“Bishop to the Arabs”) of Kufa
27
 (674-724) are examples of these early Christian 
translators. The Syrian schools of Edessa and Nisibis, as well as the school in 
Qinnesrin, provided room in their curriculum to study and translate Greek 
philosophy. 
 Over a period of centuries, Syriac-Christian scholars developed five key 
points on the study of Greek philosophy that influenced the later Arab-Islamic study 
of this topic.
28
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• Arranging the nine branches of logic in the neo-Platonist order 
(introduction, categories, interpretation, prior analytics, posterior 
analytics, topics, sophistical refutations, rhetoric, and poetics. 
• Esteeming the Alexandrian neo-Platonists’ commentaries on the Organon 
(and adopting their method, scholasticism). 
• Supporting neo-Platonist syncretism (the attempt to reconcile Platonism 
and Aristotelianism). 
• Exposing students to the first four treatises of Aristotle (Introduction, 
Categories, Interpretation, and Prior Analytics). 
• Promoting the study of logic as preparation for advanced studies (science, 
medicine, and theology). 
Through schools, especially in Baghdad (the House of Wisdom) and 
Jundishapur
29
 (the Academy), eastern Christians bequeathed these five essential 
philosophical elements to their Arabic scholar peers.
30
 Though these eastern 
Christians were ultimately conservative in thought, they did allow the Greek 
philosophical tradition to move into the hands and minds of the Muslims in whose 
territories they lived.
31
 Also, with the advent of Islam, these various scholastic centers 
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could and did pursue conversations with each other, without worry or threat from 
“orthodox” supervisors. “Anti-Byzantinism thus becomes philhellenism”
32
 within the 
growing Islamic Empire. 
 
5.3 The Abbasid Dynasty Translation Movement 
As the “Golden Age” of the Islamic Empire unfolded, under control of the 
Abbasid Dynasty with their capitol in Baghdad, wealthy Arabic readers increased the 
demand for Arabic translations of Greek writings. A strong and long literary tradition 
already existed in Arabic before the rise of Islam, and Arabic literature continued to 
flourish after its initiation. In the eastern Mediterranean, Arabic rapidly became the 
language of scholarly discourse, replacing Latin, Greek, Persian and Syriac.
33
 
“Whatever their political and religious positions might be, all Muslim rulers thought 
it important to support literature, which brought luster and entertainment to their 
courts . . . Writers built on the strong foundation of pre-Islamic literature with a 
notable cross-fertilization of the Arabic and Persian traditions.”
34
 Evidence of this 
strong literary tradition is widely acknowledged during the Abbasid period.  
Besides great libraries attached to the mosques and the larger schools, princes, 
nobles, and merchants had extensive private collections which they were 
usually willing to open to qualified scholars. We hear of a private library in 
Bagdad [sic], as early as the ninth century, that required a hundred and twenty 
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camels to move it from one place to another. Another scholar of Bagdad 
refused to accept a position elsewhere because it would take four hundred 
camels to transport his books; the catalogue of this private library filled ten 
volumes. This is the more astonishing when it is realized that the library of the 
king of France in 1300 had only about four hundred titles.
35
  
 
Gutas remarks that even though translations, of Greek works were being done 
in Damascus and in Syriac, the reasons for these translations and the purposes for 
which they were used, were different from what happened later in Baghdad. The 
Syrian work was still done within a Christian context and the place of Greek 
philosophy was still to some degree stigmatized. By moving the translation projects 
to Baghdad, away from Byzantine influences and into the heart of Islamic-Arabic 
culture, the translations of Plato and Aristotle took on new energy and direction. “The 
transfer of the caliphate from Damascus to central Iraq—i.e., from a Greek-speaking 
to a non-Greek-speaking area—had the paradoxical consequence of allowing the 
preservation of the classical Greek heritage which the Byzantines had all but 
extirpated.”
36
 This point cannot be stated too strongly—the Greek-Syriac-Arabic, and 
eventually Latin, translation success was significantly dependent on the Abbasid 
contribution to Islamic culture and its openness to Greek thought. Without that 
support, the Greek translation movement may have died in Syria, within a kind of 
intellectual cul-de-sac. Gutas emphasizes again the importance of the Islamic Empire 
over against the work of Syrian Christians alone: “There is a widespread 
misconception in the majority of works dealing with the transmission of Greek 
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knowledge into Arabic that this was effected on the basis of pre-existing Syriac 
translations . . . Before the Abbisids, relatively few secular works had been 
transformed into Syriac.”
37
 The Syriac-speaking Christians contributed much of the 
technical skill needed in this translation movement, but the support and management 
of this movement was found within the context of Abbasid society itself. 
Their Hellenized subjects in previously controlled Byzantine lands provided 
Islam with access to the classical tradition, as the traditional centers of education 
became incorporated into the Islamic Empire—Alexandria, Damascus, Jerusalem, 
Edessa, and Antioch. This literature was appropriated, but in a selective way. 
Classical fictional literature and political theory were not of interest to the Muslims. 
Greek science and philosophy were, at least in the early centuries. Of these last two 
areas, “the Arabs drank deeply from a number of Hellenic sources: from the secular 
and scientific Aristotelian tradition of Alexandria, from the later Platonism of Athens 
. . . and from the theological Hellenism that rested within the Christian tradition.”
38
 
During the time period from 450-750, only Greek to Syriac translations of 
Greek philosophy were active. “One should not suppose that early Arabic 
philosophers, any more than scholastic Christian philosophers, worked primarily 
through a direct and independent reading of [Greek philosophy].”
39
 Beginning about 
                                                           
     
37
 Ibid., 21-22. 
 
     
38
 Peters, “Hellenism in Islam,” Paths from Ancient Greece, ed. Thomas, 86.  
 
     
39
 Adamson and Taylor, “Introduction, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, 2.  See 
also L.E. Goodman, “The Translation of Greek Materials into Arabic,” in Religion, Learning and 
Science in the Abbasid Period, ed. M.J.L. Young, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 477-497. 
 
 246 
810, we start to see translations of Greek philosophers from Syriac to Arabic; again 
most of these translators were Syrian Christians who had become acquainted with the 
sister language of Arabic. Some of these key translators included Timotheus (728-
823), Yahya (Yuhanna) ibn al-Bitriq (770-830), Ayyub ibn al-Qasim of Raqqah (780-
840), Hunain ibn Ishaq of Baghdad (809-877), Thabit ibn Qurra of Harran (834-901, 
the only non-Christian in this group), Ishaq ibn Hunain of Baghdad (845-910), Abu 
Bishr of Baghdad (870-940), and Yaya ibn Adi of Takrit (893-974).
40
 These Syriac 
translators set high standards and used the following principles when taking a text 
from the original Greek: 
• Write a Greek “critical text,” by compiling a single copy after reviewing 
variant wording in several much older Greek manuscripts acquired in 
Alexandria, Harran, or Damascus. 
• Translate the Greek critical text into Syriac. Sometimes this step was 
skipped and a Greek text was translated directly into Arabic, especially if 
a Syriac translation had not been completed earlier. 
• Translate the Syriac copy into Arabic, not in a literal word-for-word 
manner but in a thought-for-thought approach, insuring better 
understanding for the end reader.
41
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Translation is always a complex operation, and the same holds true when we 
talk about the Arabic translation movement during the Abbasid period. When 
considering how translations were made during this time frame, we must keep in 
mind the following set of variables: 1. The languages (including, but not exclusively 
Syriac) from which Arabic translation was made, 2. The integrity of the original 
manuscript, 3. How revisions of previous translations were used to make new 
translations, 4. Competency of the translator, 5. Complexity of the original work’s 
ideas and structure, and, 6. The intended audience or readership of the translation. 
This translation program, with the accession of the Abbasids to power, was 
truly a full social phenomenon, and not a mere accident of history and not the pet 
projects of a few scholars and leaders.
42
 While it is true that later, Arabic philosophers 
would be moved toward the boundaries of intellectual thought, in its first period, 
several supportive factors can be outlined showing the depth to which the translation 
movement penetrated Islamic culture. There was a desire to learn. First, the 
translation movement lasted well over two centuries, a considerable period of time. 
Second, it was supported by the entire elite of Abbasid society; it was not the pet 
project of an isolated group of individuals. Third, it was subsidized by funds, both 
public and private. Fourth, it resulted in a meticulous methodology, initiated and 
sustained by the Hunain ibn Ishaq family of Baghdad resulting in a systematized 
approach to translation work. “The support for the translation movement cut across 
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all lines of religious, sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and linguistic demarcation. Patrons were 
Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites, generals and 
civilians, merchants and land-owners.”
43
 
Al-Mansur (712-775), the builder of Baghdad, the second in the line of 
Abbasid caliphs and the real founder of the policies that enabled the Abbasid state to 
flourish, is usually credited with initiating and maintaining the translation movement 
of Greek works into Arabic.
44
 The Arabic historian al-Masudi (d. 956) quotes an 
earlier historian, al-Ahbari, who said about al-Mansur: “He was the first caliph to 
have books translated from foreign languages into Arabic [among them] books by 
Aristotle . . . These [translated books] were published among the people, who 
examined them and devoted themselves to knowing them.”
45
 The Andalusian 
historian, Said (d. 1070) reported:  
When God Almighty put an end to this dynasty [the Umauuads] by means of 
the [Abbasids] and directed the rule to the latter, people’s ambitions revived 
from their indifference and their minds awoke from their sleep. The first 
among the Arabs who cultivated the sciences was the second caliph, Abu 
Gafar al-Mansur. He was—God have mercy on him—deeply attached to them 
and to their practitioners, being himself proficient in religious knowledge and 
playing a pioneering role in [promoting] philosophical knowledge.
46
 
 
Part of the impetus for the Abbasid dynasty to pursue translation projects 
going back to the Greeks relates to the Persian view that when Alexander the Great 
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conquered their territory in the 300s B.C., he actually stole ancient Persian ideas
47
 and 
transferred them to Greece. So when Greek works were translated into Arabic, they 
were in essence the original ideas of this region “coming home.” Al-Kindi (see later 
in this chapter), from the Arab side of things, even devised a genealogy according to 
which Yunan, the so-called ancestor of the ancient Greeks (actually the Ionians; 
Yunan is an eponym of Iona) was presented as the brother of Qahtan, the originating 
ancestor of the Arabs, creating a similar connection as that claimed by the Persians. 
Whether these ancient connections were true or not, it is easy to see why the Abbasid 
dynasty, with its capital in the heart of the Persian homeland, would consider Greek-
Arabic translations of extreme value. It is even evident why the Greek language was 
not considered significant to study in itself in regard to these Greek classics—Greek 
was not the original language of composition and deserved no special attention. 
Related to this assertion of ancient connection in the Middle East, al-Mansur’s 
circularly constructed Baghdad was sometimes referred to as the “Round City,” 
symbolizing centrality and control. Legend says that the doors of this city were 
derived from ancient sources including Solomon and the Pharaoh of Egypt. “Thus al-
Mansur presented Baghdad not merely as a symbol of his indisputable rule but also of 
the Abbasid dynasty as the heir to the rich past of the Near East with its mosaic of 
various peoples, religions, and traditions.”
48
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Later Abbasid leaders continued the translation process, and added to it. One 
of its important secondary purposes is seen clearly in anti-Byzantine and anti-
Christian propaganda that was popular in Baghdad in the ninth century.
49
 They used 
the rational reasoning processes of the Greeks to ridicule the Christian idea of Trinity, 
which sounded too much like polytheism to the Arab mind (and to which the 
Christians had a hard time explaining even to themselves), and the idea that God, in 
the person of Jesus Christ, could be a mere mortal “who urinates and defecates,” 
again illogical to the Islamic mind which holds a high, transcendent view of a holy 
God. Al-Gahiz (d. 868), famous Arabic author, when talking about the logical 
inconsistencies of Christians regarding three-gods-in-one and a divine-human Son of 
God, remarks, “If we had not seen it with our own eyes and heard it with our own 
ears, we would not consider it true. We would not believe that [Christians could 
believe and take pride in such things].”
50
  
In another lengthy quotation from al-Gahiz, the Arab writer criticizes 
Byzantium for its lack of intellectual prowess and its ignorance and lack of 
connection to Greek thinking, and in counter-perspective uplifts the Islamic ability 
and desire to be a culture worthy of the ancients. 
Had the common people but known that the Christians and the Byzantines 
[known by the Arabs simply as the “Romans”] have neither wisdom nor 
clarity [of mind] nor depth of thought but are simply clever with their hands    
. . . they would have removed them from the ranks of the literati and dropped 
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them from the roster of philosophers and sages because works like the 
Organon, On Coming to Be and Passing Away, and Meteorology were written 
by Aristotle, and he is neither Byzantine nor Christian; the Almagest was 
written by Ptolemy, and he is neither Byzantine nor Christian; the Elements 
was written by Euclid, and he is neither Byzantine nor Christian; medical 
books were written by Galen, who was neither Byzantine nor Christian; and 
similarly with the books by Democritus, Hippocrates, Plato, and on and on. 
All these are individuals of one nation; they have perished but the traces of 
their minds live on: they are the Greeks. Their religion was different from the 
religion of the Byzantines, and their culture was different from the culture of 
the Byzantines. They were scientists, while these people [the Byzantines] are 
artisans who appropriated the books of the Greeks on account of geographical 
proximity. Some of those books they ascribed to themselves while others they 
converted to their religion, except for those Greek books that were too famous 
and the philosophical works were too well known; unable, then, to change the 
names [of the authors] of these books, they claimed that the Greeks were but 
one of the Byzantine tribes. They used their religious beliefs to boast 
superiority over the Jews, to display their arrogance toward the Arabs, and to 
wax haughty over the Indians to the point that they actually claimed that our 
sages are followers of theirs, and that our philosophers have followed their 
example. And that is that.
51
 
 
Al-Masudi, an Arabic historian of the tenth century, continues this anti-
Byzantine line of reasoning, clearly indicating that the classical Greek inheritance did 
not flow through Constantinople. Note not only his content but his tone as well. 
During the time of the ancient Greeks, and for a little while during the 
Byzantine [i.e., in this case, Roman] empire, the philosophical sciences kept 
on growing and developing, and scholars and philosophers were respected and 
honored. They developed their theories on natural science—on the body, the 
intellect, the soul—and on the quadrivium . . . The sciences continued to be in 
great demand and intensely cultivated until the religion of Christianity 
appeared among the Byzantines; they then effaced the signs of philosophy, 
eliminated its traces, destroyed its paths, and they changed and corrupted what 
the ancient Greeks had set forth in clear expositions.
52
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Ibn-Ridwan (d. 11
th
 century) adds, “But for that [Islam’s appreciation for 
Greek ideas], all the sciences of the ancients, including medicine, logic, and 
philosophy, would have been forgotten, <just as they have been forgotten> today in 
the lands in which they were most specifically cultivated; I mean Rome, Athens, the 
Byzantine provinces, and in many other lands.”
53
 The implications are clear; Islam is 
superior to Christianity because it has recognized rather than rejected the wisdom of 
the ancient Greeks.
54
  
Gutas goes on to state that an appreciation for the level of work done during 
the translation movement in Baghdad can hardly be overestimated, even though it is 
little discussed in Western histories of philosophy. Listen to his petition, among the 
strongest statements in this dissertation: 
The Graeco-Arabic translation movement of Baghdad constitutes a truly 
epoch-making stage, by any standard, in the course of human history. It is 
equal in significance to, and belongs to the same narrative as, I would claim, 
that of Pericles’ Athens, the Italian Renaissance, or the scientific revolution of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it deserves so to be recognized 
and embedded in our historical consciousness.
55
  
 
Over time, the Syriac to Arabic translations became better in quality and 
quantity as translators became more familiar with the Arabic language and as the 
demand for translations increased among Arabic-speaking leaders and scholars. Some 
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of the translators began producing commentaries and paraphrases in addition to the 
basic translations, showing an evolution in philosophical debate. A further gift that 
these Syrian translators gave to the Muslim Empire was an Arabic vocabulary for 
philosophical concepts. Because many Muslim scholars were prejudiced against the 
languages of “unbelievers,” none of the later Arabic philosophers were well trained in 
Greek, and thus had to rely on the work of the translators before them.
56
 Richard 
Walzer makes this important observation: “Translators are not very conspicuous 
figures in the history of philosophy, but without their painstaking work, the essential 
links in the continuity of Western thought would never have been forged, nor would 
Arabic philosophy in particular ever have come into existence.”
57
 
 
5.4 Philosophical Genres used in Islam Culture 
Up to this point, we have talked about how translations of Greek ideas were 
beginning to be diffused within the Islamic culture at large. Before moving into a 
discussion of the formation of a professional, philosophical Arabic-speaking elite, and 
the consequences of these Arabic philosophers on the West, a brief side-trail must be 
mentioned to illuminate the broad genres in which philosophy found its way into the 
intellectual life of Islam.
58
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The use of Greek philosophy can be said to be bordered by two extremes. On 
the one end of the scale is the philosophical auctoritas or “name-dropping,” a kind of 
pseudo-intellectualism where Greek philosophers are mentioned to support a wide 
variety of personal positions, using the authority of Plato or Aristotle in a loose, 
sometimes even inappropriate way. On the other end of the spectrum is the close 
word-by-word, textually correct and critical investigation of the Greek philosophers. 
Between these two extremes is a wide range of influence that a thinker might exert on 
a culture, and the resultant diverse ways in which that influence might be manifested 
within the intellectual environment. Not all of the following philosophical devices 
were novel to Islam; in fact, most had a history that went back to early Hellenistic 
times.
59
 Here we will simply note that within Islamic culture, Greek philosophy was 
placed into many of these forms to further opportunities to discuss, explain, and teach 
philosophy, showing to what extent Greek ideas were permeating this culture in 
general. 
Foundationally, the Arabic philosophical movement made great use of the 
eisagoge
60
 device, a kind of introductory, pedagogic tool to help a novice get oriented 
within a particular philosopher’s corpus. This device was well known in earlier 
Hellenistic times, but the Arabic scholastics made this a key part of their curriculum, 
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offering a kind of systematization to philosophical inquiry that would later move to 
the West. 
Typical of the more common commentary movement philosophy circles, 
Arabic commentaries are more literary in style, rather than in the style of a classroom 
lecture, done paragraph by paragraph with instructor notes added by notes taken by 
students. Since philosophy in Islam culture did not particularly penetrate the school 
curriculum, commentaries were produced by individuals in more private settings.  
With the maturing of the Baghdad school, the exegetical/gloss commentaries 
became popular, where we get a better feel of the commentator’s own ideas in 
interaction with the original philosopher. These exegetical commentaries could come 
in different “sizes” depending on the intended audience: small, middle, or large. The 
smaller gloss commentaries included marginal notations, usually philological in 
nature, and sometimes a culminate work of several succeeding scholars. The Arabic 
tafsir (sometimes called “Great Commentary) was especially notable in the work of 
Averroes on Aristotle. 
Some of the manuscripts used in the Arabic philosophical tradition include 
what is called an “epitome,” referring to the practice of some later authors who wrote 
distilled versions of larger works. Some writers attempted to convey the stance and 
spirit of the original, while others added further details or anecdotes regarding the 
general subject. This device is sometimes simply called a paraphrase. As with all 
secondary sources, a different bias not present in the original could creep in.  
 256 
Another philosophical genre is described as a “Book of Definitions” which, as 
the name implies, was a listing of key philosophical and technical terms with concise 
explanations of these concepts. An example in the Syrian is the Book of Definitions 
on all the Subjects of Logic by the Nestorian Ahoudemmah (d. 575), followed by 
Arabic works like al-Kindi’s On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things and       
al-Israili’s Book of Definitions, and including works in the same genre into the 
thirteenth century. 
The philosophical encyclopedia was an attempt to condense collected 
knowledge in a particular area of study as well as to organize materials into consistent 
and related topics. In this way, an Arabic scholar could show how Plato’s or 
Aristotle’s works, according to their interpretation, was best categorized. Here we see 
how the Greek authors were systematized and their thought woven into the fabric of 
the then-current philosophical discussion. Some of these encyclopedias could be quite 
heterogeneous and cover a variety of subjects well outside the normal boundaries of 
philosophy proper. 
A doxographical collection is a gathering of quotes or ideas from a variety of 
writers, in this case philosophers, on any give subject. These sayings are multiplied 
by an editor in order to prove a point or to make an assertion. A doxography is, in 
effect, a series of excerpts, sometimes taken out of their original context, and used by 
the editor to examine a particular tenet of belief or fact.
61
 Related to the genre of 
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doxography is the Arabic literature category of gnomonology, which are collections 
of short sayings from the philosophers, usually on ethical topics; much like a book of 
proverbs. 
The influence of Greek philosophy in Islam was not restricted to strictly 
literary works; it supplied a great deal of influence in the general culture of Islam, 
what is called adab in Arabic. This word refers to the sum of virtues that are prized 
by a society. Greek thought infiltrated the general structure of Islam, especially in 
helping understand the rational world. While Islamic theology would place barriers 
on the extent to which Greek philosophy would be allowed to enter into dialogue with 
it, the shaping of a broad world-view with regard to the natural world made its way 
into the non-technical handbooks of Arabic life. 
The whole point of this excursion into various philosophical devices within 
the Islamic world is to emphasize that the connection of Greek philosophy, from 
Byzantium to Western Europe via Islam, was much more than a mere handing on of 
manuscripts. The Greek philosophical tradition was integrated into Arabic intellectual 
discussion at many levels and arrived in Spain to be translated into Latin having been 
processed by the Arabic mind.
62
 This reminds us of an important part of this historical 
analysis, which has been repeated in previous chapters—the Western philosophical 
tradition cannot simplistically be reduced to a foundation built on Plato and Aristotle 
alone; there is a series of filters that lay between Western thought and the original 
Greek philosophers that informs and shapes the way in which that ancient tradition 
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was passed on to us. While we can read the Greek philosophers for ourselves, 
assuming our current versions of their manuscripts are somewhat trustworthy (an 
interesting question in itself), we cannot ignore the way in which these ideas were 
packaged and distilled as they came into the hands of pre-Renaissance Europe, with 
the commentary of centuries of scholars attached to them. This dissertation is a 
reminder that many of those commentators were attached to the Islamic Empire and 
Arabic tradition. As we have seen, “both as textual technicians and as commentators 
the Arabs were capable of advanced work.”
63
  
 
5.5 Arabic-Speaking Philosophers in the Islamic Empire 
In the Abbasid period, as people of Hellenized areas were incorporated into 
the Islamic Empire, and as Greek philosophy became more available, the movement 
called mutikallimum theology emerged. Derived from the term kalam (reasoned 
argument), this discipline applied philosophy to Islam for two purposes: apologetics 
and dogmatics.
64
 Islam theologians would use various philosophical elements to 
bolster their arguments and to show the strength of their positions. No methodical use 
of Greek philosophy was maintained, rather “we see a key operative principle of 
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kalam, its eclectic use of individual philosophical ideas at points where they were 
useful, rather than systematic reformulation of theology in philosophical terms.”
65
 
 The first true Arabic philosophers began to appear around 850. This is what 
might be called the classical
66
 or formative period of philosophy in the Arabic 
language. This period “goes from the ninth to the twelfth centuries C.E. During this 
period, authors working in Arabic received and reinterpreted the philosophical 
inheritance of the Greeks, especially Aristotle.
67
 The process culminated at the end of 
the classical period with the massive body of commentaries on Aristotle by 
Averroes.”
68
 I will briefly examine several of these key figures, who provide 
significant links in the Greek philosophical chain on continuity.
69
 Interestingly, most 
of these men were both scientists
70
 as well as philosophers, especially interested in 
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medical science. The West today often recognizes some of these names in connection 
with medical advances rather than philosophy, showing both that they were, in 
reality, accomplished medical thinkers as well as a Western bias against and/or 
ignorance of the connection of Arabic philosophy to Western thought.
71
 
As much as Arab aristocracy desired access to Greek learning, the primary 
organized and institutional education in philosophy was in schools run by Christian 
scholars. As Islamic theologians gradually began to dominate Christian influence, and 
Islamic law schools (madhabs or madrasas) and Islamic colleges (masjid) 
proliferated, the study of “foreign” sciences such as philosophy waned, and these 
Christian schools died out.
72
 “The structure of schooling in Muslim lands first 
advanced and then took its toll on speculative thought.”
73
 As Laughlin concludes, 
“Individuals who were dedicated to studying ancient Greek philosophy and logic had 
to resort to isolated, individual teachers. It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that the 
study of [Greek philosophy] slowly died in the following centuries [within Arabic 
circles].”
74
 Most of the Arabic-speaking individuals who continued in the Greek 
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philosophical tradition did so either through independent teachers or through their 
own personal diligent efforts. While the demise of the study of Greek philosophy 
within the Islamic Empire as a whole is regrettable, it does not devalue the 
contribution of Arabic scholars to the story of the historical continuity of classical 
Greek thinking. It does point out how cultures change and evolve and, for our 
purposes, how each civilization in this study is dependent not only on its 
predecessors, but interestingly, also on it successors to carry on the work established 
during its period of creative intellectual activity. 
 First, before we engage in our biographical review of key Arabic scholars, we 
need to limit and define what we mean by “Arabic” philosophy. Generally, the term 
“Islamic philosophy” is not used in the relevant literature because of several 
important reasons. First, what we encounter in these Arabic works is largely Greek 
philosophy rendered into the Arabic language.
75
 That does not mean that there is no 
creative work involved in this stage. In fact, as I pointed out in chapter 1, “translation 
is always interpretation and . . . philosophers can be at their most creative when they 
take up the task of understanding their predecessors.”
76
 Second, many of those 
involved were in fact Christians or Jews and not Muslims (and in most cases not 
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strictly “Arab” either). Third, many of the Arabic philosophers who were Muslims, 
while not necessarily antagonistic toward Islamic theology, intentionally tried to 
separate theology and philosophy. But equally important to remember is the linkage 
of this philosophical work, done in the Arabic language, with the Islamic Empire. The 
above definitions might suggest that Islam was irrelevant to the transmission of Greek 
ideas; that it was simply a matter of language that happened to be Arabic. What the 
Islamic Empire accomplished was to create a society in which philosophy could 
flourish, at least within limited portions of that society, a general climate of stability 
where philosophical debates could find resources, and a communication vehicle from 
which to exchange ideas across vast geographical territories. As well, due to the 
strong influence on Arabic-speaking philosophers by Islamic theologians, the 
philosophy-theology debate was never far from hand and did influence in direct ways 
the commentaries of the Arabic philosophers, as I will show below. In turn, when 
their translated works came into Latin, the Islamic presence is still felt in the 
background of their contributions to Western thought just as much as Christian 
theology is found in the commentaries on Greek thought by Byzantine writers. 
 
5.51 Al-Kindi 
Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi of Basra (805-873; Latin: Alcindi), sometimes 
called the first true Arabic philosopher,
 77
 worked to reconcile and integrate 
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Platonism, neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism with Islam, with emphasis on the latter. 
This was the next step in the development of Arabic philosophy, following kalam, 
known as falsafah,
78
 or philosophy studied apart from theology.
79
 Al-Kindi is 
generally regarded as the initiator of falsafah. He objected to the piecemeal way that 
philosophy was used under kalam, and incorporated a more systematic usage of Plato 
and Aristotle. “He developed an overarching vision of the unity and interrelatedness 
of all knowledge and its research along verifiable and rational lines.”
80
According to 
al-Kindi, 
We ought not to be ashamed of appreciating the truth and of acquiring it 
wherever it comes from, even if it comes from races distant and nations 
different from us. For the seeker of truth nothing takes precedence over the 
truth, and there is no disparagement of the truth, nor belittling either of him 
who speaks it or of him who conveys it. [The status of] no one is diminished 
by the truth; rather does the truth ennoble all.
81
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The falsafah movement generated great attention in the Arabic world for one 
important reason—it was new. Compared to the centuries-old battle between reason 
and faith in the years prior to the time of Byzantium and into its early history, the 
influx of Greek ideas was new to Islamic thinkers and this newness created 
controversy, debate and dialogue; in other words it created vitality. The Byzantine 
thinkers of later centuries had had the arguments of Greek thought discussed to the 
point of exhaustion by the Church Fathers. The newness was gone and rigidity had set 
in. In Islam, the debate was fresh and full of life. “Both the novelty and the vigor of 
this unparalleled assault on the intellectual life of Islam attracted some of its great 
talents.”
82
 
With support from patrons, al-Kindi spent most of his career in Baghdad, 
gathering a wide circle of individuals capable of dialogue on philosophy.
83
 He was in 
many ways bound by theological issues, like many of his former Christian 
counterparts, as he attempted to combine faith and reason.
84
 “His main contribution    
. . . was introducing philosophy to a culture which superstition had dominated before 
Muhammad and a crude theology had dominated after Muhammad.”
85
 Al-Kindi’s 
own objective is seen here: “My principle is first to record in complete quotations all 
that the Ancients have said on the subject; secondly, to complete what the Ancients 
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have not fully expressed, and this according to the usage of our Arabic language.”
86
 
Al-Kindi repeats his purpose in several of his introductions, namely not to merely 
repeat what the ancients have said but to expand their ideas.
87
 Al-Kindi’s extensive 
work “stands at the midway point between the earlier translators and the later Arabic 
logicians and philosophers.”
88
 Even though al-Kindi did not start with the intent of 
creating a new dialogue on Greek philosophy, he did, and the future of Arabic 
philosophy is indebted to his adventurous work. “He meant to be unoriginal, and in 
this respect, he failed.”
89
 
 
5.52 The Peripatetics of Baghdad 
 The school of philosophy in Alexandria did not die out when the Muslims 
conquered North Africa. Continued scholarship is seen in this city on a continuous 
basis. But there was a kind of transfer of prestige from Alexandria to Baghdad about 
the year 900. Al-Quwayri, Yuhanna ibn Haylan, and Abu Yahya al-Marwazi came to 
Baghdad from Alexandria and began lecturing on philosophy. Al-Farabi (see below) 
was a first generation student of this group of teachers. 
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5.53 Al-Rhazi 
 Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Rhazi of Persia (865-925; Latin: 
Rhazes) spent most of his life in Rayy, near Teheran.
90
 According to Walzer, “In the 
history of Arabic philosophy, al-Rhazi was the most original philosopher, and the 
only prominent scholar to challenge fundamental Islamic beliefs.”
91
 This seems like 
an overstatement, when Ibn Sina and Ibn Rusdh are considered, but Walzer is correct 
in showing al-Rhazi’s significance for his particular time. He was a pioneer in many 
ways. He taught that the road to salvation was found through philosophy. Though 
accused of being an infidel and schismatic, many of his ideas influenced future 
scholars, though none of his philosophical works survived. 
 
5.54 Al-Farabi 
 For Arabic readers, al-Kindi had emphasized elements of Aristotle’s works. 
Al-Rhazi had added a Platonic dimension. Al Farabi (870-950; Latin: Abunaser) 
concentrated his work on neo-Platonism, which still worked with the foundations of 
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both Plato and Aristotle.
92
 Al-Farabi moved the falsafah tradition further down the 
road of Arabic thinking. One title from his many works shows his desire for synthesis 
among the Greek philosophers, as the neo-Platonists were trained to do: “On the 
Agreement of the Opinions of the Philosophers Plato and Aristotle.”
93
  His neo-
Platonist and neo-Aristotelian synthesis is clearly seen in this quote: 
Man is a part of the world, and if we wish to understand his aim and activity 
and use and place, then we must first know the purpose of the whole world, so 
that it will become clear to us what man’s aim is, as well as the fact that man 
is necessarily a part of the world, in that his aim is necessary for realizing the 
ultimate purpose of the whole world. Therefore, if we wish to know the object 
toward which we should strive, we must know the aim of man and the human 
perfection on account of which we should strive.
94
 
 
Al-Farabi’s contemporaries gave him the title, “The Second Teacher” 
(Aristotle is consistently known as The First Teacher) because of his knowledge of 
Aristotle’s logic.
95
 Starting his studies in Damascus, he moved to Baghdad and 
studied under a Syriac-Christian teacher. He soon became the foremost logician in the 
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Islamic world.
96
 Unlike al-Kindi and al-Rhazi, al-Farabi was well known and 
appreciated in his own time. As with all philosophers who are also driven by 
theological concerns, the relation between faith and reason is critical. Al-Farabi 
wanted to uplift the status of philosophy within Islam; he did not want to abandon 
theology but wanted it restricted to the realm of non-philosophers.
97
 Al-Farabi, 
however, did not shy away from an obvious conclusion: religious communities were 
all conditioned by the historical circumstances into which and from which they were 
born. “Philosophy is perennial; religions are of this time and this place.”
98
 
The influence of al-Farabi on later Western medieval writers was significant. 
The work of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquanas, thirteenth century theologians, 
show considerable acquaintance with his work, as we will explore further in the next 
chapter. 
 
5.55 Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 
99
 
 Abu Ali al-Husain ibn Sina (980-1037; Latin: Avicenna)
100
 was both an 
organizer of other philosophers’ work and also an original philosopher himself, likely 
                                                           
     
96
 Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World, 3
rd
 ed., vol. 1 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1965), 402.  
 
     
97
 Walzer, Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy, 18, 20. 
 
     
98
 Peters, “Hellenism in Islam,” Paths from Ancient Greece, ed. Thomas, 89. 
 
     
99
 Jules Janssens has provided an exhaustive list of recent works written about Avicenna in his An 
Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sîna (1970-1989) (Leuven, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
1991); First Supplement (1990-1994) (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
1999). 
 
     
100
 I will consistently refer to Ibn Sina as Avicenna, his traditional Latinized and more familiar 
Western name. 
  
 269 
influenced by the so-called Ismaili sect of theologians/philosophers of the tenth 
century. Avicenna lived in the far northeastern corner of the Islamic Empire, raised in 
what is now Uzbekistan and later moving near the modern city of Tehran, Iran. 
Avicenna reports that he had read “the works of the ancients,” including both 
translations of original works as well as commentaries, while yet a teenager, 
particularly the works of Aristotle: Metaphysics and De Interpretatione. “When I 
reached my eighteenth year I was done with all these sciences. And while at that time 
I had a better memory for [such] knowledge, I am more mature today; otherwise the 
knowledge [itself] is one and the same thing, nothing new having come to me 
afterward [i.e., after the age of eighteen].
101
 
Colish calls him “easily the most original philosopher in early medieval 
Islam,”
102
 in distinction to Walzer’s description of Ibn Rhazi above. “The formative 
period [of Arabic philosophy] involves more than just the commentaries of the Greek 
philosophical tradition. Most important for the later Islamic tradition was the 
towering achievement of Avicenna . . . Indeed, one way of viewing Arabic 
philosophy is as the tradition that leads up to and stems from the work of 
Avicenna.”
103
 Avicenna is credited with writing ninety-nine books on philosophy and 
science. Robert Wisnovsky describes him as,  
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. . . the central figure in the history of Arabic-Islamic philosophy. Before 
Avicenna, falsafa (Arabic Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy) and 
kalam (Islamic doctrinal theology) were distinct strands of thought . . . After 
Avicenna, by contrast, the two strands fused together and post-Avicennian 
kalam emerged as a truly Islamic philosophy, a synthesis of Avicenna’s 
metaphysics and Muslim doctrine.
104
 
 
Colish notes that “whether he sought to unite philosophy and theology or 
practiced pure falsafah with a compartmentalized mind has inspired debate since his 
own day, for there are positions he takes that support both interpretations of his 
work.”
105
 Avicenna was primarily a metaphysician, feeling that the mind is 
fundamental, which places his Platonic preferences before his sense-based 
epistemology derived from Aristotle.
106
 In fact, his form of idealism has been 
compared to Descartes’ own “I think therefore I am” argumentation.
107
 D’Ancona 
describes the relationship between Plato and Aristotle in the falsafah tradition by the 
time of Avicenna and shows how these two masters’ ideas are often difficult to 
separate in the mind of the Middle Ages, whether that mind be Islamic or Christian: 
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The project of crowning Aristotle’s metaphysics with a rational theology 
based on the Platonic tradition is an application of the last Neoplatonic model 
of philosophy as a systematic discipline, covering topics from logic to 
theology. We do not know whether this pattern reached the circle of al-Kindi 
as such or whether it was in a sense recreated. What we can say is that the 
attribution of a Neoplatonic rational theology to Aristotle has its origins in 
post-Plotinian Platonism, and in the primacy that the Alexandrian 
commentators gave to Aristotle without renouncing the main Neoplatonic 
tenets regarding the One, Intellect, and Soul. For this reason, falsafa cannot be 
properly understood if its roots in the philosophical thought of Late Antiquity 
are not taken into account.
108
 
 
Later Arabic philosophers would often feel a need to respond to Avicenna, 
either positively or negatively, due to his sheer weight among scholars. “Like Kant in 
the German tradition or Plato and Aristotle in the Greek tradition, Avicenna 
significantly influenced everything that came after him in the Arabic tradition.”
109
 He 
was a very popular writer and more than any other scholar, helped spread the ideas of 
neo-Platonism within the Islamic world. Avicenna was “in the Arabic culture the 
most effective promoter of Greek philosophy.”
110
 Avicenna’s impact was felt not only 
in the Arabic world but in Christian Europe as well, overshadowed only by Averroes.  
 
5.56 Al-Ghazali 
During this time of Arabic reflection on Greek philosophy, Islamic 
theologians, much like the case in Byzantium, were fearful of its influence and 
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gradually their attacks on this kind of education and thinking become dominant. 
During this period of philosophical alienation, al-Ghazali of Khurasan (1058-1111; 
Latin: Algazel) was studying the work of Plato and Aristotle. Al-Ghazali pursued a 
personal course of investigation into the value of philosophy; his conclusion moved 
him to embrace mysticism.
111
 Convinced that philosophy was in error, he plotted an 
intellectual attack on the philosophers of his day, whom he considered to be sources 
of irreligion and heresy. To present his arguments in the best light possible, he 
consciously studied the philosophy he had come to reject. Out of his research he 
wrote a book titled, “The Goals of the Philosophers,” in which he outlined the 
philosophical agenda of the Greeks and of those who followed in their tradition. Then 
he wrote a second book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, in which he 
systematically dismantled and refuted the arguments of his first book.
112
 Al-Ghazali’s 
attacks on the premises and tools of philosophy weakened support for this field in the 
eastern portions of the Islamic Empire. For this group of Muslims, submission to 
God, not submission to philosophy, was the path to Truth in the world. But the 
Muslim world was not confined to the reaches of Baghdad. The story of how Greek 
philosophy continued in Arabic-speaking lands now shifts focus to the extreme 
opposite end of the Empire, to Sicily and Spain. 
                                                           
     
111
 His journey into intellectual doubt is reminiscent of Descartes’ similar journey centuries later. 
Some have suggested Descartes owed al-Ghazali at least a footnote in his Discourse on Method.  
 
     
112
 Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: 
Brigham Young University Press, 2000). 
 
 273 
There is some debate about what al-Ghazali’s ultimate purposes and attitudes 
toward philosophy were.
113
 Colish maintains that al-Ghazali was not anti-
philosophical (perhaps anti-Platonic, more attuned to Aristotle), but that he simply 
wanted philosophers to use their tools more precisely. While he himself was a critic 
of the philosophers, al-Ghazili was a master in the art of philosophy and had an 
immense education in the field. “In principle, al-Ghazzali holds out the possibility of 
integrating the intellectual and the experiential in religion, of synthesizing reason and 
authority.”
114
 However, most theologians saw in al-Ghazali’s work a call to retreat 
from falsafah and to go only as far as kalam. While it is not widely agreed that al-
Ghazali himself intended to “shut the door” on Arabic philosophical inquiry 
completely and permanently, such an interpretation of al-Ghazali’s work led Islamic 
society to be “frozen in time,” first in the East and eventually in the West. Works of 
critics of al-Ghazali, as well as the works of any ancient philosopher, were practically 
forbidden after this time. Notably, al-Ghazali’s works spurred on the work of the few 
brave Islamic philosophers who came after him.
115
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5.57 Islamic Philosophers in Andalusia 
By 700, Arab armies had swept across North Africa and from there they began 
to access the southern approaches to Europe, in Sicily and southern Italy and 
especially in Spain. Arab-Islamic invaders had little trouble conquering Spain (al-
Andalus in Arabic or Andalusia) and held this portion of Europe, or parts of it, until 
the 13
th
 century; the last Arabic ruler in Spanish territory was not subjugated until 
1492.
116
 The capitol city of al-Andalus, which in many ways considered itself 
separate from the Empire centered in Baghdad, was Cordoba. Between the years 900-
1000, al-Andalus became the most heavily populated area of Europe. Schools and 
libraries flourished. Arabic philosophers, trained in the East, migrated to the West 
where, at least in certain areas and certain time periods, there was more openness to 
philosophical inquiry than in the theologically-bound eastern Islamic Empire. 
Multiculturalism was deeply rooted in this region; the languages of Arabic, Latin, and 
Hebrew mixed and flowed together as did the respective cultures represented by these 
languages.
117
  
For many decades the intellectual and cultural climate of “al-Andalus” was     
. . . subsidiary to that of the East [Islam Empire]. Philosophy was no 
exception: it came first from the East, but in time acquired an autonomous 
life. This is reflected in the history of Andalusian philosophy, which at first 
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followed in the footsteps of al-Farabi and Avicenna, but soon developed along 
two very different paths.
118
 
 
One of these paths would lead to the work of the Sufis and mysticism, for 
example in the work of Ibn Bajja (d. 1070; Latin: Avempace) and Ibn Tufayl           
(d. 1185). However, our study will concentrate on the second of these paths, found in 
the work of Averroes and, to a lesser degree, Maimonides. 
 
5.58 Ibn Rushd (Averroes)
119
   
 Abu l-Walid Muhammad ibn Amad ibn Rushd of Cordoba (1126-1198; Latin: 
Averroes)
120
 was the most systematic presenter of Aristotle’s philosophy in Arabic 
culture. “Averroes represents the high tide of rationalism in medieval Islam. He is a 
proponent of falsafah in its purest form.”
121
 Averroes was convinced that philosophy, 
notably Aristotle’s logic, derived through reason, could offer the best answer to 
understanding the world.
122
 Two of Averroes’ predecessors, al-Farabi and Avicenna, 
had tried to push the philosophical agenda in the East, but were met with such 
opposition by Islamic theologians that their work was blunted. Averroes desired to 
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speak out about philosophy, but without angering those for whom faith placed such a 
great role in their perception of reality. Averroes developed a three-step plan to make 
this happen.
123
 First, he attempted to uncover the “real” or “pristine” Aristotle and to 
remove interpretations that had been added over the centuries that clouded a clear 
understanding of this man’s actual ideas. 
[Aristotle] was confused with Plotinus, reconciled with Plato, declared to be a 
disciple of [the Egyptian god of letters] Hermes, and even hailed as a 
venerable monotheistic sage. It is no wonder that his genuine teaching had 
remained virtually unknown until the latter part of the twelfth century, which 
witnessed the appearance on the philosophical scene of the first and last great 
Aristotelian, Ibn Rushd.
124
 
 
 Averroes has generally been regarded as primarily a rationalist philosopher 
whose devotion to Islam and the theological agenda of his peers was perhaps 
disingenuous. Yet this conclusion should be rejected for a more sympathetic 
understanding of Averroes as a devotee of the religion of his culture, Islam. “His 
philosophical thought includes important roles for religion in the development of 
human powers toward their fulfillment in the highest intellectual insight into God and 
his creation, even as it gives critical assessment to the truth and efficacy of religious 
arguments and statements.”
125
 This important insight by Richard Taylor is exactly the 
bridge that will be used by Latin Christian scholars in the next century. 
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Averroes proceeded to produce the most detailed commentaries on Aristotle’s 
treatises that any scholar in any language had created in the 1500 years since Aristotle 
first wrote them.
126
 Of Aristotle, Averroes commented, “I believe that this man was a 
model in nature and the exemplar which nature found for showing final human 
perfection.”
127
 Colish adds, “Averroes achieved the most thorough grasp of Aristotle 
of anyone up to his time.”
128
 Therese-Anne Druart proposes that beyond Avicenna, 
al-Ghazali may have been a primary prompter for Averroes to go back to read 
Aristotle for himself and thus find those innate ideas so fundamental to Aristotle 
himself. “Al-Ghazali’s attacks against the falasifa and emanation in particular, as well 
as the close reading required for paraphrases and literal commentaries, awoke 
Averroes from his dogmatic slumber and changed him into a reformist who preached 
a return to uncontaminated Aristotelianism.”
129
 One limit however on Averroes’ 
works is that he knew no Greek, and had to rely on earlier Arabic translators (who 
sometimes inadvertently added a neo-Platonic bias, which he was so anxious, but not 
always successful, to purge). 
 Second, Averroes wrote a treatise on his own in 1180, titled The Incoherence 
of the Incoherence, in which he delivered a direct blow to the work of al-Ghazali’s 
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attacks on philosophy, showing that philosophy had been misunderstood and unfairly 
judged. 
 Third, Averroes reaffirmed an old adage his neo-Platonist predecessors knew 
well: one truth exists, manifested in many forms. For Averroes, the revealed dogmas 
of the Koran properly interpreted were as true as the best doctrines of Aristotle 
properly interpreted. However, who was qualified to “properly interpret” Truth? Here 
Averroes turned to a source that no one could dispute, the Qur’an itself: “It is 
[Muhammad] who has revealed the Book to you . . . some of its verses are 
unambiguous . . . and the others are ambiguous . . . only God and those confirmed in 
knowledge know its interpretation.”
130
 Averroes then sealed his argument by 
identifying “those confirmed in knowledge” as the philosophers. 
 Averroes’ methodology is particularly enlightening as he strives to balance 
faith and reason: 
Referring to the three modes of proof described in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
exhortation, dialectic, and demonstration, Averroes states that exhortation, 
which revelation provides and which faith accepts, is appropriate for the 
uneducated masses. For them, adherence to the moral law of the Koran by 
faith lads to the truth. Dialectical argument, which rests on premises that are 
probabilities and which yields conclusions that are likewise probable, not 
certain, is the method of the theologians, who combine faith and reason. 
Theology conduces the educated to the truth. The third and most rigorous type 
of argument is demonstration, which uses proofs that are entirely rational, 
proofs verifiable deductively and empirically, proofs that yield scientific 
certitude. This is the method of the philosophers. It is suited only to the most 
highly trained minds and it leads them to the truth.
131
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In principle, the conclusions of revelation, theology, and philosopher should 
take us to the same endpoint; there are indeed three paths to a single truth.
132
 
However, Averroes’ seeming separation of reason and religion in The Decisive 
Treatise provided a justification, for some, of a doctrine of separation of religion and 
state. Thus, Averroism is considered by some writers as a precursor to modern 
secularism, and Averroes the founding father of secular thought in Western 
Europe.
133
 George Sarton, the father of the history of science, writes: “Averroes was 
great because of the tremendous stir he made in the minds of men for centuries. A 
history of Averroism would include up to the end of the sixteenth-century, a period of 
four centuries which would perhaps deserve as much as any other to be called the 
Middle Ages, for it was the real transition between ancient and modern methods.”
134
 
Menocal convincingly states, “For several centuries to come, his name would be 
universally known and would invoke loathing or inestimable respect, would be either 
sacred or anathema. It is he, in many ways and for some time, who was the new 
Aristotle of Europe.”
135
  
 Averroes was a tireless writer, producing treatises and commentaries on a 
wide variety of philosophical topics and works, primarily related to Aristotle, 
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although he did write a commentary on Plato’s Republic.
136
 Amazingly, his influence 
on his own peers was weak,
137
 but his influence on Western Europe, as we will see in 
the next chapter, was immense. While Aristotle had gained the title, “The 
Philosopher,” due to his great work, Averroes was crowned with the title, “The 
Commentator,” by Thomas Aquinas in the next century. Within a single generation 
after Averroes, almost all of his works had been translated into Latin. “In the 
following century, scholars ranging from the Jewish Ibn Maimun . . . to the Latin-
Christian Thomas Aquinas avidly read Ibn Rushd’s writings. In 1472, Ibn Rushd’s 
commentaries appeared in print alongside the first Latin edition of Aristotle’s 
writings.”
138
 Blumenthal reminds us that the production of commentaries on ancient 
Greek philosophy remained a dominant method of “doing philosophy” throughout the 
early Middle ages and into the time of Averroes and beyond. “The technique of 
commentary on [Greek philosophers’ works] reached its fullest deployment with 
Averroes, who wrote not one but three commentaries on many of [Aristotle’s] 
treatises, traditionally known as short, middle and long commentaries . . . most likely 
. . . intended for students and scholars working at different levels.”
139
 Of the series of 
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commentaries written by Averroes, 38 titles have survived either in Arabic, Hebrew, 
or Latin.
140
 
 It must be reemphasized that Averroes’ work was so much more than a mere 
transmission of Greek ideas, it involved interpretation and creative synthesis. What 
Averroes offered the later Latin world was Greek plus Arabic ideas. “On the whole, 
the work of Averroes marks a return to the authentic Aristotelianism . . . All the same, 
the Aristotelianism of the Commentator, by comparison with that of Aristotle himself, 
has some explanations and additions of considerable importance, especially in 
metaphysics (creative causality) and psychology (monopsychism).”
141
 
 
5.59 Ibn Maimun (Maimonides) 
 Abu Imran Musa ibn Ubaid Allah ibn Maimun (1135-1204; Latin Moses 
Maimonides)
142
 was not an Arabic-Islamic scholar but an Arabic-Judaic scholar.
143
 
He grew up in Cordoba, but fled Spain due to Jewish persecution, and ended his 
career in Cairo. He tried to reconcile Jewish theology with Aristotelianism, having 
studied the work of Averroes. He produced material that enhanced the study of 
Aristotle, notably his key work, Guide to the Perplexed. His work also contributed to 
the ongoing influence of Averroes, providing another vehicle from which Greek ideas 
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could flow to Latin Europe. He was later referred to in Latin Europe simply as “the 
Rabbi” or “Rabbi Moses.” I will not pursue here the deep dialogue that could be 
created concerning the role of medieval Jewish thinkers. Suffice it to say that Jewish 
scholars, like Maimonides participated actively in the intellectual life of the Muslim 
West and Spain.
144
 
  
5.6 The Fate of Philosophy within Islam   
Some historians have tried to belittle the achievements of the Arabic 
philosophers in particular, and Islamic culture in general, by claiming that their work 
was unoriginal, a mere copy or imitator of former genius. “Such a judgment is all 
wrong. In a sense, nothing can be more deeply original than the genuine hunger for 
knowledge which possessed the Arabic leaders.”
145
 The Islamic Empire found itself 
in a uniquely enriched geographical region from which they could synthesize ideas 
from many originators into something new. Their location in the Middle East allowed 
them to encounter Greek, Roman, Christian, and Jewish ideas from the West and 
Hindu and Chinese ideas from the East. Islamic culture was dynamic and freely 
traded material and intellectual goods with its neighbors, as opposed to the rather 
static state of Byzantium during most of this period. Philosophy is never created ex 
nihilo, and the Muslims had the best of all worlds to draw upon as they created novel 
thinking derived their prime intermediary position in both history and geography. In 
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fact, to label the Islamic Empire as Middle Eastern is to ignore their connections to 
the farthest east and west points then known to civilization.   
Others might say that many, if not most, of these translators and philosophers 
were non-Muslims and non-Arab and Islam should receive little if any credit for the 
continuation of Greek thought. While credit can and should be shared, it was the 
Islamic Empire that provided the environment for this philosophical chain to continue 
and the cultural connections for ideas to travel from East to West. “In general, no 
work, especially one which is long and exacting, can be done unless somebody wants 
it badly enough and is willing to maintain the scholars engaged in it. The Arabic 
leaders were generally anxious to have the work done and ready to make its 
performance possible . . . The initiative was theirs,”
146
 at least in the beginning 
period. It is significant also to note that when Rome conquered Greece, Rome 
allowed Greek philosophy to continue in Greek language, essentially allowing the 
captive to conquer the conqueror. “The Arab conquests, however, did not lead to the 
Arabs being ‘taken captive’ in this way. Instead they imposed their language and 
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something of their outlook on most of the peoples of the empire.”
147
 The Arab 
scholars proved remarkably skilled at drawing upon the legacies of the civilizations 
they conquered, while at the same time creating a unique synthesis within their own 
cultural milieu.
148
 
“Of all three early medieval civilizations [Latin, Greek, Islam] Islam produced 
the most original work in science and philosophy. Thinkers in these fields grasped 
their principles and used them to make new and creative discoveries.”
149
 They were, 
especially during the ninth and tenth centuries, the primary intellectual culture in the 
Mediterranean region. “While Western Christians lost themselves in prayer and 
Eastern Christians in ritualized controversy, the cultural awakening that had not 
occurred in Byzantium became the glory of Islam.”
150
 The Arabs, Persians, and other 
Muslims were not content to be mere curators of philosophical curiosities, they 
advanced the work they inherited, but not so far that the Greek foundations could not 
be discriminated. As Sarton states, “The medieval Arabic-speaking peoples were . . . 
not blind and passive transmitters, but on the contrary they increased the Greek 
heritage and bequeathed a richer one to their Latin successors.”
151
 The Arabic 
                                                           
     
147
 Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, 10. 
 
     
148
 Hollister and Bennett, Medieval Europe: A Short History, 99. 
 
     
149
 Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 130. 
 
     
150
 Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children, 78. To one anonymous tenth-century Arab geographer, this is 
how the Europeans appeared: “. . . their bodies are large, their natures gross, their manners harsh, their 
understanding dull, and their tongues heavy . . . The farther they live to the north, the more they are 
stupid, gross and brutish,” quoted by Hollister and Bennett, Medieval Europe: A Short History, 100. 
 
     
151
 Sarton, The Incubation of the Western Culture in the Middle East, 41. Bolgar adds, “Arab 
interest in the past was narrower . . . than the Byzantine, but within its narrower scope it was more 
 285 
tradition built on what they learned. Southern makes this interesting comparison, as 
we ready ourselves for the next chapter in this historical analysis: 
It is the most astonishing event in the history of thought [the retention of 
Greek philosophy within Islam], just as the rise of Islam as a political force is 
the most astonishing fact in the history of institutions. Islam luxuriated in 
abundance, while the West was left with the Church Fathers, the classical and 
postclassical poets, the Latin schoolmasters—works of impressive solidity but 
not, at least in the early Middle Ages, wildly exciting. A comparison of the 
literary catalogues of the West with the lists of books available to the Moslem 
scholars makes a painful impression on a Western mind, and the contrast 
came as a bombshell to the Latin scholars of the twelfth century, who first had 
their eyes opened to the difference.
152
  
 
Gutas goes on to point out a critical element in the work of the Arabic-
speaking philosophers that will help us understand our concluding chapter, as we 
move from Islam to Latin Europe:  
[Arabic translation and use of Greek philosophy] demonstrated for the first 
time in history that . . . philosophical thought [is] international, not bound to a 
specific language or culture. Once the Arabic culture by forged by early 
Abbasid society historically established the universality of Greek . . . 
philosophical thought, it provided the model for and facilitated the later 
application of this concept . . . in the West, both in . . . the renaissance of the 
twelfth century and in the Renaissance proper.
153
 
 
But, as Laughlin points out, the Muslim period of philosophical continuity 
would not last long beyond this period. “After the two contemporaries, Ibn Rushd and 
Ibn Maimun, no significant Arabic philosophers (Aristotelian or otherwise) appeared 
in Islamic culture—ever. In Islamic-Spain, the study of logic and philosophy (as parts 
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of “alien learning”) became extinct, extinguished by popular and theological hostility 
to non-Islamic culture.”
154
 There was always a stream in Islam that distrusted both 
philosophy and philosophers.
155
 While it is difficult to define what is meant by 
“orthodox” Islam, it does appear true that the more conservative elements within 
Islam eventually pushed philosophy outside the safe boundaries of dialogue and 
discussion as again, as in Byzantium, the division between faith and reason grew 
larger.
156
 This kind of division is stated by, interestingly, a philosopher, Abu-
Sulayman as-Sigistani:  
They [Islamic theologians] thought that perfection is achieved when Greek 
philosophy and Arab [Islamic] law are brought together in an orderly 
arrangement . . . They thought they could insert philosophy . . . into Islamic 
law and attach Islamic law to philosophy. This, however, is an aspiration on 
the way to which there are insurmountable obstacles . . . Islamic law is 
derived from God, by means of an ambassador between Him and humans, by 
way of revelation.
157
 
 
Another example is provided by Abdallah ibn-abi-Zayd (922-998), a legal 
scholar, gave this view of philosophy and of the Abbasid’s poor judgment in opening 
this dangerous ideological door: 
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When the caliphate passed from [the Umayyads] and devolved upon the 
Abbasid dynasty, their state was based upon the Persians, who held positions 
of leadership, while the hearts of most of the leaders among them were filled 
with unbelief and hate for the Arabs and for the Islamic state. They introduced 
within Islam currents ideas that would permit the destruction of Islam. Had it 
not been for the fact that God Almighty had promised His Prophet that his 
religion and its adherents would be victorious on the Day of Judgment, they 
would have abolished Islam. They did, however, make breaches on its walls 
and damage its pillars, but God will fulfill His promise, God willing! [sic] The 
first current which they introduced was to export in Islamic lands the books of 
the Greeks which were then translated into Arabic, and circulated widely 
among the Muslims. The reason of their being exported from the land of the 
Byzantines into Islamic territories was Yahya ibn-Halid ibn-Barmak.
158
 
 
 This line of reasoning is significantly different from the view that Greek 
philosophy was actually of Arab/Persian ancestry and thus worthy of study and use, 
as we explored above. This view sees philosophy as the enemy of Islam and faith. In 
fact, this view was popularly recounted in a way that made Yahya’s acquisition of 
philosophy a trick of Byzantium. According to this stream of Islamic thought and as 
outlined by Abdallah ibn-abi-Zayd, the Byzantine emperor, in whose land the Greek 
books originally resided, was afraid that if the Christians examined these books they 
would leave their faith and revert to the religion/philosophy of the Greeks, thereby 
ruining his empire. So he collected all the ancient books and had them hidden in a 
secret location. When Yahya took control of the Abbasid state, he heard about these 
hidden books and requested to borrow them. The emperor was delighted with this 
request and sent them to Yahya with the message, “No need to return these.” In this 
way, he reasoned, “the Muslims will be afflicted with these books and we shall be rid 
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of their evil. For I am not sure that there will not come someone after me who will 
dare to make these books public to the people, in which case they will fall into what 
we are afraid of.” Abdallah ibn-abi-Zayd then ends with this moral: “Very few people 
ever applied themselves to the study of [these books] and were saved from heresy. 
Then Yahya established in his house disputations and dialectical argumentation on 
matters that should not be discussed, and every adherent of a religion began to discuss 
his religion and raise objections against it relying on himself alone [i.e., disregarding 
revelation].
159
 The Arabic poet Abu Said ibn-Dust (d. 1040) writes: 
 You who seek religion, avoid the paths of error, 
  Lest your religion be snatched from you unawares. 
 Shiism is destruction, Mutazilism is innovation, 
  Polytheism is infidelity, and philosophy is a lie.
160
 
 
Peters laments, then offers hope: “They all perished together, Spanish Islam, 
Arabian Aristotelianism, and Ibn Rushd. But there were heirs; within a century all 
three had come to life again at the University of Paris.”
161
 Colish, in agreement with 
Peters, leads us to the next chapter of this research, “Thus, the extraordinary advances 
in speculative thought initially fostered by the patronage of Muslim rulers came to a 
halt after the twelfth century. In the sequel, it was Western Europe rather than Islam 
that capitalized on this achievement once it was translated into Latin.”
162
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 Our line of historical research has shown us that Greek philosophy was 
seriously hindered in both the East and West remnants of the former Roman Empire. 
However, a new civilization seized the Middle East and southern Mediterranean 
regions, and inherited, with zeal, the Greek intellectual tradition. The Islamic Empire 
of the Middle Ages engaged in a centuries-long translation movement that placed 
most of the ancient Greek philosophical works into the language of Arabic, with an 
emphasis on Aristotle and an underlying current of Platonic thought as well. These 
Arabic-speaking philosophers filled the intellectual gap that presented itself in the 
Middle Ages by continuing the Greek philosophical tradition, through active 
discussion, interpretation and involvement with key Greek ideas. This pattern of 
learning and thinking circumscribed the Islamic Empire, from East to West. However, 
as Islam moved into a more conservative period of development, the philosophical 
dynamism of this great medieval empire began to fade. One of its last outposts was to 
be found in the western provinces of the Islamic sphere of influence, in the region 
today called Spain. Here, the last great Arabic philosopher, Averroes, maintained and 
made available the Greek philosophical treasury to those who were in contact with 
the vestiges of the collapsing Islamic community in Spain, which included both Jews 
and Christians. From this serendipitous and multicultural community of scholars, the 
Greek tradition was allowed to move out of the dying hands of Islam’s philosophical 
school into the eager but as yet untrained arms of Latin Europe.  
The scene is like watching a track relay race where the runner, who has just 
completed the circuit, races to the point of passing the baton to the next runner in line. 
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As the first runner approaches, there is a stumbling action and the runner begins to 
lose balance. Just before falling completely to the ground, the two runner’s hands 
connect and the baton is passed to the second runner who firmly grasps the baton and 
begins to pick up speed on the next leg of the race. In our research, which has traced 
the history of philosophical continuity, the failing runner represents the Islamic 
Empire and the Arabic scholars, who ran the race well during their time and without 
whom the race would have been in jeopardy; there were no other qualified or 
interested runners to take their place. The fresh runner represents the Western 
European scholars of France, England, and Italy, who have been waiting on the 
sidelines for their turn to be engaged in the race. The baton, of course, represents the 
Greek philosophical/ educational tradition.
163
 In the next chapter, we will conclude 
our analysis and see how the next runner handles the following leg of the race. Our 
gaze shifts from Islam to Latin Christianity, from Arabic Spain to Western Europe.
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Chapter 6 
 
Greek Philosophy Revived in Medieval Europe:  
Aquinas and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance 
 
 I have presented evidence showing that the continuity of Greek philosophy in 
history has an important partner within the medieval Islamic Empire and the Arabic 
philosophical tradition. I have traced the course of philosophical progress within 
“Western” culture and have outlined how both Byzantium and western Europe, after 
the fall of Rome, were poor candidates to further the authentic use of either the 
Platonic or Aristotelian sources or patterns of thinking. Instead, the Greek intellectual 
tradition was safeguarded, used and enhanced by Arab thinkers for over half a 
millennium. By the time we reach the twelfth century, the Islamic period of active 
philosophical inquiry is beginning to fade, and its last stronghold happens to be found 
in the southwestern corner of Europe. As Latin Christianity re-exerts its influence in 
the Iberian peninsular region, a natural osmosis of thought and literature begins to 
flow from Arabic into Latin, from East into West. From this connecting point, the 
Greek philosophers are introduced into Western Europe in tentative but concrete 
ways, to the extent that the intellectual patterns of Western thought are forever 
stamped with their image. As the possibilities of faith and reason becoming partners 
rather than adversaries begin to emerge in the work of Middle Age theologians like 
Aquinas, the environment becomes amenable to an infusion of Greek rationality and 
the path of classical Greek philosophy into Western thinking is cleared. This final 
chapter will simply connect the last dot in our historical analysis of the journey of 
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Plato and Aristotle from ancient Greece to Western Europe. The key discovery in this 
foray into philosophical archeology was presented in the last chapter, as the 
indisputable role of Islam was demonstrated. The only aspect of this study that 
remains is to show how the Greek tradition flowed into Europe in the later Middle 
Ages and led directly to the Italian Renaissance and to what we know today as the 
Western mindset or philosophical tradition. To connect this last section of history, I 
will explore the Arabic-Latin translation movement in Spain, the rise of universities 
and scholasticism in western Europe, the significant work of Aquinas in marrying 
philosophy and theology within Western-Christian tradition, and finally, I will show 
how the roots of the Renaissance were embedded in the late Middle Ages revival of 
Greek thinking, moving us into the modern period of philosophical and educational 
thought.  
 
6.1 Reconquista and Covivencia: Christians and Muslims in Spain 
 The fact that Arabic philosophers found their last productive arena in Spain 
may be an accident of history, but it certainly provides the key geographical element 
in the history of the Western philosophical journey. To understand this supremely 
significant historical sidebar, a brief review of Iberian politics is necessary.  
After the infusion of Muslim rule in al-Andalus beginning in the eighth 
century, there was parallel anti-Muslim activity from Christian Europeans. The 
Reconquista (English: Re-conquest), as this movement is called, was an almost eight-
century-long process during which Christians re-conquered the Iberian peninsula 
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(modern Portugal and Spain) from the Muslim and Moorish states of Al-Andalus. The 
Umayyad conquest of Hispania from the Visigoths occurred during the early eighth 
century; the Reconquista began almost immediately, in 722, with the Battle of 
Covadonga. In 1236, the last Muslim center, Granada, and the last Iberian Islamic 
ruler, Mohammed ibn Alhamar, were finally subjugated by Ferdinand III of Castile, 
and Granada became a vassal state of the Christian kingdom.
1
 In 1492 (the year 
Columbus sailed to the New World), the last Muslim ruler on the peninsula, Abuabd 
Allah Muhammad XII (also known as Boabdil of Granada), surrendered to Ferdinand 
and Isabella. This resulted in the creation of a united Christian nation encompassing 
most of modern day Spain.
2
 (The Portuguese Reconquista had culminated in 1249 
with the subjugation of the Algarve by king Afonso III.)
3
 
  The final period of the Reconquista corresponds with the Crusade concept 
advocated by the Latin Church.
4
 The Christian Crusades were a series of military 
conflicts of a religious character waged by Christians during 1095–1291, most of 
which were sanctioned by the Pope.
5
 The Crusades originally had the goal of 
recapturing Jerusalem and the sacred “Holy Land” from Muslim rule and were 
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originally launched in response to a call from the Eastern “Orthodox” Byzantine 
Empire for help against the expansion of the Muslim Seljuk dynasty into Anatolia 
(Asia Minor or modern Turkey). Since the time of Constantine (4
th
 century), 
Christians had gone on pilgrimages to the Holy Land. Even though Muslims had 
ruled Jerusalem since 638, Christians were still allowed to visit this city. By the 
eleventh century, however, the situation had changed. Just as the number and 
frequency of pilgrimages to Jerusalem were at new peaks, the Seljuk Turks took over 
control of Jerusalem and hindered pilgrimages. There were seven major Crusades; the 
first began in 1095 with Pope Urban II’s famous speech to retake Jerusalem because 
“God wills it!” (Deus vult!), and the last ended in 1291 when Acre, the last of the 
Latin holdings in Palestine, was lost.
6
  
 The Crusades to the eastern end of the Mediterranean were largely 
unsuccessful from a military point of view for the Europeans, but the positive impact 
of these incursions into the Middle East was the connection that East and West 
invariably made as Christian and Muslim forces lived in close proximity to each 
other.
7
 That idea exchange occurred during this period is clear, but the environment 
for philosophical dialogue was not conducive for extended impact on Europe.
8
 So we 
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will shift our focus from the Crusades of the East to the Crusades of the West, where 
Latin Christians waged a similar battle against Muslims in Spain, but with an entirely 
different setting and outcome.  
 The term “reconquista” is a politically biased term which points to a 
recapturing of land from a foreign power. While it is true that at times native 
Spaniards were fighting against Muslims, more often native Spaniards who had 
converted to Islam many generations previously were fighting non-native Spaniards 
from Western Europe.
9
 The very fact that this “reconquest” took place over more than 
seven centuries shows the extent to which the Iberian peninsula was a thoroughly 
mixed society of Muslims, Christians, and Jews who, rather than constantly in battle 
and opposition to each other, had learned to live together and learn from each other. 
La Convivencia (literally: “the Coexistence” or “living together”) is the term used to 
describe the situation just described.
10
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Reconquista, Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Spain lived in relative peace together. 
The term convivencia refers to the general religious toleration exhibited between 
these three faiths and, more importantly for our purposes, the interplay of cultural 
ideas between the three groups.
11
 It was an interplay and fusion of social and cultural 
forces unique in the medieval world.
12
 An example of this interconnection of cultures 
in Spain is found in the famous quote by al-Zubaidi, tutor of al-Hakam II (who came 
to power in Cordoba in 961 and created a library of 400,000 volumes): “All lands in 
their diversity are one, and men are all brothers and neighbors.”
13
 Even though 
Christian kingdoms were at war with the Muslims, within the lands not currently 
under dispute, Christians, Muslims, and Jews lived daily side by side.
14
 In cities like 
Toledo there was a mix of mosques, churches, and synagogues. The intellectual 
interests treasured by the Muslim rulers were valued by the Christians and Jews; the 
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three cultures worked most closely together in the arenas of philosophy and science, 
areas generally outside of religious practice controversy.
15
  
  Under Muslim rule, Christians and Jews were usually tolerated within the mix 
of society. The same is true when Christians retook Spain with regard to Muslims; 
less, over time, in regard to Jews. When the Christian ruler Alfonso VI conquered 
Toledo, he promised the Muslim inhabitants that they could continue their religious 
practices. In Toledo, the church of Santa Maria la Blanca was even shared for a 
while: Muslims using it on Fridays, Jews on Saturdays, and Christians on Sundays. 
Alfonso VI’s physician was Granada-born Joseph Nasi Ferruziel, a prominent Jew 
who owned large estates around Toledo. Talented Jews and Muslims would hold 
other important positions in the court of the Christian kings. Alfonso X even granted 
some foreign scholars the title of caballero, gentlemen or knight. It is during this 
period that “the thousands of Arabic loan words made their way into the Romance 
vernaculars which were fast turning into Castilian, Portuguese and Catalan.”
16
 One of 
the most important of these connecting cultural links during the period of convivencia 
involved translation of Arabic, Hebrew and even ancient Greek texts into Latin, as we 
will explore in the next section. 
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6.2 Greek Philosophy: Arabic into Latin 
 The introduction of Arabic texts into the studies of the West divides the 
history of science and philosophy in the Middle Ages into two distinct periods. 
Before the availability of Islamic learning, the Western mind had to be satisfied with  
fragments of the Roman schools which had been cobbled together by western 
teachers like Boethius, Marianus Capella, Bede, and Isidore. As far as knowledge of 
Greek literature, before the twelfth century the language of Plato and Aristotle was 
virtually unknown. Even the Greek alphabet was lost. “At the hands of the medieval 
scribe a Greek word becomes gibberish or is omitted with grecum inserted in its 
place—it was ‘all Greek’ to him.’”
17
 In the limited scheme of medieval education, 
there were seven kinds of study, or seven faculties of scholarship (the trivium and 
quadrivium). These were grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and 
astronomy. The Muslim expansion into Spain brought with it a new worldview and 
new arenas of learning previously unrealized in Europe. The scholars of Islam in 
Spain brought with them a large body of studies in natural science developed by 
generations of men from traditions, ancient and contemporary. Included in the Arabic 
libraries was a fully developed mathematics of physics and astronomy, and the 
ancient Greek medical texts of Hippocrates and Galen In the realm of philosophy, 
they brought the entire body of Aristotle’s writings as well as an extensive library of 
commentaries on Greek thought. The recovery of this ancient learning, supplemented 
by what the Arabs had gained through their own observations, constituted an 
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opportunity for an intellectual rebirth of Europe. “Far from being peripheral or 
secondary to the principal concerns and activities of those who remained speakers of 
Latin . . . the dominant world of the age in which Arabic was the classical language 
was rarely out of mind and never out of reach, and the effects of such contacts were 
widespread and central. They were often the intellectual lifeblood of northern 
European centers.”
18
 
The worldview of Europe was further shaken throughout the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries as Latin Christians, traveling east to fight in the Crusades, 
discovered that the so-called infidels had a higher civilization than their own. The  
Muslims had hospitals, sewers, irrigation, and for battle, heavy artillery in the form of 
great iron crossbows. In debate, the Muslims were more reasonable, using the logical 
tools of Aristotle. For Europeans, it was a kind of culture shock that shook the 
foundations of their identity: the self-discovery of their own backwardness!
19
     
The twelfth century saw a major search by European scholars for new 
learning, which led them to the Arabic fringes of Europe, to the intellectually rich 
deposits to be found in Islamic Spain and Sicily.
20
 As early as the end of the tenth 
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 “The extent of Islamic rule . . . was formidable. In the early twelfth century, men regarded the 
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For any Christian who had come in contact with Muslims . . . their unshakable sense of superiority 
must have been disturbing . . . The distortion of the image of Islam among Europeans was necessary to 
compensate them for this sense of inferiority,” Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, 82. 
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 Sicily, the island west of the “toe” of Italy, had been part of the Byzantine Empire until 878, was 
under Muslim control from 878-1060, and came under Norman control between 1060 and 1090. As a 
consequence, the Norman Kingdom of Sicily maintained a trilingual culture, which made it an ideal 
place for translations. Sicily also maintained relations with the Greek East, which allowed for a 
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century, European scholars had purposely traveled to Spain to enhance their 
education.
21
 Translations, however, did not begin in Spain for another century.
22
 For 
them, Toledo was a special intellectual jackpot, being the seat of scholarship in Spain 
under the Arabs. The conquest of Toledo by Christians led to the establishment there 
of the capitol of the Kingdom of Castile. That city became the most important center 
of Arabic-Latin translation, even as Arab-Latin connections spread across Spain.  
That the history of Western philosophy is strongly dependent on texts written 
in Arabic is attested to by the sheer volume of works that were translated, perhaps 
numbering in the thousands.
23
 Translations were produced throughout Spain and 
surrounding areas. Plato of Tivoli worked in Catalonia, Herman of Carinthia in 
Northern Spain and across the Pyrenees in Languedoc, Hugh of Santalla in Aragon, 
Robert of Ketton in Navarre, Robert of Chester in Segovia, Hermann of Carinthia, 
with his pupil Rudolf of Bruges, Robert of Chester in central Spain, and Adelard of 
Bath in Sicily. Key locations of translation work in Spain included Barcelona, 
Tarasona, Sagovia, Leon, Pamplona, as well as beyond the Pyrenees at Toulouse, 
Beziers, Narbonne, and Marseilles, in the first quarter of the twelfth century. Later, 
after 1116, the most important center of translation was, as mentioned above, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
minimal exchange of ideas and manuscripts. Although the Sicilians generally translated directly from 
the Greek, when Greek texts were not available, they would translate from Arabic. 
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 As well, Arabic culture began to travel northward into Europe. “Through trade contacts and 
through political presence in Spain and Sicily the superior culture of the Arabs gradually made its way 
into western Europe,” Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, 29. 
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great cathedral library of Toledo. Toledo was a center of multilingual culture, with a 
large population of Arabic-speaking Christians and had prior importance as a center 
of learning. This tradition of scholarship, and the books that embodied it, survived the 
conquest of the city by King Alfonso VI in 1085. Toledo became a center of 
translations, which were on a scale and importance that had “no match in the history 
of western culture.”
24
 
Ferdinand III, king of Castile and Leon, encouraged the sharing of languages, 
and on his death in 1252, he was enshrined with an epitaph in Latin, Spanish, 
Hebrew, and Arabic, all languages that were part of his Spanish kingdom. His son, 
Alfonso X (“The Wise”), set up the school of translators in Toledo to continue this 
work. Among the early translators at Toledo were Avendauth (who some have 
identified with Abraham Ibn Daud), who translated Avicenna’s encyclopedia,
25
 the 
Kitab al-Shifa (The Book of Healing), in cooperation with Domingo Gundisalvo, 
Archdeacon of Cuellar. Alfonso of Toledo’s translations into Latin included 
Averroes’ De separatione primi principii. John of Seville’s translations included the 
works of al-Battani, Thabit ibn Qurra, Maslamah ibn Ahmad al-Majriti, al-Farabi, 
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 Note that these translators often worked in several different branches of learning including 
science, medicine, and philosophy. This parallels to some extent the work of Plato and Aristotle who 
also worked in a variety of disciplines, showing their metaphysically coherent view of reality. See 
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Abu Mashar, al-Ghazali, and al-Farghani.
26
 There was nothing particularly organized 
about the translation movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Many different 
scholars were at work, at different times and in different places or at the same time 
but in different places, usually (though not always) in ignorance of what others were 
doing. Work was, inevitably, duplicated, which added to the mass of translations that 
became available.
27
 
The most prolific of the translators to work in Spain was the Italian Gerard of 
Cremona. He came to Toledo about 1140 and stayed there until his death in 1187, 
translating 87 books, including Ptolemy’s Almagest, al-Khwarizmi’s On Algebra and 
Almucabala, Archimedes’ On the Measurement of the Circle, Aristotle’s On the 
Heavens, Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Jabir ibn Aflah’s Elementa astronomica, al-
Kindi’s On Optics, al-Farghani’s On Elements of Astronomy on the Celestial Motions, 
al-Farabi’s On the Classification of the Sciences, the chemical and medical works of 
al-Rhazi, the works of Thabit ibn Qurra and Hunayn ibn Ishaq, and the works of al-
Zarkali, Jabir ibn Aflah, the Banu Musa, Abu Kamil, Abu al-Qasim, and Ibn al-
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Haytham.
28
 An obituary notice penned by his pupils tells us what interest he had in 
Spain: 
He was trained from childhood at centers of philosophical study and had come 
to a knowledge of all of this that was known to the Latins . . . [so] he went to 
Toledo. There, seeing the abundance of books in Arabic on every subject, and 
regretting the poverty of the Latins in these things, he learned the Arabic 
language in order to be able to translate. In this way he passed on the Arabic 
literature in the manner of the wise man who, wandering through a green 
field, links up a crown of flowers, made not just from any, but from the 
prettiest. To the end of his life he continued to transmit to the Latin world (as 
if to his own beloved heir) whatever books he thought finest, in many 
subjects, as accurately and as plainly as he could.
29
 
 
 One of Gerard’s students, the Englishman Daniel of Morley, explains that 
although Gerard knew Arabic he often employed an assistant, Ghalid the Mozarab, 
who translated from the Arabic text into the vernacular by word of mouth to Gerard, 
who then wrote a translation into Latin.
30
  
At the close of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, Mark 
of Toledo translated the Qur’an and various medical works. Alfred the Englishman is 
noted by Roger Bacon as a key translator from Arabic. Michael Scot (c. 1175-1232) 
translated the works of al-Betrugi in 1217, al-Bitruji’s On the Motions of the 
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Heavens, and Averroes’ influential commentaries on the scientific works of Aristotle. 
David the Jew (c. 1228-1245) translated the works of al-Rhazi into Latin. Arnaldus de 
Villa Nova’s (1235-1313) translations include the works of Avicenna, Qusta ibn 
Luqa, and Galen.  
Meanwhile, outside of Spain, James of Venice, Henricus Aristippus, and a 
certain Johannes were responsible for translating directly from Greek Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and the Analytica Posteriora which was the only part of his Organon 
probably not translated by Boethius. However, neither in terms of accuracy nor their 
subsequent impact did these Greek-Latin translations match the Arabic-Latin 
translations of Gerard of Cremona, John of Seville (sometimes called Avendaut), 
Michael the Scot, Hermannus Alemannus, Hugh of Santalla, Dominicus 
Gundissalinus (sometimes called Gundissalvi), and a group of Jewish scholars 
including Petrus Alphonsi, Savasorda, and Abraham ben Ezra. Sponsored by a great 
patron of Arabic learning, Raymond, Bishop of Toledo, those translations contributed 
in a decisive way to the revival of Greek thought in Western Europe. Specifically, the 
translations of Averroes’ works by translators like Michael the Scot helped bring the 
Greek philosophical tradition into the mainstream of Latin thought. “In the Christian 
West, Latin translations of many of his [Averroes’] Long Commentaries were 
available to thinkers of the thirteenth century, where they served to play a 
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fundamentally important role in teaching the Latins how to read Aristotle with 
sympathy and insight.”
31
  
The Arabic-Latin translations of philosophical works were, certainly, centered 
on Aristotle. The Arab scholars had some access to Plato but Aristotle was always in 
the forefront of Arabic thought. However, Platonic works were available to some 
degree, not only through the prior work of Boethius, but through translations into 
Latin from the translations into Arabic by Arab scholars, as well as indirectly through 
their work and comment on Aristotle.
32
 In fact, “Neoplatonic treatises mistakenly 
attributed to Aristotle by Arabic scholars were included in the corpus of his 
[Aristotle’s] works.”
33
 As I have shown earlier, Aristotelianism assumes some basis 
in Plato, either as forerunner or adversary.
34
 Even though Aristotle’s reputation 
during the western Middle Ages eclipsed that of Plato, the European philosophical 
tradition still can be said to be a “series of footnotes to Plato,” as noted by Whitehead 
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in 1929.
35
 “An age which strove to reconcile its authorities . . . reminds us that 
Aristotle is at times quite Platonic . . . [indeed] it so happens that the most active 
period of medieval Platonism falls in the twelfth century.”
36
 
 Islamic learning in the Middle Ages was so far in advance of the European 
thought that the usage of Islamic knowledge by Europe via translations into Latin 
cannot be seen as other than the adoption of an entire foundation of knowledge upon 
which the later Renaissance was constructed. “Arabic thought provided European 
thought with new materials, and brought within its purview a whole new world of 
metaphysics.”
37
 Fletcher summarizes this section well: 
The learning of the Islamic world was discovered, appropriated, colonized by 
western scholars, and made widely accessible by means of translation into 
Latin, the international language of scholarship. This was one of the turning-
points in the intellectual evolution of mankind . . . The traffic was all one way. 
Moorish Spain was the donor, western Christendom the eager recipient.
38
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 Fletcher, Moorish Spain, 147, 174. Paulus Orosius adds to this final word from Fletcher by 
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6.3 The Twelfth-Century Renaissance 
The Renaissance of the twelfth century was a period of many changes during 
what is sometimes termed the “High Middle Ages” in Western Europe, directly 
connected to the influx of intellectual wealth from Arabic-Latin translations.
39
 It 
included social, political, and economic transformations, and an intellectual 
revitalization of Europe with strong philosophical and scientific roots. During the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe, there was a radical increase in the rate of 
new inventions, innovations in the ways of managing traditional means of production, 
and economic growth.
40
 In less than a century, there were more inventions developed 
than in the previous thousand years of human history. The period saw major 
technological advances in many areas of human society, including the widespread use 
of printing, gunpowder, the astrolabe, spectacles, and reliable clocks. These changes 
paved the way for later achievements, such as the literary and artistic movement of 
the Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century and the scientific developments of the 
seventeenth century.
41
 
 Charles H. Haskins was the first historian to write extensively about a 
“renaissance” that ushered in the High Middle Ages starting about 1100. In 1927, he 
wrote that: 
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. . . [the twelfth century in Europe] was in many respects an age of fresh and 
vigorous life. The epoch of the Crusades, of the rise of towns, and of the 
earliest bureaucratic states of the West, it saw the culmination of Romanesque 
art and the beginnings of Gothic; the emergence of the vernacular literatures; 
the revival of the Latin classics and of Latin poetry and Roman law; the 
recovery of Greek science, with its Arabic additions, and of much of Greek 
philosophy; and the origin of the first European universities. The twelfth 
century left its signature on higher education, on the scholastic philosophy, on 
European systems of law, on architecture and sculpture, on the liturgical 
drama, on Latin and vernacular poetry.
42
 
 
Whether the twelfth century advance in culture and literature can truly be 
called a “renaissance” has been debated since the work of Haskins in the early 
twentieth century.
43
 The alternative terms of renewal, revival, and “proto-
renaissance” are sometimes offered as more precise definitions. Part of the question 
lies in the definition of renaissance, a word technically meaning “rebirth.” Is what 
happened in the twelfth century a true rebirth of classical thought or a more subdued 
remembering of ancient ideas? For some scholars, the work of the twelfth century 
represents a shallow understanding of true Greek form and content, and does not 
represent an authentic return to Greek roots, which occurred in the next three 
centuries.
44
 “By 1204, the great period of acquisition was coming to an end: the 
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period of digestion was beginning.”
45
 Eby and Arrowood go on to state plainly, “The 
thirteenth [and presumably the twelfth] century scholars used Aristotle, but they were 
not Hellenists; their culture was essentially Latin. They worked from translations, but 
few of them understood the Greek language, and none understood the Greek spirit.”
46
 
Yet, the twelfth century was involved in such a resurgence of fresh ideas that calling 
it a renaissance does justice to its unique character and contribution to Western 
Europe without detracting from the history-altering renaissance attached to the 15
th
 
century.  
Haskins notes that the revival of the twelfth century was not the product of a 
particular court or single dynasty, not the work of one country. Italy, France, England, 
and even Germany all participated in this upturn in learning, with Spain holding a 
special role. “Spain’s part was to serve as the chief link with the learning of the 
Mohammedan world; the very names of the translators who worked there illustrate 
the European character of the new search for learning: John of Seville, Hugh of 
Santalla, Plato of Tivoli, Gerard of Cremona, Hermann of Carinthia, Rudolf of 
Bruges, Robert of Chester.”
47
 It addition to the diversity of cultures represented in 
this translation/revival activity was also the impression that David Knowles 
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expresses: these scholars were “working solely from a disinterested desire for 
knowledge.”
48
 
The flowering of the medieval spirit in Europe took place beginning in the 
twelfth century, the outgrowth of a process that had started in the seventh century. 
The common misunderstanding of the Middle Ages as a period of complete 
stagnation is inaccurate; Europe, while slowed by the conquests of barbarian groups 
after the fall of Rome, certainly retained a certain dynamism and cannot be simply 
viewed as a time of intellectual or cultural “darkness.” Such a view ignores the 
development of  
. . . the great medieval institutions of feudalism, ecclesiasticism, and 
scholasticism . . . [and the] great economic changes within this epoch, the 
influx of the new learning of the East, the shifting currents in the stream of 
medieval life and thought. On the intellectual side, in particular, it neglects the 
medieval revival of Latin classics and of jurisprudence, the extension of 
knowledge by the absorption of ancient learning and by observation, and the 
creative work of these centuries in poetry and art.
49
 
 
However, philosophical and scientific teaching of the early Middle Ages was 
based upon the few copies and commentaries of ancient Greek texts that remained in 
Western Europe after the collapse of the western Roman Empire. Much of Europe 
had lost contact with the knowledge of the past. The state of philosophy in pre-twelfth 
century Europe was bounded by an important shortcoming; “it remained fragmentary 
and, as it were, incidental; it remained eclectic and never rose to the level of 
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knowledge with a universal object, for it knew nothing of the all-embracing 
pretensions of a philosophical system,”
50
 which would come into play as Aristotle’s 
works enabled them to build an authentic Weltanschanuung, built on both reason and 
faith. While such notable pre-twelfth century thinkers such as Anselm and Abelard 
were generating key philosophical works before the period of Arabic-Latin 
translations of Greek ideas, the availability of Greek literature helped Latin Europe 
dress its thoughts more carefully. 
This scenario changed during the Renaissance of the twelfth century. The 
increased contact with the Islamic world in Spain and Sicily, the Crusades, the 
Reconquista, and later, increased contact with Byzantium, allowed Europeans to seek 
and translate the works of Hellenic and Islamic philosophers and scientists, especially 
the works of Aristotle.
51
 The birth of medieval universities allowed Europe to 
propagate these texts and started a new infrastructure which was needed for scientific 
communities. By the beginning of the thirteenth century there were reasonably 
accurate Latin translations of the main works of almost all the intellectually crucial 
ancient authors from the past, with the exception perhaps of Plato’s works, whose 
basic ideas were reasonably well represented within the Augustinian/Christian 
tradition. 
Some writers on the medieval period have stressed that many of the 
philosophical treatises used by the Scholastics were actually produced directly from 
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the Greek, and Arabic translations were used only when Greek translations were 
unavailable.
52
 While this is true, it is also misleading. The Arabic-Latin translations 
predated, in most cases, the Greek-Latin works, since access to Greek manuscripts 
from Constantinople did not occur until the thirteenth century, after European 
Crusaders invaded Constantinople. Because Latin and Greek are much more similar 
in form and syntax than Arabic and Latin, Greek-Latin translations could be made 
more smoothly, although often more stilted,
53
 and thus eventually overtook the 
Arabic works.
54
 But the preeminence of the Arabic translations still remained. As 
well, the multitude of Arabic commentaries on Greek philosophy gave Western 
Europe a broad base from which to explore Greek philosophy that Greek texts alone 
could not accomplish.
55
 The advantage of the Arabic Aristotelian works over the 
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Greek works was also seen in the dynamic tradition of commentary and teaching that 
remained current and viable through the period of translation.
56
 “It is clear, then, that 
even though Aristotelianism represents an unbroken tradition that stretches across 
eighteen or nineteen centuries from the philosopher’s death . . . the system continues 
to grow through . . . the contributions of individual thinkers whose own insights flow 
into the literature of comment and thus into the system itself.”
57
 As Watt says, 
When one becomes aware of the full extent of . . . Arab thinking and Arab 
writing, one sees that without the Arabs, European . . . philosophy would not 
have developed when [it] did. The Arabs were no mere transmitters of Greek 
thought, but genuine bearers, who both kept alive the disciplines they had 
been taught and extended their range. When about 1100 Europeans became 
seriously interested in the . . . philosophy of their Saracen enemies, these 
disciplines were at their zenith; and the Europeans had to learn all they could 
from the Arabs before they themselves could make further advances.
58
 
 
Knowles comments that “the manner of its arrival [Greek philosophy via 
Arabic philosophers], and the vehicles by which it was conveyed, had a great share in 
determining the quality and the extent of its influence [in Western Europe].”
59
 
Hollister and Bennett offer a helpful commentary on the relation between Islam and 
the twelfth-century Latin revival: “Although the monastic schools from which these 
Europeans came belie the notion of a deeply asleep Europe kissed awake by an 
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Arabian prince, there is no doubt that the intellectual development of medieval 
Europe was profoundly stimulated by the richness of Islamic libraries and the wisdom 
of their scholars.”
60
 
 
6.31 Scholasticism and the Rise of Universities 
In early medieval Europe, all education, other than trade skills, was controlled 
entirely by the Roman Catholic Church for the express purpose of assisting the clergy 
in establishing the Christian religion as promoted from Rome, to promote scholarship 
in service of the worldview of the Catholic hierarchy. The Church’s focus on 
scholarship was intended to assist the promotion of the Christian faith, not to increase 
knowledge per se. So, the scholarship of medieval Europe prior to the twelfth century 
consisted primarily of a study of religion, and the natural sciences were confined to a 
search for the moral qualities in man and nature. The common beginning point for a 
change in Europe’s intellectual environment typically is assigned to the twelfth 
century and the advent of scholasticism. 
Scholasticism finds its roots in the Latin word scholasticus (Greek: 
σχολαστικός), which means “that which belongs to the school,” and was a method of 
learning advocated by the academics (or schoolmen) of Western, Latin medieval 
universities circa 1100–1500. Although the essential techniques of Scholasticism, and 
indeed the willingness to use critical thinking tools, predates the arrival of Arabic-
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Latin texts,
61
 Scholasticism soon found purpose in an attempt to reconcile the 
philosophy of the ancient classical philosophers with medieval Christian theology, as 
Greek ideas began to flow into Europe from Islamic Spain. It was not a philosophy or 
theology in itself, but a tool and method for learning which put emphasis on 
dialectical reasoning.
62
 The primary purpose of scholasticism was to find the answer 
to a question or to resolve a contradiction. Scholastic philosophy usually combined 
logic, metaphysics, and semantics into a single discipline. In order to continue our 
historical analysis, it is important to briefly describe the scholastic educational 
environment of Western Europe during the Middle Ages in order to show how Greek 
ideas moved from isolated translations in the hands of individuals to a connected 
forum of thought within the Western intellectual society. 
Learning was no longer confined to monasteries and monastic schools, but a 
new guild of professional intellectuals was created, which developed new 
intellectual aspirations. Such men were no longer satisfied with the traditional 
concept of Christian wisdom but wanted to pursue the whole domain of 
human learning, and they resolutely set out to recover and develop the 
intellectual heritage of antiquity.
63
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The scholastics would choose a book by a renowned scholar as a subject of 
investigation.
64
 By reading the book thoroughly and critically, the readers learned to 
appreciate the ideas of the treatise. Then other documents related to the original 
document would be referenced, both ancient and contemporary. The points of 
disagreement and contention between these multiple sources would be written down, 
looking at it from all sides, hopefully with an open mind.
65
  
Once the sources and points of disagreement had been outlined, there would 
be a dialectical attempt to make the two sides of an argument agree.
66
 This was done 
in two ways. First, through philological analysis, words were examined to see if they 
could have more than one meaning, or if an author could have intended a word to 
mean something else. Ambiguity in language could be used to find common ground 
between two otherwise contradictory statements. Second, through logical analysis 
which relied on the rules of formal logic, contradictions could be eliminated. 
Scholastics developed two different genres of literature. The first was called 
“questions” which posed a question and was followed by a number of quotes, either 
in support or disagreement of the question. The second was called a summa. A 
summa was a system of related questions on a particular subject, producing a 
summary of ideas within a particular subject area. The famous summa of Thomas 
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Aquinas was called Summa Theologica; its stated goal was to cover the “sum” of 
Christian theology at the time. 
Scholastic schools used two methods of teaching.
67
 The first was called the 
lectio. A teacher would read a text, discussing certain words or ideas; but no 
questions were allowed. It was a simple reading of a text with an explanation from the 
master teacher. The second was called the disputatio, which was at the center of the 
scholastic method and where discussion was allowed and required. There were two 
types of disputatios. The first was called the “ordinary,” where the question to be 
disputed was announced beforehand. The second was the quodlibetal in which the 
students would give the question to the teacher without prior preparation. The teacher 
in both cases would respond, citing authoritative texts to support and prove his 
position. Students would then give rebuttals in response. Someone would keep notes 
on what was said during this exercise. The teacher would then summarize the 
arguments from these notes and present his final position the next day. 
Scholasticism overlapped movements in Islamic philosophy (for example, the 
work of Averroes) and Jewish philosophy (especially Maimonides). From the eighth 
century, the Mutazilite school of Islam, defending their ideas against the orthodox 
Islamic authorities of their day, used philosophy in support, and were one of the first 
to develop a rationalistic theology, as we discussed in the last chapter, called Ilm-al-
Kalam. This can be seen as a form of scholastic theology. 
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Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) is sometimes called the “Father of 
Scholasticism” because of the prominent role reason played in his theology. Anselm 
of Laon (d. 1117), Peter Abelard (1079-1142), and Peter Lombard (1100-1160) are all 
also part of the early Scholastic tradition. By the time we reach the thirteenth century, 
we see the attempted suppression of various groups perceived as heterodox, and the 
associated rise of orthodox orders (notably the Franciscans and Dominicans). Those 
two orders quickly became contexts for some of the most intense scholastic debates, 
producing such theologians as Alexander of Hales (Franciscan) and Thomas Aquinas 
(Dominican). Scholastic theology continued to develop into the fourteenth century, 
becoming ever more complex and subtle in its distinctions and arguments. The 
fourteenth century saw in particular the rise to dominance of the nominalist theologies 
of men like William of Ockham, which in many ways opened the door for the 
breakdown of the Thomistic synthesis and for the later “science versus theology” 
battles.
68
  
Latin Scholasticism was undoubtedly the offspring of the resurgence of 
Aristotelianism in Europe. Arabic thought and translation helped create an 
environment where rational inquiry was acceptable and accessible, and provided the 
kinds of philosophical models and tools with which to do this work. This is a critical 
point of recognition in the progress of Western philosophical thought. The receptivity 
of Arabic sources of intellectual inquiry in Europe must be seen not only as a direct 
product of an increase in Greek-based philosophical manuscripts in the Latin 
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language but as an indirect change in the entire scholastic environment, one in which 
a prior emphasis by Arabic scholars, using rationalistic models of thinking, 
encouraged and modeled for Europeans a new way of investigating questions of 
metaphysics and epistemology. The Arab writers opened the door for Latin Christians 
to see fresh ways of using philosophical tools, still within the context of theological 
prioritization.  
The Christian translator, Adelard of Bath, provides a clear example of the shift 
in European sensibilities with the addition of Arabic derived texts. What he acquired 
from the Arabs was a rationalist’s mentality, what might be later called “secular 
thinking,” although this generation still worked within theological constructs. He 
developed a feel for observation and experiment. In a letter to his nephew, he wrote 
these telling words:  
It is a little difficult for you and me to argue . . . I, with reason for my guide, 
have learned one thing from my Arab teachers, you, something different; 
dazzled by the outward show of authority you wear a head-stall [a halter]. For 
what else should we call authority but a head-stall? Just as brute animals are 
led by the head-stall where one pleases, without seeing why or where they are 
being led, and only follow the halter by which they are held, so many of you, 
bound and fettered as you are by a low credulity, are led into danger by the 
authority of writers. Hence, certain people arrogating to themselves the title of 
authorities have employed an unbounded license in writing, and this to such 
an extent that they have not hesitated to insinuate into men of low intellect the 
false instead of the true. Why should you not fill sheets of paper, aye, fill them 
on both sides, when today you can get readers who require no proof of sound 
judgment from you, and are satisfied merely with the name of a time-worn 
title? They do not understand that reason has been given to individuals that, 
with it as chief judge, distinction may be drawn between the true and the false. 
Unless reason were appointed to be the chief judge, to no purpose would she 
have been given to us individually: it would have been enough for the writing 
of laws to have been entrusted to one, or at most to a few, and the rest would 
have been satisfied with their ordinances and authority. Further, the very 
people who are called authorities first gained the confidence of their inferiors 
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only because they followed reason; and those who are ignorant of reason, or 
neglect it, justly desire to be called blind. However, I will not pursue this 
subject any further, though I regard authority as matter for contempt. This one 
thing, however, I will say. We must first search after reason, and when it has 
been found, and not until then, authority if added to it, may be received. 
Authority by itself can inspire no confidence in the philosopher, nor ought it 
to be used for such a purpose. Hence logicians have agreed in treating the 
argument from authority not as necessary, but probable only. If, therefore, you 
want to bear anything from me, you must both give and take reason.
69
  
 
The creation of the first European medieval universities generally coincides 
with the Scholastic period and provided a common setting in which philosophical 
discussions could take place.
70
 These universities evolved from much older schools 
and monasteries, and it is sometimes difficult to define the date at which they became 
true universities.
71
 Before the twelfth century, the intellectual life of Western Europe 
had been relegated to monasteries, which were primarily concerned with the study of 
liturgy and prayer; few monasteries could claim true intellectuals. Following the 
Gregorian Reform’s emphasis on canon law and the study of the sacraments (1050-
1080, based on the authority of Pope Gregory VII), bishops formed cathedral schools 
in key European cities to train the clergy in canon law, but also in the more secular 
aspects of church administration, including logic useful in preaching and theological 
discussion, and accounting in order to more effectively oversee finances. Learning 
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became essential for the advancement of the clergy hierarchy, with the result that 
master teachers gained prestige. However, demand quickly outpaced the capacity of 
cathedral schools, each of which was essentially run by one teacher. Cathedral 
schools began to migrate to large cities, like Paris and Bologna, to increase needed 
resources and to attract larger numbers of students.
72
 
The predecessor of the modern university found its roots most notably in 
Paris,
73
 especially under the guidance of Peter Abelard, which made it a priority to 
collect texts for university study. Abelard and others formed the Universitas, modeled 
after the medieval guild system. Initially, medieval universities did not have a formal 
campus; classes were taught where space was available, such as in homes and 
churches. A university was not defined as a physical space but as a collection of 
individuals united as a universitas (a corporation). Soon, however, some universities 
(such as Cambridge) began to buy or rent rooms specifically for the purposes of 
instruction. Universities were generally structured along three types, depending on 
who paid the teachers. The first type was in Bologna, where students hired and paid 
for the teachers. The second type was in Paris, where teachers were paid by the 
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Church. The third type, examples of which include Cambridge and Oxford, were 
predominantly supported by the state.
74
  
The following list contains the names of Western European universities in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries:
75
 
• University of Bologna, Italy: teaching from 10th century, recognized as a 
University in 1088 
• University of Paris, France: 1150 
• University of Oxford, England: teaching from 1096, recognized as a 
University in 1167 
• University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy: 1175 
• University of Vicenza, Italy: 1204 
• University of Cambridge, England: teaching from the 12th century, 
recognized as a University in 1209 
• University of Palencia, Spain: 1212 
• University of Arezzo, Italy: 1215 
• University of Salamanca, Spain: 1218 
• University of Padua, Italy: 1222 
• University of Naples, Federico II, Italy: 1224 
• University of Toulouse, France: 1229 
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• University of Siena, Italy: 1240 
• University of Piacenza, Italy: 1248 
• University of Valladolid, Spain: 1250 
• University of Seville, Spain: 1254 
• University of Northampton, England: 1261 
• University of Montpellier, France: 1289 
• University of Coimbra, Portugal: 1290 
• University of Macerata, Italy: 1290 
• University of Lisbon, Portugal: 1290  
• University of Lleida, Spain: 1300 
 
 
6.32 Averroism 
 
As these translations, derived from the Greeks, found their way into European 
universities, they caused an intellectual stir as the grand philosophical system of 
Aristotle engaged Latin Christian minds. “The effect of this new material was 
immediate and electric. Shortly after A.D. 1200 the influence of [Arab philosophers] 
began manifesting itself in the Arts Faculty of Oxford and Paris.”
76
 The Biblotheque 
Nationale in Paris holds a manuscript, dated to 1243, that contains almost the 
complete body of work created by Averroes, which shows that the impact of Averroes 
was complete by about 1240.
77
 The work of Averroes on Aristotle, “the man in whom 
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truth was consummated,”
78
 caused European scholars to take both pro and con views 
of “The Commentator’s” ideas: the pro-Averroists, known as Latin Averroists, with 
Siger of Brabant at their head, and the anti-Averroists, with Thomas Aquinas, a 
fellow Dominican with Siger, at their head. The issues that divided these two groups 
were significant, ranging from unity of the intellect, to the question of the eternity of 
the world, to the reality of divine providence. Islam and Christianity both encountered 
a three-fold dilemma in regard to using Aristotle’s ideas. First, Aristotle posits a 
mechanistic view of God who is simply the “prime mover,” while Islam and 
Christianity see God in a theistic way, both providential and actively participating in 
human history. Second, Aristotle assumes the eternity of matter while Islam and 
Christianity believe in a creation of the world ex nihilo. Third, Aristotle argued 
against the immortality of the individual soul in contrast to Islam and Christianity. 
“The Moslem . . . thinkers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, like their Christian 
successors in the thirteenth and fourteenth, had the choice of rejecting Aristotelianism 
in its entirety, of separating the world of science from the world of faith, or of trying 
to prove the ultimate compatibility of reason and revelation.”
79
 
Importantly, even the critics of Averroes and his brand of Aristotelianism,—
Aquinas included—could not escape the influence of the great Arabic thinker. “Their 
understanding of Aristotle (again including Aquinas) was conditioned by Averroes’ 
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interpretation.
80
 Eby and Arrowood concur; “It is of particular interest that Moslem 
scholars contributed to the development of Christian thought by furnishing opposition 
to Christian theologians . . . In later centuries, the scholastic theologians of the Roman 
Catholic Church elaborated their own system in refuting the doctrines of Islam.”
81
 As 
I stated in chapter 1, this kind of understanding of the dependence of Aquinas on 
Averroes prompted Renan to conclude that Aquinas owed “almost everything” to 
Averroes.
82
 While the statement of Renan is obviously an exaggeration, the place of 
Averroes and Aristotle in the mind and work of Aquinas can hardly be 
underestimated. Aquinas, however, did move beyond both Averroes and Aristotle as 
we examine the unique direction of his synthetic system, building a “remarkable 
extension and transfiguration of the peripatetic philosophy, so much so that it 
becomes a philosophy in its own right, transcending its historical sources.”
83
 Such an 
admission of creativity on the part of Aquinas does nothing to dispel the foundational 
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role of Averroes in the thought of Aquinas. It simply reminds us of the dynamic give 
and take that must accompany philosophic inquiry in every generation. 
 Etienne Gilson gives Averroes the distinction of having established the 
“primacy of reasons” or a purely philosophical rationalism long before the official 
beginning of the Renaissance. He writes that rationalism was “born in Spain, in the 
mind of an Arabian philosopher, as a conscious reaction against the theologism of the 
Arabian divines.”
84
 Gilson goes on to add that Averroes “bequeathed to his 
successors the ideal of a purely rational philosophy, an ideal whose influence was to 
be such that, by it, even the evolution of Christian philosophy was to be deeply 
modified.”
85
 Specifically, Gilson grants to Averroes the same recognition that would 
become such a pivotal part of Aquinas’ own work: “That nothing should enter the 
texture of metaphysical knowledge save only rational and necessary demonstration. 
For the same reason, he [Aquinas] even agreed with Averroes that the so-called 
necessary reasons of so many theologians were merely dialectical probabilities.”
86
  
Averroism is the term applied to either of two philosophical trends among 
scholastics in the late thirteenth century. The main ideas of the earlier philosophical 
concept of Averroism, found in Averroes’ commentaries to Aristotle, were: 
• there is one truth, but there are two ways to reach it: through philosophy and 
through religion; 
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• the world is eternal; 
• the soul is divided into two parts: one individual, and one divine;  
• the individual soul is not eternal;  
• all humans at the basic level share one and the same divine soul (an idea 
known as monopsychism);  
• resurrection of the dead is not possible.  
This stance was condemned, in 1270 and 1277, by the Roman Catholic bishop 
Etienne Tempier. Tempier went on to specify 219 other unacceptable Averroist 
theses. To resolve the problem, Siger and Boetius of Dacia claimed that there existed 
a “double truth”: a factual or “hard” truth that is reached through science and 
philosophy, and a “religious” truth that is reached through religion, and the two could 
lead to different conclusions.
87
  
The later philosophical concept of Averroism was the idea that the 
philosophical and religious worlds are separate entities. However, upon analyzing the 
219 theses condemned by Tempier, it was obvious that not many of them originated 
in Averroes. Radical Aristotelianism and heterodox Aristotelianism were the terms 
commonly used for a while to refer to the actual philosophical movement started by 
Siger and to differentiate it from Averroism. The idea of the separation of philosophy 
and religion found in Averroism was influential in the development of modern 
secularism. 
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In spite of, or perhaps partly because of, the journey of Averroism in Western 
Europe, the impact of the Arabic philosopher remained great within the Latin 
intellectual tradition.
88
 
Apart from the translations of the works of Abu Mashar, al-Kindi, al-Farabi 
and Avicenna, it was the translations of the great commentaries of Averroes 
on the whole Aristotelian Corpus, with the exception of the Politics, that 
brought about a genuine intellectual revolution in West European learned 
circles and led to the rise of that great philosophical-theological movement, 
known as Latin Scholasticism, in the thirteenth century.
89
 
 
 In support of this strong claim, we have the contemporaneous testimony of the 
British philosopher Roger Bacon (d.1294), who spent most of his adult life at the 
universities of Oxford and Paris. He wrote in the Opus Majus, commenting on the 
Arabic contributions to the revival of Greek thought in Western Europe: “But the 
larger portion of the philosophy of Aristotle received little attention, either on account 
of the concealment of the copies of his works and their difficulty or unpopularity or 
on account of the wars in the East, till after the time of Mohamet [Mohammed] when 
Avicenna and Averroes and others recalled to the light of full exposition the 
philosophy of Aristotle.”
90
 Myers states, “. . . ibn Rushd came to be regarded as the 
arch-infidel and the greatest enemy of the Christian faith. Aquinas’ immense efforts 
against him were indicative of the general reaction against Averroism. 
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Notwithstanding the Church’s opposition, Averroes’ writings remained alive in 
Europe until the sixteenth century.”
91
 
 
6.4 Aquinas 
 
I am now at the point in this dissertation where I can connect the 
philosophical/educational points of historical continuity that typically arise in 
philosophy of education textbooks, as outlined previously in chapter one. Typically, 
philosophy of education textbooks move from the classical Greek philosophers 
immediately to the Middle Ages, commonly directly to Aquinas.
92
 As my study has 
shown, this historical jump of about 1600 years ignores the rich and varied history of 
philosophy that pertains to the intermediate period; it does no justice to the course of 
Western thought around the dual roadblocks of post-Rome Europe and Byzantium 
nor through the auspices of Arabic thinkers and the Islamic Empire. Aquinas 
completes the philosophical circuit in that his work was closely influenced by that of 
Averroes, as both a protagonist and antagonist,
93
 but without doubt adopting the 
method of commentary modeled by Averroes. “St. Thomas Aquinas, whose 
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achievement it was to show that reason and revelation could coexist in a Christian 
philosophy, explicitly cited Averroes no less than 503 times in the course of his 
work”
94
 And as Watt notes, “The whole range of . . . European philosophy was 
deeply indebted to the Arabic writers; and Thomas Aquinas owed just as much to the 
Aristotelianism of Averroes as did Siger of Brabant [the Latin Averroist and 
philosophical opponent of Aquinas].”
95
 Not only did Aquinas lean on the work of 
Averroes, but the careful investigator can find influences from other Arabic scholars 
in Aquinas’ work as well. For example, the arguments for the existence of God built 
by al-Farabi are remarkable similar to Aquinas’ own proofs; al-Farabi’s work on the 
attributes of God are also obviously seen in Aquinas’ list and description of divine 
characteristics.
96
 
Thus, my work is near completion as I move my focus back into the typical 
timeline often used in discussing Western intellectual tradition and connect with the 
work of Aquinas.  
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) lived at a critical juncture of Western culture 
when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question 
of the age-old issue of the relationship between faith and reason. This crisis flared up 
just as universities were coming into prominence. Aquinas, after early studies at the 
Italian monastery of Monte Cassino, moved on to the University of Naples, where he 
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met members of the new Dominican Order. It was at Naples too that Aquinas had his 
first extended contact with the new learning. When he joined the Dominican Order he 
went to study with Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great), author of a paraphrase of the 
Aristotelian corpus. Aquinas completed his studies at the University of Paris. In two 
stints as a regent master, Aquinas agued against both the Averroistic interpretations of 
Aristotle as well as the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result 
was a new way, at least for Latin Europe, to connect faith and philosophy. Over time, 
Aquinas’ theological writings became normative in the Catholic Church and his 
textual commentaries on Aristotle represent an ongoing cultural resource.
97
 The 
philosophy of Aquinas exerted enormous influence on subsequent Christian theology, 
especially that of the Roman Catholic Church, extending to Western philosophy in 
general, where he stands as a vehicle and modifier of Aristotelianism. 
Philosophically, his most important and enduring work is the Summa Theologica, in 
which he expounds his systematic theology.
98
 
 From the beginning of his writing career, Aquinas produced writings which 
would not have emerged from the usual tasks of a mere theological master.
99
 On 
Being and Essence and The Principles of Nature date from his first stay at Paris, and 
unlike his commentaries on Boethius’ On the Trinity and De hebdomadibus, are quite 
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obviously philosophical works. When he returned to Italy, his productivity increased. 
He finished the Summa Contra Gentiles, wrote various disputed questions, and began 
the Summa Theologica.
100
 In 1268, at Rome, he began the work of commenting on 
Aristotle with On the Soul, and during the next five or six years commented on eleven 
more Aristotelian treatises. During this time he also wrote such polemical works as 
On the Eternity of the World and On There Being Only One Intellect.  
 At the time of his death in 1274, Aquinas was under a cloud of suspicion in 
Paris and in 1277, 219 Aristotelian/Averroism propositions were condemned by a 
commission appointed by the Bishop of Paris, among them 16 tenets of Aquinas 
himself. This was soon lifted; he was canonized and eventually was given the title of 
Doctor of the Church.
101
 “The extraordinary impact Aquinas had on Western thought 
lay especially in his conviction that the judicious exercise of man’s empirical and 
rational intelligence, which had been developed and empowered by the Greeks, could 
now marvelously serve the Christian cause.”
102
 
Aquinas’ creative joining of faith and reason, the “medieval synthesis” as it is 
sometimes called, is an important capstone in our present conversation, as it brings 
the question of “how theology and philosophy can support one another” to the 
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forefront, a question that earlier Christianity struggled to address fully or 
appropriately.
103
 In order to accomplish this linkage, as a philosopher, Aquinas is 
dependent on Aristotle, although not ignorant of other patterns of thought including 
the Platonic tradition that had moved behind the scenes in the Latin Church.
104
 The 
recognition that Aquinas is fundamentally an Aristotelian does not mean that 
Aristotle is the only influence on him. It does mean, however, that whatever Aquinas 
takes from other sources is held to be compatible with what he already holds in 
common with Aristotle. And, of course, to draw attention to the sources of Aquinas’ 
philosophy is not to say that everything he holds philosophically can be traced 
directly back to historical antecedents.  
Other early Christian thinkers, such as Augustine, argued that philosophical 
reflection complemented theology, but only when these philosophical reflections 
were firmly grounded in a prior intellectual commitment to the underlying truth of the 
Christian faith. Thus, the legitimacy of philosophy was derived from the legitimacy of 
the underlying faith commitments. Augustine’s view was obviously hierarchical, with 
philosophy a servant to theology. Into the later Middle Ages, Augustine’s views were 
widely known and defended. It was during this time however that Aquinas described 
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another model for the relationship between philosophy and theology, distinct from 
Augustine’s ideas. According to the Thomistic model, philosophy and theology are 
actually separate enterprises, heading from different directions toward the same goal. 
Both were, contrary to Augustine, completely part of God’s truth. The primary 
difference between the two is their intellectual starting points. Philosophy takes its 
data from the input of our natural mental faculties: what we see, hear, taste, touch, 
and smell. This information can be accepted as true on the basis of the reliability of 
our natural faculties with respect to the natural world. Theology, on the other hand, 
takes as its starting point the divine revelations contained in the Bible. This 
information can be accepted on the basis of divine authority. 
In this way of seeing the two disciplines, if at least one of the premises of an 
argument is derived from revelation, the argument falls into the domain of theology; 
otherwise it falls into the domain of philosophy. Since God created a world which is 
accessible to philosophy as well as revealed through the texts accessible to 
theologians, the claims derived by one cannot conflict with the conclusions yielded 
by another unless a previous error has been made. Since the conclusions of the two 
disciplines must coincide, philosophy can be put to the service of theology (and 
perhaps vice-versa). Theology might hold preeminence over philosophy but the two 
were never in contradiction. 
Faith and reason, while distinct from each other but related in purpose, are the 
two fundamental tools for understanding the breadth of theology. Aquinas saw that 
both were necessary, or, at least, that the intersection of both was necessary, for a 
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person to obtain true knowledge. Aquinas blended Greek philosophy and Christian 
doctrine by positing that rational thinking and the study of nature, just like revelation, 
were valid ways to understand God. According to Aquinas, God reveals himself 
through nature; to study nature is to study God. The ultimate goals of theology, in 
Aquinas’ mind, are to use reason to grasp the truth about God and to experience 
salvation through that truth. “Attempts were made to ban the study of Aristotle’s 
works at the University of Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century. Intemperate 
academic struggles occurred until Aquinas showed in his Summa Theologica that 
reason and revelation were compatible, and could come together as in the taut 
harmony of a Gothic archway.”
105
 Even though Aquinas’ union of faith and reason 
were largely undone by the later nominalists and empiricists, the place of Greek 
thought was firmly established in European thought patterns due to the immense 
influence of Aquinas within the constructs of Scholasticism.  
Williams says of the relationship between Aquinas and Aristotle and the 
resulting impact on Europe,  
. . . what is certainly the most evident and concentratedly important influence 
of Greek philosophy on subsequent thought, the influence of Aristotle on the 
thought of the Middle Ages. Aristotle, who was for Thomas Aquinas “The 
Philosopher,” for Dante il maestro di color che sanno, “the master of those 
who know,” did much to form, through his various and diverse interpreters, 
the philosophical, scientific, and cosmological outlook of an entire culture.
106
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In the altarpiece done by Traini for the Church of Saint Caterina at Pisa 
(1345), Aquinas is shown seated with an open book, his own works.
107
 Above him is 
Christ, Moses, Paul, and the four Gospel writers. On either side of Aquinas, and 
slightly lower, stand Plato and Aristotle, with their books open for him to read. 
Directly below Aquinas sits Averroes. The message of this artwork clearly shows that 
the great doctor of the Church, Aquinas, while subservient to Christ and saints of 
church history, is influenced by the great Greek philosophers of ages past. That 
Averroes, the Muslim, is placed in a secondary, humble position is appropriate for 
this Christian painting; that he is pictured at all indicates to what extent this Arab 
philosopher was part of the greater discussion of faith and reason. 
Aquinas’ thought was summed up by Leo XIII in the Encyclical “Aeterni 
Patris” (1879):  
He won this title of distinction for himself: that single-handed he victoriously 
combated the errors of former times, and supplied invincible arms to put to 
rout those which might in after times spring up. Again, clearly distinguishing, 
as is fitting, reason and faith, he both preserved and had regard for the rights 
of each; so much so, indeed, that reason, borne on the wings of Thomas, can 
scarcely rise higher, while faith could scarcely expect more or stronger aids 
from reason than those which she has already obtained through Thomas.
108
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6.5 Renaissance 
 I will be content to make one further historical connection post-Aquinas in our 
journey of Western philosophical/educational foundations. From Aquinas and the 
twelfth-century renaissance, it is a relatively easy jump to the fourteenth-sixteenth 
century Italian Renaissance; from there the path into modern thought is direct and 
well-established.
109
 That the Italian Renaissance represents the advent of the modern 
period of Western thinking is clearly acknowledged, but what I have attempted to 
establish is that there is a line of continuity that flows back in history to, and even 
beyond, the early Greeks. Within modern Western thought, the place and priority of 
Plato and Aristotle have been firmly established;
110
 my goal has been to show how 
this Greek presence came to be.  
  I agree strongly with the presuppositions of (but not always the conclusions 
of) the so-called “continuity thesis” which proposes that there was no radical 
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discontinuity between the intellectual development of the High Middle Ages, and the 
developments in the Renaissance and early modern period. Continuity theorists argue, 
and I concur, that the real intellectual revolution came earlier, both in the twelfth 
century, with Averroes’ revival of Aristotle and its embrace by the Latin West, and 
earlier at the turn of the millennium within the Islamic civilization.
111
  
 The idea of a continuity, rather than contrast, between medieval and modern 
thought begins with the work of Pierre Duhem, the French physicist and 
philosopher/historian of science. He ideas ares set out in his ten-volume work on the 
history of science, Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de 
Platon à Copernic. Unlike many former historians such as Voltaire and Condorcet, 
who did not consider the Middle Ages to offer much of intellectual importance, he 
tried to show that the Roman Catholic Church actually had helped foster the 
development of Western science and that there was an uninterrupted series of small 
improvements from doctrines professed in the heart of the medieval schools, in spite 
of strong difference in opinion about how such rationalistic progress should be 
made.
112
  
Robert Briffault also criticized the idea of a Renaissance taking place in the 
fifteenth century. He instead argued, perhaps too enthusiastically, that a real 
Renaissance took place centuries earlier in the Islamic civilization.  
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It was under the influence of the Arabian and Moorish revival of culture, and 
not in the fifteenth century, that the real Renaissance took place. Spain, not 
Italy, was the cradle of the rebirth of Europe. After steadily sinking lower and 
lower into barbarism, it had reached the darkest depths of ignorance and 
degradation when the cities of the Saracenic world, Baghdad, Cairo, Córdoba, 
Toledo, were growing centres of civilization and intellectual activity. It was 
there that the new life arose which was to grow into a new phase of human 
evolution. From the time when the influence of their culture made itself felt, 
began the stirring of a new life . . . The fact has been set forth again and again. 
But it has been nevertheless stubbornly ignored and persistently minimized. 
The debt of Europe to the “heathen dog” could, of course, find no place in the 
scheme of Christian history, and the garbled falsification has imposed itself on 
all subsequent conceptions . . . It is highly probable that but for the Arabs, 
modern European civilization would never have arisen at all; it is absolutely 
certain that but for them, it would not have assumed that character which has 
enabled it to transcend all previous phases of evolution.
113
 
 
More recently the Australian mathematician and historian of science, James 
Franklin, has argued that the idea of a European Renaissance is a myth.
114
 He 
characterizes this myth as the view that around the fifteenth century there was in 
Europe a “sudden dawning” of a new outlook on the world after a thousand years of 
darkness. He claims that the Renaissance was in fact a period when thought declined 
significantly, bringing to an end a period of advance in the late Middle Ages, and that 
the twelfth century was the true renaissance. For example, the rediscovery of classical 
knowledge, which the later Italian humanists claimed for themselves, was actually 
accomplished in the twelfth century. “Something of the general continuity in 
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philosophic thought is shown in the fact that the favorite book of Descartes, which he 
carried in all his travels, was Aquinas’ Summa.”
115
 
The philosopher and historian Robert Pasnau makes a similar claim that 
modernity came in the late twelfth century, with Averroes’ revival of Aristotle and its 
almost immediate embrace by the Latin West.
116
 He believes the concerns of 
scholastic philosophy are largely continuous with the central themes of the modern 
era, that early modern philosophy, though different in tone and style, is a natural 
progression out of later medieval debates, and that a grasp of the scholastic 
background is essential to an understanding of the philosophy of Descartes, Locke, 
and others. “The men of the later Middle Ages studied a substantial number of Greek 
authors, pagan as well as Christian. Directly or indirectly they learnt a great deal 
about the Greek past. They laid the foundations without which the Renaissance could 
not have flourished.”
117
  
Another view has been recently proposed by Arun Bala, in his history of the 
birth of modern science. Bala argues that the changes involved in the Scientific 
Revolution have to be seen as rooted within the multicultural influences on Europe. 
Bala argues that by ignoring such multicultural impacts we have been led to a 
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Eurocentric conception of the Scientific Revolution.
118
 Fletcher, in agreement, states, 
“Modern science begins in thirteenth-century Europe, based firmly on the plinth 
furnished by translations from Arabic and Greek. In this perspective the European 
scientific and industrial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
appear less as new beginnings than as the end of a long haul.”
119
 
 While I do not agree to the lengths at which the continuity theorists downplay 
the creative work of the Italian Renaissance, I do agree with their uplifting of the 
creative work done in the twelfth century in response to and in light of the Arabic 
translation work done in Spain of Greek philosophical treatises. I also affirm the idea 
of the general continuity and conservation/interpretation of human thought 
throughout the Middle Age period that lies at the heart of the continuity theorists 
construct. As the scope of Arabic sponsored work infiltrated Western Europe, so too 
with it came a renewed sense of how to understand and investigate the world. “With 
interest came method: a rationalistic habit of mind and an experimental temper . . . 
kept alive in the Mohammedan countries, and . . . passed to Western Christendom.”
120
 
Hugh Bibbs summarizes,  
The subtle shift away from rationalism and scholasticism towards empiricism 
and experiment had by no means become obvious by the end of the Medieval 
period. Traditionalists still held sway. However, the great influence of the 
Arab literature remained. The Christian world had changed in light of the 
Muslim world, and the new learning offered possibilities where the old 
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learning failed. Indeed, the old learning had failed, so there was no way of 
recovering the mentality of the tenth century. After contact with the Arabs, the 
Later Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution were perhaps inevitable in 
Europe.
121
 
 
It is interesting, as it is unfortunate, that as the Renaissance progressed, the 
appreciation for Arabic roots faded. As Christianity and Islam grew further apart 
geographically, their shared cultural streams dried up as well. For example, the Italian 
scholar, Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), who was himself well-versed in Arabic, 
says in one of his works, “Leave to us in Heaven’s name Pythagoras, Plato, and 
Aristotle, and keep your Omar, your Alchabitius, your Abenzoar, your Abenragel.”
122
 
While in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there had been professors of Arabic in 
several European universities, when a student asked about instruction in Arabic in 
Salamanca, he was told, “What concern have you with this barbaric language, 
Arabic?”
123
 As I will conclude in my final chapter, the beginnings of Western 
ignorance and repression of Islamic philosophical ties begins with these kinds of 
culturally-biased assumptions that divided East and West.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 The Greek Path to Europe 
 The philosophical journey from ancient Greece, and before, to the beginning 
of the European Renaissance period is now complete. What my research has 
attempted to add to the intellectual dialogue of Western educational foundations has 
been a tracing of the varied avenues that classical Greek thought has taken, both 
through text and context, in route to our present discussion forums. I have taken a 
synthetic, analytical approach to the study of the twin philosophical giants, Plato and 
Aristotle, through whom Western thought has derived its compass bearings.
1
 We have 
observed how the broad ideas of these two men have come into focus, through the 
flexible assimilation from earlier cultures, the creative genius of early Greek thinkers, 
and the sheer personal resources of Plato and Aristotle themselves. As their individual 
conclusions became general systems of thought, we have seen their influence wash 
through the Greek and Roman empires, finding capable interpreters in every century 
who propelled their ideas ahead to the next generation. 
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 As we approached the history-shattering splintering of the old Roman Empire 
into its West and East partitions, the fate of Greek philosophy followed the contours 
of the emerging geopolitical realities, and, first in the West, then in the East, these 
philosophical priorities fell into disuse. The West, overrun by Teutonic barbarians, 
lost its hold on the Greeks and on education in general as it moved from culture to 
crisis. The East, dominated by the hierarchical regime of Christian Byzantium, found 
in the Greek classics a dangerous undertow to their theological presuppositions and 
the intellectual climate moved largely into stagnation. The line of Greek philosophical 
continuity found itself jeopardized by this double dead-end. 
 Without precedent, a desert nomadic culture from the southeast margins of the 
Mediterranean world emerged in the seventh century to fill the power vacuum left 
from the demise of the Rome-based, multi-century empire of the Caesars. The 
religion of Islam appeared out of the sands of Arabia, overrunning first the remnants 
of the old Persian territories of Mesopotamia and then the former Hellenized colonies 
of the eastern Mediterranean. Within a century, a mere heartbeat in human history, 
the Muslim crusaders marched across the northern shores of Africa and established a 
western base of operations on the Iberian peninsula. This culture, tied together by a 
common deity, proclamation, and tongue, assimilated the civilizations it captured, 
including, most notably for this research, the key works and ideas of the Greek 
thinkers. Through a series of translators, the marginalized Greek philosophers were 
moved within the heart of the Arabic tradition. There they survived and reproduced, 
in the hands of capable scholars who spoke Arabic, not Greek.  
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 This work of Arabic scholars “demonstrated for the first time in history that 
scientific and philosophical thought are international, not bound to a specific 
language or culture.”
2
 Once the Arabic culture forged by early Abbasid society 
established the universality of Greek thought, it provided an accessible and proven 
model for the Latin West to adopt and within which to invest, showing that faith and 
reason could be married.  
 These Arabic-infused treatises moved steadily into the western Islamic centers 
in al-Andulas, where they received their final Arabic treatment, through the work of 
Averroes. From Spain, the Latin West, just recently opening its mind’s door to 
broader streams of thought, drank deeply from the translated Greek works and 
commentaries that surrounded them. The ensuing twelfth-century revival allowed 
Plato and especially Aristotle to find a new group of interested and inquiring 
individuals to read and respond to these Greek ideas. Through the auspicious work of 
Christian scholars like Thomas Aquinas, Greek thought was regenerated within the 
Christian tradition and allowed to sprout new growth within the gates of Europe’s 
blossoming universities. From here, the Greek ideas were ready at hand for the 
humanistic explosion of renaissance thought that occurred between the fourteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Thus, Plato and Aristotle arrived from their long and, at times, 
perilous passage to find a secure home with Western philosophical/educational 
thought and to mold its entire culture from the bottom up.
3
 
                                                           
     
2
 Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, 192. 
 
     
3
 See Appendix J, which summarizes the basic theme of my research in a succinct format.  
 346 
 The key to this dissertation has been the emphasis laid upon the often ignored 
role that the Islamic Empire played in transmitting, translating, and transforming 
Greek philosophy in such a way as to make it available for adoption by Europe in the 
high Middle Ages. It is clear that,  
. . . what the Arabs transmitted to the West went far beyond the Greek legacy. 
For it was the Arabs from whom Europe also learned that there can be no 
exclusiveness in man’s quest for truth, and that truth itself knows no frontiers 
of race or religion. These were in fact the principles that were to guide the 
Renaissance and make Western progress and Western civilization possible.
4
  
 
The priority of this research has been to demonstrate that Western philosophy 
has Eastern ancestors, a fact hardly acknowledged in the history of our cultural 
development but one that has immense ramifications for a proper understanding of 
what it means to participate in the Western intellectual tradition.  
 Finley states the natural conclusion to my thesis, and its significant 
implications, well: 
The diffusion of ideas and institutions—legacy is one form of diffusion, in 
time rather than in space—is never a mechanical copying merely for the sake 
of copying. Legacy implies values; it is always selective, that is to say, there is 
also rejection, non-legacy, and there is unending adaptation, modification, 
distortion . . . The institutional and social framework of European civilization 
changed fundamentally, not once but several times, in the more than two 
thousand years since the end of classical Hellas. Hence there was no 
institutional legacy in any meaningful sense, despite occasional futile pleas for 
turning back the clock, and even more common illegitimate claims of ancient 
authority for institutions and institutional changes . . . But there was a very 
substantial, genuine cultural legacy—that is a commonplace—and the 
complexity of fitting that into a succession of different environments is 
perhaps the most interesting, and most difficult, aspect of all.
5
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7.2 The Myth of Westerness 
 My research has opened a door through which Western thought can reexamine 
itself from the vantage point of wider understanding of its own cultural integrity. It is 
no secret that historical reviews of one’s own background and identity always fall 
prey to subjectivity in spite of pretensions to maintain an objective status. History is 
typically written by the “victors” and usually serves to ratify and commend the 
current state of affairs. The writing of history is preoccupied with the myths of our 
intellectual heredity and tells those kinds of stories we want to hear, that affirm our 
place in the history of civilization. Such a predisposition colors the kind of 
information we process and governs the hypotheses we find tenable. This image 
determines what facts we include in our histories and what priority we give the 
various streams that make up our story. 
 According to Maria Menocal, the most pervasive construct we have of 
ourselves and our culture is one that can be subsumed under the descriptor “Western.” 
“Whether it is spoken or unspoken, named or unnamed, we are governed by the 
notion that there is a distinctive cultural history that can be characterized as Western, 
and that it is in distinctive, necessary, and fundamental opposition to non-Western 
culture.”
6
 With this Western bias comes a natural corollary: a tacit presupposition of 
the superiority of West over East. As Southern notes, this is not a new problem: “The 
Western sense of superiority in every sphere of endeavor has scarcely been 
challenged for three hundred years. It has become part of our heritage, most painful to 
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abandon or adjust.”
7
 When we examine the medieval period of intellectual 
development, however, if we are honest, we see actually a very different, almost 
reverse picture. I have offered evidence that for the greater period of the Middle 
Ages, it was not the West but the eastern Islamic Empire which played the role of the 
ascendant and dominant culture, while the West languished in self-absorbed 
mediocrity. The resistance to the proper acknowledgement of the fundamental 
characteristics of our intellectual genealogy is deep-seated. “The tenor of some of the 
responses to the suggestion that this Arab-centered vision might be a more viable 
historical reconstruction for the West has occasionally been reminiscent of the 
reactions once provoked by Darwin’s suggestion (for so was the theory of evolution 
construed) that we were ‘descended from monkeys.’”
8
 This same thought is continued 
here:  
Notwithstanding the substantial influence that it has had on western 
philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophy is not generally regarded as part of 
the philosophical canon in the English-speaking world, and such figures as Ibn 
Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) remain obscure by comparison 
with Augustine and Aquinas. More often than not, they are either considered 
curiosities deriving from an entirely different philosophical tradition, or 
preservers of and commentators on the Greek philosophical heritage without a 
sufficiently original contribution of their own. The reasons for these omissions 
and for the disparagement of Islamic philosophy are steeped in the often 
conflicted history of Islam and Christendom.
9
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Islam appeared to be barbaric and backward but it could not be denied that it 
had the ability to advance and to maintain stability—and it would not go away. 
Southern adds to this analysis by offering insight into the fundamental Christian-
Islam question: 
The existence of Islam was the most far-reaching problem in medieval 
Christendom. It was a problem at every level of experience. As a practical 
problem it called for action and for discrimination between the competing 
possibilities of Crusade, conversion, coexistence, and commercial 
interchange. As a theological problem it called persistently for some answer to 
the mystery of its existence, . . . was it . . . a heresy, a schism, or a new 
religion; a work of man or devil; an obscene parody of Christianity, or a 
system of thought that deserved to be treated with respect? It was difficult to 
decide among the possibilities. But before deciding it was necessary to know 
the facts, and these were not easy to know. So there arose a historical problem 
that could not be solved, could scarcely be approached, without linguistic and 
literary knowledge difficult to acquire, and made more difficult by secrecy, 
prejudice, and the strong desire not to know for fear of contamination.
10
  
 
By way of example of this kind of Westernized view of history, Catholic 
scholars would describe the role of Arabic philosophy in Western thought as severely 
overrated. Here is a clear sampling of such a perspective: 
The Arabians contributed in a very large degree to making Aristotle known in 
Christian Europe; however, in doing this, they were but transmitting what they 
themselves had received from Christian sources; and, moreover, the Aristotle 
who finally gained recognition in Christian Europe was not the Arabian 
Aristotle, but the Greek Aristotle, who came to Western Europe by way of 
Constantinople.
11
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 The concept that there are paradigms that govern periods of scholarship and 
that these paradigms undergo periodic revision is well known, especially since the 
work of Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
12
 The paradigm that 
has greatly shaped our understanding of the Middle Ages and of the development of a 
Western mindset was partially formulated during the period immediately following 
the medieval period, when it was thought that a true “rebirth” had occurred after a 
long interval of cultural darkness. The Renaissance mind was loath to attach any 
continuity to the Middle Ages and instead fostered the view that the now modern 
world was directly connected to the classical world. The medieval contribution to this 
heritage was not considered worthy of incorporation into the intellectual family tree.  
Noted deconstructionist, Stanley Fish, reminds us of a first key principle of 
hermeneutics: 
I argue that whatever account we have of a work or a period or of the entire 
canon is an account that is possible or intelligible only within the assumptions 
embodied in current professional practice. Rather than standing independently 
of our efforts, works, periods, and canons have the shape they do precisely 
because of our efforts, and therefore no act of literary criticism, no matter how 
minimally “descriptive” can be said to “bypass” the network that enables it.
13
 
 
 The remainder of this paradigm was manifested in the imperial and colonial 
experiences of the emerging modern Europe, which helped sharpen the perception of 
Western superiority as well as its inherent differences between it and the rest of 
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global society. Europe was the sole entity that was capable of bringing light to an 
otherwise darkened world. Civilization resided exclusively in the West, and had 
always been latent there as direct heirs of the first civilization of the Greeks.  
 So to include the cluttered history of the Middle Ages into the grand product 
of Western Europe in any meaningful way offered more problems than benefits. And 
to propose that there might be an Arab-Islamic component to this Western 
environment was unbearable. That an alien, Semitic culture could have important 
contributions to the cultural ideology of the privileged West seemed to be the ultimate 
oxymoron. 
The proposition that the Arab world played a critical role in the making of the 
modern West . . . is in clear and flagrant contradiction of cultural ideology. It 
is unimaginable in the context of the readily observable phenomenon that was 
institutionalized as an essential element of European ideology and that has 
remained so in many instances to this day: cultural supremacy over the Arab 
world.
14
 
 
During the time when medieval studies were in their heyday, the image of the 
Arab world was severely limiting; even in an earlier period it was hard to imagine 
that the Arab culture could have anything more than a marginal element in Western 
development. So it is no surprise that our current view of the connection between 
classical Greek philosophy and modern Western thought essentially bypasses the 
central role of Arabic scholars to this process during the Middle Ages; “the key to the 
unimaginability of this particular bit of revisionism is that it would have challenged 
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and ultimately belied the regnant worldview, requiring the reversal of an ideologically 
conditioned sense of the communal Western self.”
15
 This kind of reassessment 
requires the ability and, more importantly, the desire to acknowledge a degree of 
indebtedness to a culture generally regarded as inferior and perhaps the epitome of 
“otherness.” 
The Arabic component of the Western philosophical stance has remained 
incidental in most treatments of the subject. In spite of isolated recognition of this 
component in modern studies, “such perspectives have never become part of the 
mainstream within the community of scholars who regularly deal with medieval 
European studies . . . the question of the effect of the Arab sojourn in Spain is hardly 
a matter of vital importance to most medievalists.”
16
 The Semitic languages of 
Hebrew and Arabic are not known resources among most modern scholars. There is 
no cry to add to required reading lists the names of Avicenna or Averroes. “Because 
Europe was reacting against Islam it belittled the influence of the Saracens and 
exaggerated its dependence on its Greek and Roman heritage. So today an important 
task for western Europeans, as we move into the era of “one world,” is to correct this 
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false emphasis and to acknowledge fully our debt to the Arab and Islamic world.”
17
 
Southern adds, “We have reached a point in the study of medieval history at which it 
is very important that attention should be directed to communities outside western 
Europe, and especially to those that exercised an influence on the development of the 
West.”
18
  
What I call for in this conclusion is a willingness to resist the temptation to 
de-historicize or devalue what actually occurred in the historical development of 
Western thought. In order to understand current Western constructs, we are obligated 
to investigate the pathways that enabled those constructs to be established. “It seems 
only logical that  . . . we should more closely and explicitly reevaluate our 
assumptions and knowledge of the often-hidden Other—the Arab, the Semite, the 
Averroes—who stands silently behind Aristotle in the thirteenth century.”
19
 Without 
these other voices, our Western views are impoverished and less than truthful and 
suffers from a self-induced psychosis of cultural xenophobia. Without these other 
views, we delimit what it means to be fully human within a global context. “My own 
conviction is that the men of the East are not essentially different from those of the 
West. In every country one finds the whole gamut of men . . . Civilization is not 
Eastern or Western. It is not located in Washington any more than in Baghdad. It can 
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exist only wherever and whenever there are good men and good women who 
understand it, who know how to use it, and do not abuse it.”
20
  
 I stated in the introduction to this dissertation that my work would be 
moderately revisionist in scope. I still maintain that posture. Revisionism is never 
popular; it involves the “murder” of cherished ideas and ideologies. But in this case, I 
am not presenting a full revisionist history of Western philosophy. I am 
recommending that in addition to the canon of texts we value in the West, we add to 
it, not necessarily delete from it. My research has shown that our Western intellectual 
tradition must allow previously so-called alien forces to be owned as part of our own 
tradition. The ancestry of the West is mixed and colorful. It is diverse and broad. It is 
multicultural and multiethnic. It is inclusive not reclusive or exclusive. “All cultures 
are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, 
extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic.”
21
 We cannot afford to allow 
ourselves to languish in the stupor of cultural amnesia. 
 The next logical step implied by this research is not only to fully embrace our 
past, but to use our historical foundations from which to build our path for future 
intellectual development. Philosophy and education are dynamic activities that must 
capture the imagination of each successive generation to such an extent that they 
become living entities and not simply repeated mantras relevant to past eras. The 
Greek philosophers and philosophies will remain a starting point for these future 
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concerns, but they cannot remain static museum pieces to be studied but not to be 
lived. Philosophical constructs always call for interpretation based in the current 
cultural environment and with a true representation of existing presuppositions. It has 
been true, and will continue to be true that, “for every generation Greece wore a 
different face, and there is no reason to suppose that we have come to the end of its 
potential metamorphoses.”
22
 The active, creative involvement of the current 
intellectual community is the key to a thriving civilization; and a thriving civilization 
is no guarantee, as we have seen in various periods of history along our research path. 
When critical thinking ceases, society dies. Sarton makes the interesting observation, 
“Civilization is not a disease which can be cured; it is a struggle which must be 
fought over and over again. It is never secure. Our freedom, our knowledge, all the 
blessings of our lives, are ours only on probation. We must continue to deserve them 
or else we shall lose them. If we relax, we slide down. The struggle against injustice, 
error, ugliness, poverty is endless.”
23
  
 
7.3 Directions for Further Research  
 
 As this study comes to a conclusion, let me offer, in the form of simple brief 
statements, where this research might profitably continue and where questions or 
issues that have only tangentially been touched might find a fuller arena of 
discussion. 
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• The study and reading of classic Greek philosophy today must be 
immersed in the full historical and cultural context of it precursors, both 
early Greek and especially non-Greek, as well as its history of 
transmission into modern times, including Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Latin, 
and Jewish personalities. A better recognition of the multicultural 
crosscurrents inherent in Western thought is mandatory for future work in 
philosophy of education. What would it mean for us to fully understand 
that “the roots of Western thought are a mixture of Greco-Arabic and 
Hebrew thought”?
24
 
• More attention should be given to the role of Spain in Western studies, and 
its influence as the leading fertile intellectual area of pre-Renaissance 
Europe deserves considerable attention. 
• The history of Islam, its religion and empire, should find a fuller emphasis 
in Western texts and, without exaggeration, be put on a similar status to 
that of the Roman Empire period. 
• Adding encouragement for students to study the Semitic languages of 
Arabic and Hebrew will assist future studies in the background of Western 
thought. 
• I have only mentioned in passing the complex system of Islamic education 
during its reign in the Middle Ages. More directed research about 
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educational constructs in the Middle East and their bearing on later 
Western education would find a bountiful array of insights. 
• Philosophy of education courses and curriculum must find more 
intentional ways to connect Western philosophical/educational history, 
from ancient Greece to Renaissance Europe, in more appropriate and 
authentic terms, filling the “hole in history” that I have pointed to in this 
study. 
• The direct and meaningful inclusion of Arabic philosophers should be 
common in future Philosophy of Education textbooks, with adequate 
exposure and inclusion of their works within the so-called Western canon 
of literature. This would include especially Arab thinkers from the Middle 
Ages but would not preclude modern Arab thought. 
• Perhaps most importantly, a purposeful and ongoing dialogue between 
East and West must become routine in our modern intellectual discourse. 
Educators and philosophers can lead the way in this search for common 
ground and mutual respect as we grow irresistibly into a global 
community.
25
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7.4 Hesperos is Phosphoros 
 
 As the sun sets, the jewel of the sky, the evening star shines brightly above the 
western horizon. As it has since humans first gazed into the heavens, the evening star 
meekly points to the obvious fact that its giant cousin, the life-giving sun, has 
departed for yet another day. But in its own unique brilliance, the evening star sends a 
message of hope that the light slipping away in the West will return to bathe the earth 
again with its radiance. The Greeks gave the evening star the name of one of their 
gods: Hesperos. Later, the Romans renamed all of the Greek gods and Hesperos 
became Vesper in Latin, a word we know in English associated with the time of 
evening. In both of these words, with a simple phonetic substitution of the first letters 
from an H or V to a W, we see the etymological linkage to our English word “west.” 
The West is where the evening star lives.
26
 
 As the Greeks looked at the evening star, toward the West, they thought about 
the lands that lay in that direction from their homeland; lands that today bear the 
names of Italy and Spain. These lands the Greeks sometimes referred to simply as 
Hesperia, the “evening land” or “western land.”  
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 When the Greeks looked to the East in the pre-dawn hours, they would see the 
“the morning star,” which they named Phosphoros, literally, the “torchbearer,” again 
recognizing its role in announcing the soon rising of the sun. As they gazed eastward, 
the lands that lay in that direction filled their minds, lands that today bear the names 
of Iraq and Iran. 
  In the earliest days of Greek civilization, the evening star in the West, 
Hesporos, and the morning star in the East, Phosphoros, were thought to be two 
entirely separate bodies, separated by the widest of heavenly measures. But 
Pythagoras, in the sixth century B.C., was the first to make the amazing discovery— 
that the morning and evening stars were the same “star,” both were actually the planet 
Venus! The East and West stars were not separate entities at all; they were, in fact, 
inseparable. 
The sentence, “Hesperus is Phosphorus,” has been used to indicate the 
correspondence of two items initially considered different or foreign from each other. 
Gottlob Frege used this paradox to illustrate his idea of sense and reference. Saul 
Kripke used the sentence to demonstrate that the knowledge of something necessary 
(in this case an identity) is not always an a priori matter, but could (and in some 
cases, necessarily) be something a posteriori, discoverable by the senses. 
In the context of this dissertation, I will conclude with this same strangely 
sounding truth: “Hesperus is Phosphorus,” West is East. Western philosophical/ 
educational foundations are not alien to Eastern, at least Middle Eastern, ways of 
thinking, historically speaking. The truth is, they are inseparable.
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Appendix A:  
The Philosophical/Educational “Hole in History” in the Western Intellectual Tradition 
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Appendix B:   
Averroes in “The School of Athens”  
 
 
 
 The School of Athens 
(1509-1510) 
by Raphael 
Averroes 
http://mv.vatican.va/3_EN/pages/x-Schede/SDRs/SDRs_03_02_020.html 
  
3
6
2
Appendix C:   
The Hellenistic World  
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~atlas/europe/static/map09.html 
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Appendix D:  
The Extent of the Roman Empire  
http://gbgm-umc.org/umw/corinthians/maps/empiregray.gif 
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Appendix E:  
Chart: Reason vs. Faith 
 
 
The Range of Positions on the Issue of Reason versus Faith 
 
 
1. Reason is the only avenue to knowledge. Logic is a tool for making sure that our thinking about the world around us is 
valid. 
 
2. Reason is the main avenue to knowledge, with faith (in revelations) reserved for non-philosophers. Theology is the 
handmaiden of philosophy. Logic is the key to gaining demonstrative (scientific) knowledge about the universe. 
 
3. Reason and faith are equal in validity, each in its own domain (the “sensible” and the “intelligible” worlds.) Logic is 
useful for placing our beliefs in a tidy order. 
 
4. Faith is the main avenue to knowledge about important issues (God and ethics, for example), with reason reserved for 
learning about “how” and “what” of everyday life. 
 
5. Faith is the only avenue to knowledge: a faithfully accepted revelation may come from outside (a burning bush, for 
example) or from inside (mystical insights, for example). Logic is unnecessary at best, a threat at worst.
1
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Appendix F: 
The Extent of the Islamic Empire 
http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/I_Transp/IO6_Shia.html 
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Appendix G:  
The Re-conquest of Spain  
http://libro.uca.edu/socwar/map1.jpg 
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Appendix H: 
Arabic-Latin Translations 
 
The following list highlights the major Arabic-Latin translators of the 12
th
 -14
th
 centuries. This list does not include the 
Arabic-Hebrew or Arabic-Spanish translators, which are important to the movement of Greek thought into Europe, 
but who lie tangentially to my dissertation. 
 
Adelard of Bath   1116-1142; English, Christian Robert the Englishman c. 1270; English, Christian 
John of Seville   1126-1151; Spanish, Jew  John of Brescia  c. 1263; Italian, Christian 
Domingo Gundisalvo  1126-1151; Spanish, Christian Armenguad, Son of Blaise c. 1290; French, Christian 
Herman the Dalmatian 1138-1145; Croatian, Christian Herman the German  c 1250; German, Christian 
Hugh of Santalla  1119-1151; Spanish, Christian Moses of Palermo  c 1250; Sicilian, Jew 
Robert of Chester  1141-1150; English, Christian Faraj ben Salim  13
th
 century; Sicilian, Jew 
Plato of Tivoli   1133-1150; Italian, Christian  Stephen, Son of Arnold c. 1350, Spanish, Christian 
Stephen of Antioch  c. 1128; Italian, Christian 
Abraham Bar Hiyya  1133-1150; Spanish, Jew       
Gerard of Cremona  1114-1187; Italian, Christian 
Marc of Toledo  1190-1200; Spanish, Christian 
Judah ibn Tibbon  1150-1180; Spanish, Jew 
Alfred of Sareshel  c. 1200; English, Christian 
Michael Scot   c. 1200-1235; Scotch, Christian 
Steven of Saragossa  c. 1230; Spanish, Christian 
Peter Gallego   c. 1230; Spanish, Christian 
Salio of Padua   c. 1240; Spanish, Christian 
William of Lunis  c. 1230; Italian, Christian 
Philip of Tripoli  c. 1233; Syrian, Christian 
Arnold of Villanova  c. 1260; Italian, Christian 
Giovanni Campanus  c. 1260; Italian, Christian 
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Appendix I:  
Pre-Renaissance Europe 
http://www.euratlas.com/big/big1000.htm 
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Appendix J:    
The Journey of Greek Philosophy to the West  
 
Byzantium 
rigidity 
Classical Greek-Roman Tradition: 
Byzantine Empire:  
Western Europe:  
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